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By Henry Cabot Lodge

WAR ADDRESSES, 1915-1917.

SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ESSAYS.

STUDIES IN HISTORY.

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BALLADS AND LYRICS. Edited by HENRY CABOT LODGE.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
BOSTON AND NEW YORK

WAR ADDRESSES

1915–1917

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1915–1917

BY

HENRY CABOT LODGE

Gloucester, 't is true that we are in great danger;
The greater therefore should our courage be.
Henry V, IV, i.

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1917

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Published May 1917

To C. R. R.

In gratitude for devoted and unfailing friendship I dedicate these speeches and addresses, which have been honored by her approval.

HENRY CABOT LODGE

WASHINGTON, *May, 1917*

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I

MEXICO

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, JANUARY 6, 1915

I

MEXICO

The Senate had under consideration the bill (H.R. 20241) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year 1915 and prior years, and for other purposes.

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I desire to thank the Senator from California [Mr. Works] for his kindness in giving way to me to speak briefly on this amendment at this moment. I also appreciate the kindness of the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Overman] in being good enough to allow the bill to go over yesterday in order that I might speak this morning upon the amendment proposed by the Senator from Utah [Mr. Smoot]. I shall try to be as brief as possible.

This amendment, which is purely formal, proposes to strike out the clause supplying the deficiency in the appropriations for the War Department caused by the leasing of transports to take troops to Vera Cruz. It is an honest debt, honestly incurred, and must of course be paid; but I think, Mr. President, it is not amiss at this time and in this connection to review briefly the circumstances which have led to the necessity for this appropriation, and which will lead to the necessity for other appropriations to cover other deficiencies arising from the same source. I wish, in as compact a manner as possible, to call attention to the events in Mexico which have led to these appropriations and to the condition of affairs in Mexico at the present moment.

The great war in Europe has obscured that question, as it has many others, in people's minds. The Mexican situation has been largely pushed aside and forgotten. Although one of the most important transactions in which this country has been engaged in the last two or three years, it seemed so unimportant to the President that he did not even allude to it in his annual message. But, Mr. President, although in comparison with what we are witnessing in Europe it may not be serious, I think that in itself it is extremely grave, and especially so to the United States, whose territory adjoins that of Mexico.

If I may go back for a moment, so that we may get simply the order of events, I would remind the Senate that in the autumn of 1910 the Madero revolution, directed against the long-established Government of President Diaz, began. President Diaz left Mexico City on May 25, 1911, and Francesco Madero, the leader of the successful revolution, arrived there on June 7 of the same year. He took the oath of office as President November 6, 1911.

When the revolution broke out, as every one will recall, President Taft sent an army of twenty thousand men to the border to maintain peace in that region. After Madero had taken the oath and become President *de facto* of Mexico, the disturbances still continuing, President Taft issued a proclamation of neutrality March 2, 1912. On March 14, 1912, Congress passed a resolution giving the President power, when he found that in an American country conditions of domestic violence existed which were promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured in the United States, to forbid the export of such arms or munitions of war, and on the same day President Taft exercised this power and laid an embargo on the export of arms to Mexico.

Mr. President, at the time it seemed to me that the action of Congress was reasonable. I made no opposition to it. I think it was generally agreed to on both sides. But subsequent events in Mexico convinced me of the unwisdom of giving such an authority to the President. The Constitution reserves to Congress the sole right to declare war. To put in the hands of the Executive the opportunity to alter at will neutrality laws which have been in existence more than a hundred years is going far toward impairing the authority of Congress in the great function of declaring war or maintaining peace. We can see how it operated in this case. President Taft imposed an embargo on the export of munitions of war and arms, and it was a direct aid to the Madero Government, which was then facing an insurrection. Then President Wilson, at a later period, lifted the embargo, and that was a direct aid to the insurgents who were opposing the Government of General Huerta. I think this is a power which should not be in the hands of any one man, and I think, moreover, that it is a mistake to subject the Chief Executive to the pressure which the existence of that power in his hands necessarily causes — pressure from one side or the other and from all sorts of influences, which may be sinister or the reverse. The alteration of the neutrality laws is a grave duty which ought to remain in the hands of Congress, which has the sole authority to declare war.

Nevertheless Congress gave the President that authority, and President Taft, as I have said, laid the embargo on the export of arms. The Madero Government was recognized by President Taft. On January 23, 1913, a little less than a year later, Felix Diaz headed a revolution against the Madero Government in Mexico City and attacked the palace. General Huerta, who was in command of the Ma-

dero forces, went over to Diaz and the Madero Government was overthrown. Madero and the Vice-President, Suarez, were arrested by Huerta February 18 and were forced to resign. On February 20 Lascurain was sworn in as Provisional President, and about forty-eight hours later Madero and Suarez were killed. The manner of their death has never been made perfectly clear, but that they were unlawfully killed is, I think, beyond doubt. General Huerta then took over the Government, and in accordance with constitutional forms became Provisional President. This was so near the 4th of March that President Taft took no action in regard to the Huerta Government, feeling that he had not the right to commit his successor on so important a point.

President Wilson came in on the 4th of March, 1913, and on the 26th of that month the revolution headed by Carranza broke out in northern Mexico. Nothing, practically, was done in regard to Mexican affairs until the following summer, when the President sent Mr. Lind as his personal agent to Vera Cruz and subsequently delivered a message to Congress upon the Mexican situation. The instructions to Mr. Lind involved a demand in the nature of an ultimatum upon General Huerta that he should abdicate. It is not usual, Mr. President, in entering into negotiations, even through a personal emissary, no matter how informal the emissary's position may be, to demand of the head of the Government, with whom that emissary is to communicate, that he should abdicate. Such a demand crudely stated laid us open to a telling retort, and that is the reason why the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Mexico was so successful in his reply. General Huerta refused to abdicate and the correspondence to which I have referred ensued.

Mr. President, I was not one of those who was disposed to find fault with the refusal to recognize General Huerta, although there was much to be said in favor of recognition. There were broad international grounds and sound international grounds upon which that refusal could have been based. It was entirely possible to say that General Huerta's Government was unable to maintain international relations, for over a large area of Mexico it exercised no authority. It was possible and proper to say that the recognition might entail the validification of the loans which the Huerta Government was then attempting in Europe, and which would have pledged certain revenues of Mexico, and thus deprived the United States of the opportunity of securing indemnity for injuries to its citizens. But those reasons, Mr. President, were not put forward. The ground on which recognition of Huerta was refused was what was called a moral ground; that he was a man of bad character, who had reached the highest position in Mexico by treacherous and murderous methods. I think it highly probable that his methods were of this description. That is the way supreme power has generally been acquired in Mexico. It has been attained by force and accompanied by acts of violence, which are repellent to every man who believes in the reign of law and in ordered freedom. But when we put our refusal of recognition on the personal ground that the character of the head of the Mexican Government at that time was unsatisfactory to us, to that extent we intervened. We had an absolute right on international grounds to refuse recognition, but when we say to another nation, We object to the man who is at the head of your government or at the head of the only government you have got because he is a person of obnoxious character, we intervene in the affairs of that nation. The

refusal, however, to recognize General Huerta was based upon this ground, and while it undoubtedly embarrassed the Huerta Government, it did not overthrow it. Huerta proved himself contumacious. The President, who disapproved of his methods, as we all disapproved of them, now had added to his feelings a personal resentment because General Huerta had not obeyed the President's demand for his abdication. The President is a man accustomed to obedience, and I can quite understand that he should feel a natural resentment at General Huerta's seeming indifference to his request. But, Mr. President, an animosity is not a policy. The policy of the United States in regard to Mexico, speaking from the international point of view, was to secure as soon as possible the pacification of the country, the reëstablishment of order, the removal of all our many causes of complaint, the security of the lives and property of our own citizens and also of the citizens or subjects of other nations, because other nations, in view of our attitude and of the Monroe Doctrine, declined to intervene and made no suggestion of intervening themselves, and that threw a moral, if not a legal, responsibility upon us. This would have been a worthy national policy, but the business of driving Huerta from power and putting somebody else in his place was not a policy at all. Nevertheless, that was the object to which our Government addressed itself.

Still Huerta continued to hold on. Rumors reached us in the spring of 1914 that he had effected a loan through the Mexican banks of sixty millions and that a large cargo of arms was on its way to him from Germany. At that time, while the indications that the Huerta Government might be established and held in power for at least a year longer were before us, there came what was known as the

Tampico incident. I need not recall it in detail to the Senate. All Senators are familiar with what happened. A boat's crew from one of our warships, flying the American flag, landed perfectly properly for peaceful purposes and were arrested. They were taken to the town hall and released. An apology was offered by the commander and Admiral Mayo demanded a salute to the flag. Our Government took the question from the locality where it had occurred and carried it to the City of Mexico, thus extending its scope and giving it a national character. The Huerta Government declined to give the salute unless they were assured that it would be returned. In those cases which have happened in our own history where a salute has been given it sometimes has been returned and sometimes not. It was on this precise point that we came to blows with the Huerta Government. The President appeared before Congress and delivered his message, and there was submitted from the White House a resolution for Congress to pass which declared that we should give the President power to take proper steps against Victoriano Huerta, naming him, which shows, as I have said, that the whole purpose was the removal of Huerta.

That resolution was passed by a genial and compliant House, but the Senate was unwilling to put the United States in the attitude of taking a step, which might very well mean a general war with Mexico, by declaring war against an individual by name. The United States in war with Victoriano Huerta did not commend itself to the Senate as a title for our action. So the name of General Huerta disappeared from the resolution. This side of the Chamber thought that, if we were to take this very serious step, it was proper to put it on the broad international ground of protection to American citizens, to their rights,

to their lives, to their property, rather than on the narrow ground of the actions of one man who happened to be at the moment President *de facto* of Mexico. Our proposition of amendment in this sense was voted down. All efforts to get any recognition of the wrongs to American citizens were voted down. An amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. La Follette] pledging this Government against the acquisition of Mexican territory was voted down, and the resolution which in fact, though not actually by name, put the United States into war with Victoriano Huerta was passed.

While it was passing our forces had gone to Vera Cruz, where there was no American property in danger, where nothing had occurred, in order to secure reparation for something that had happened at Tampico. The resolution passed to the sound of the guns. We lost nineteen men killed, and, I think, altogether there were one hundred and twenty killed and wounded. Several hundred Mexicans were also killed and wounded. There apparently was an idea in the President's mind that there would be no resistance to our taking Vera Cruz. I said in speaking that day, not knowing at the time what information the President had received, that we might look for resistance as a matter of course at Vera Cruz, and it came even while I was uttering the words. He had been told, I afterwards heard, that there would be no resistance and that we would peacefully take Vera Cruz. That is only a sample of the manner in which his agents subtracted from the sum of human information when they reported to him. But after the bloodshed in the taking of Vera Cruz it seemed to the onlooker that the Administration were very much disturbed. They did not appear to have much stomach for the unexpected fight which had arisen, and took shelter

under the Niagara Conference, a conference which never could have had any result, because, although the United States and Huerta sent representatives to it, the other party in Mexico sent none, and were not compelled by our Government to send any. However, the conference enabled us to escape further fighting, and for that we may be duly grateful.

Mr. President, the object for which we sent those ships and troops to Vera Cruz was to get reparation for the insult to the flag, and the reason for the great celerity demanded in dealing with the resolution in Congress was to stop the landing of a cargo of arms. I do not know what has become of the reparation for the insult to the flag; if it has been made, I have never heard of it. My own impression is that it has been forgotten. The ship that brought the cargo of arms from Germany, which was then selling arms to belligerents, was named the Ypiranga. She arrived, I think, the day after our occupation of Vera Cruz. We could not exclude her by a peaceful blockade; if we had made a general blockade, it would have been an act of war; and we were not to be at war. Therefore, the Ypiranga having come there, the only way she could land her cargo was by getting permission from us, as the possessors of the port, to do so. That permission, naturally, we did not give. Admiral Badger — I think he was in command at the time — telegraphed to Washington to ask if he should give clearance — the vessel was obliged to get clearance from us — to the Ypiranga. The clearance was given. She went to some American port — Mobile, I think, though I am not perfectly certain; but it does not matter — stayed there a few days, sailed again, and landed her entire cargo of arms at Puerto Mexico, which was in control of the Huerta forces. The arms

were taken up on the Tehuantepec Railroad to the City of Mexico and delivered. So we did not stop the landing of that cargo by our expedition to Vera Cruz. We neither got reparation to the flag, nor did we stop the delivery of arms to Huerta. In its avowed purposes the Vera Cruz adventure was not very successful. But President Wilson, just about that time, took off the embargo on arms. That, of course, was a real help to the insurgents, with whom we were more or less involved as allies. The insurgents had no port; they could not import arms; but they could bring them over the border when the embargo was raised, because at that time we were selling arms to belligerents without objection from anybody. The Secretary of War, however, with a wisdom and a courage which cannot be too highly commended, insisted, for military reasons, that no arms should be carried across the border. A military order to that effect was made. That left Villa and Carranza in an awkward position, without a port, and it became of very great importance to the Administration that they should have a port.

Then ensued the second Tampico incident. Our ships were withdrawn and placed nine miles away, on the ground that if they were near the town it might cause trouble. My own impression is that they would have saved us from trouble. We had freely caused trouble and bloodshed at Vera Cruz, but we seemed strangely unwilling even to run the risk of trouble at Tampico. So the ships were withdrawn. At Tampico there were American citizens in the immediate neighborhood to be protected, and also American property, especially in the oil fields. The people employed in the oil fields after the withdrawal of our ships, alarmed by the advance of the insurgents, hurried to Tampico, to find themselves without any protection and in danger of a mas-

sacre from the Huerta troops and the population still in the city. That massacre and assault were prevented was due to the action of the commanders of the German and British ships which were lying there. Those refugees, to the number of twenty-one hundred, as I recall, thirteen hundred of whom were Americans and eight hundred the citizens or subjects of other powers, were taken on board the British and German cruisers. Our ships were lying nine miles away. This method of saving American lives did not, I think, gratify the feelings of the American people. The admiral in command, when he received the order to withdraw, was so astounded by it that he declined to act unless the order was repeated; and the order of withdrawal was thereupon reiterated. Our action at Tampico in withdrawing our ships was due to the fact that unless the insurgents secured Tampico they could not get arms, and lifting the embargo would have been of no advantage to them. It was, therefore, of great importance to the movement against Huerta that the insurgents should be able to procure arms and munitions of war. They took Tampico, and they did it to secure the arms.

Mr. President, having got thus far, although we had failed in our alleged objects at Vera Cruz, the interposition at that point and our help to the insurgents in securing Tampico were sufficient to bring about the fall of the Huerta Government. The object of the President had been accomplished, but the interests and the true policy of the United States had not been advanced one step. It seemed impossible to induce any one connected with the Administration to consider what was to happen after Huerta had been driven from power. When he was driven from power it became painfully obvious that no consideration whatever had been given to this point. The whole course of

the Administration was owing to the fact that they absolutely declined from the beginning to recognize the character of the Mexican population. It was not our business, however desirable it might be, to undertake to give Mexico new land laws or to choose a President for her. We had no protectorate over Mexico, and to regulate her internal affairs would have been intervening in the affairs of another country; but it was of the utmost importance that in our policy toward that country we should not forget of what the population consisted — fifty per cent and more pure-blood Indians, some of them in a wild state; thirty per cent of half-breeds, and perhaps twenty per cent of pure Spanish blood, the descendants of the old Spanish conquerors. To suppose, with a population like this, with the history of Mexico, which apparently nobody in the Administration took the trouble to read, that you could build up a government there, at a moment's notice, such as we have, let us say, in the State of Nebraska, that with those foundations you could erect an American government on American principles, was a dream. When Huerta fell from power the result of this refusal to face facts was seen.

What has been the condition of Mexico since? As everybody who has taken the trouble to study Mexican history and to inform himself expected, the first result was that our two allies, Villa and Carranza, fell to fighting each other. It required no great intelligence to predict that such would have been the case. We did not hear so much of Carranza when we were his ally, but we can all remember how popular Villa was in certain quarters. When I ventured to have read into the Record a sketch of that eminent person's life it was resented, and a defence, said to have been prepared in the State Department, was made of Villa's character. It was currently

rumored that it was felt in the highest quarters that he must be a good man because he neither drank nor smoked. It is not apparent that these premises were correct, for I am told by other persons competent to know, such as the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Fall], that he is guilty of both drinking and smoking; but even assuming that he does not indulge in those particular vices, was it not a hasty inference that he was therefore a good man in the international sense and devoid of murderous tendencies? A mad dog neither drinks nor smokes, but it would be rash to conclude that he was therefore a safe and pleasant companion. At all events, it may be admitted that Villa seems to have been the one man in Mexico who has distinct military capacity.

As I have said, after we drove Huerta out, Villa and Carranza fell to fighting with each other, and look at Mexico to-day. It is a chaos of fighting factions, the prey of banditti, with predatory bands riding through the country. The social organization has collapsed, and anarchy is a polite word to apply to the condition of things.

Mr. President, I fear that it is now too late to adopt any policy which would be effective there except a complete military occupation of the country at great cost, which all of us wish to avoid, but it is certain that when the Mexican question was first presented to us there were but two possible policies. I am speaking now of policies and not of personal animosities. One policy was to begin by exerting all the power and influence we had under international law and under treaties and in accordance with the comity of nations to stop outrages, to prevent wrongs, and to try to bring about pacification. This was never effectively attempted, but that is the way we should have begun, and then, in line with the policy of avoiding

war at all hazards, we should have refrained from any intervention beyond the efforts warranted by international law.

The other course was to enter Mexico in sufficient force to take possession of and pacify the country and try to establish a government there which would have the capacity of fulfilling its international obligations and at least maintain order. To that course the United States was opposed, and quite naturally and rightly; but the course we did pursue was neither one nor the other. It combined with singular dexterity the evils of both and the advantages of neither. We did not stay out and we did not go in effectively. I should be sorry to shed the blood of a single American soldier or sailor for the sake of restoring order in Mexico, but nothing, it seems to me, can possibly justify shedding the blood of a single American soldier or sailor for the sake of putting one blood-stained Mexican in the place occupied by another. We have our reward for what we have done in the condition of Mexico to-day.

There was American property in Mexico to an enormous amount. I am told there was a billion dollars of American capital invested in Mexico — certainly many hundreds of millions. It is practically all gone. More capital, which is nothing but the savings of the American people, has been lost in Mexico in the last few years, many times over, than has been lost by the unfortunate interferences with our foreign trade which have occurred in the last few months. I was informed by gentlemen with property interests in Mexico, who came here representing many Americans employed and large American capital invested, that they were told substantially at the State Department, "We are not concerned about

American property in Mexico; Americans who invest in property in foreign countries must not look to this Government to protect them." That was to me a new doctrine in international law, and I think it is a novel one to everybody. I am glad to see, Mr. President, that the indifference to American property in Mexico has not extended, so far as the use of language is concerned, to American property on the high seas. I cling to the old notion that American property on the high seas and in foreign countries, when the owners of that property live in accordance with the laws of the countries in which the property is placed, is entitled to our regard and to the active protection of this Government. That protection has not been given in Mexico, and, what is far worse, between one hundred and fifty and two hundred American lives have been lost in Mexico. If there has been any redress secured, or even demanded, I do not know it, for a veil of secrecy has been drawn over our Mexican proceedings, and the inquiries of the Senate in regard to them have thus far been in vain.

Americans have been killed there within a short time. I understand that fifty-two people have been killed and wounded by Mexican bullets across the line at Naco. It is said that General Bliss announced that if there was any more shooting across the line he would stop it. There was more shooting, and I am sorry to say that he did not stop it. Knowing him as I do, I think that he may have been prevented from stopping it. There before us is that dismal record of American lives lost, and now, with irresponsible bands roaming over the country, with no government, look at the City of Mexico. One of the presidents has set up a guillotine there, and has been executing the supporters of Huerta, reminding one of the scenes of the

French Revolution, but unfortunately without that which was behind the French Revolution, a strong population, with traditions and institutions which were certain to reassert their power, as we know they did. Those securities for the future have perished in Mexico, and bloodshed goes on unchecked in the capital of the country.

It has gone further than that. These bandits have been turned loose and have thrown themselves upon the most helpless class — upon the women, upon the priests, and upon the nuns. It is a revolting story, unfortunately only too well authenticated. Father Tierney, of New York City, one of the best known and most distinguished of his order, when he went to the State Department to ask for our good offices to prevent these outrages upon his co-religionists, has stated publicly that it was said to him, in the presence of two friends, that the followers of Huerta had committed similar outrages on two American women from Iowa. What a reply to make! Certainly every dictate of humanity would lead us to do what we could to save those unfortunate men and women who have been the helpless victims of these half-wild Indian soldiers; and the reply is that Huerta's troops were guilty of two cases of similar outrages on American women! What has been done about that? There was an affront, indeed. In the reasons for the excursion to Vera Cruz it did not appear. I have no intention of doing otherwise than vote for this deficiency bill and for the others which are to follow. The Secretary of War has done his duty; but I cannot let the matter go by, Mr. President, without thus calling attention to what has happened in Mexico; without saying that, in my opinion, even in the midst of the dreadful disasters to humanity and civilization which are now filling Europe and the world, we should not forget what has taken place and is now going

on in Mexico — a situation so bad that when the President of the United States delivered his annual message to Congress the best way in which he could deal with it was by complete silence.

II

FORCE AND PEACE

CHANCELLOR'S ADDRESS DELIVERED AT COMMENCEMENT, UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, JUNE 9, 1915

II

FORCE AND PEACE

In the general Commination service to which Carlyle devoted so much time and space he always found opportunity to hymn the praise of the strong, silent man who looked facts in the face. Very characteristically he dismissed with a sneer the most silent, perhaps, of all great men, one certainly who looked at the many hostile facts which he encountered in life with a steady gaze, undimmed by illusions, to a degree rarely equalled. I do not mean by this that Washington never spoke, never in speech or writing uttered his thoughts. Many volumes attest the supreme sufficiency of his dealings with all the crowding questions of war and peace which in such victorious manner he met and answered. But there was one subject upon which he held his peace, and that was himself. I once searched every line of his writings which have been printed, as well as those of his contemporaries, and all that could be found in regard to the man himself were a few sentences of his own capable of an inference, and elsewhere some stray anecdotes. We have his opinions, frank and free, on all the transactions of his life, but nothing about himself. There silence reigns, and hence he may be called in the truest sense the most silent of the great men of modern times. A very noble quality this, worthy of consideration in any age and especially in an age of much delivery of personal feelings and much self-advertising

where publication is easy and passing notoriety extremely cheap. From the many necessary words, however, written and spoken by this most silent man upon all the far-reaching business of his life and about the world of men and things which he touched at so many points, there emerge, very luminous and distinct, an unfailing power of looking facts, whether favorable or unfavorable, in the face, a fine freedom from illusions and complete refusal to admit self-deception or to attempt the deception of others. In these days when the readiness to accept words for deeds, language for action, and a false or maudlin sentimentality for true sentiment, one of the noblest and purest of human motives, — when, I repeat, the cheerful acceptance of these unrealities seems at least to be extremely prevalent, such veracity of mind and character as that possessed by Washington would appear more than usually worthy of contemplation and imitation.

I am well aware that in saying this I lay myself open to the familiar charge of having nothing to suggest but an effort to make ourselves resemble

> "Some of the simple great ones gone
> Forever and ever by."

I can hear the well-worn accusation, coming from earnest and intelligent youth, that I am incapable of a new idea. Alas, it must be confessed that any man who has passed middle life would be dull indeed if he was not painfully aware of his incapacity in many directions. He knows that it is to youth he must look for the energy and faith which will keep the waters moving and save the world from stagnation. Whether it is hopeful, happy youth which cries out in the charming words of Miranda, —

> "How beautiful mankind is! O Brave, new world!
> That has such people in 't":

or Emerson's "fine, young Oxford gentleman" who declares, —

> "There 's nothing new and nothing true and no matter";

or earnest youth, serious and sad, which, bending under the sense of responsibility, says with Hamlet, —

> "The time is out of joint; O cursed spite,
> That ever I was born to set it right";

all alike are interesting and attractive and awaken a melancholy envy in the breasts of those who have passed through the early shining years which to them are never to return. How keenly do we long to have all those fascinating attributes of the young and wise, to behold again all the fair visions of the morning of life. How we wish we could possess once more, whether as optimists, pessimists, or cynics, the finality, the completeness of judgment, the certainty of decision, the unfaltering condemnation of all who seem to differ with us in which we rejoiced in the days when the limits of life were hidden in the mists of the future. There are no compensations for such losses as these, but the unsparing years bring at least their lessons, for they are the most effective if the most severe teachers to all who cannot avoid thought. He whose mournful incapacity for the production of new ideas has come sharply home to him, has the added pang of knowing how eagerly he thirsts for those new ideas from others and how much his ability to recognize an old idea has been developed and increased. Setting aside the endless inventions and discoveries of science, he becomes aware of the extreme rarity of really new ideas in all that concerns society and government or the relation of men to each other. He takes up the book of intelligent and earnest youth in which the world is to be set right, and after receiving the Rhad-

amanthine sentence upon himself and his coevals, a sentence from which there is no appeal, he sets out with the hope that springs eternal to find the new ideas for which he hungers and which will solve the problems which have for so long pained and troubled him. He reads the book, clever, confident, often ingenious, not marked by a sense of humor, which is an older quality, but sure of everything and splendidly condemnatory of all differences of opinion. Then he lays it down with a sigh of disappointment. The ideas, however tricked out and newly dressed, are old friends with whom he has much more than a bowing acquaintance. They may be new to the writer; they are old to the reader who has had the misfortune to live longer. So the reader, as so often before, tries to be philosophical and begins to reflect upon the alleviations for his disappointment. In relation to society and government it may be repeated that new ideas are rare; in regard to the latter, perhaps not more than two really large and new ideas have been developed in as many millenniums. Has not all progress, moreover, been attained chiefly by the energy of youth in striving to apply old ideas to changed environments and new conditions? There is comfort in the thought. The only suggestion to be made is that an ardent zeal to reform the world need not necessarily be accompanied by an entire recklessness in dealing with existing arrangements which have slowly been evolved and which represent the thoughts and hopes of mankind to which they have been adapted. It would seem that in making changes and what we believe to be advances by the application of old ideas to altered facts, we should do well to remember that the prime factor in our many problems is human nature and that human nature, after all, is very permanent. I do not mean permanent in terms of the

universe, which we have reason to think is never at rest, but permanent relatively within the very contracted limits of man's recorded history. This, by the way, is not a new idea. The best known of Roman poets wrote nearly two thousand years ago, —

> "Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret,"

and the thought, if ne'er so well expressed, was probably some thousands of years old when Horace wrote it down. Setting aside differences of place and time, which are largely superficial and perishable, there is nothing within our knowledge at once so uniform, so widely distributed and so unchanging, as human nature in its broad outlines and fundamental qualities.

A brilliant French critic has said that two great emotions have governed mankind and made his history — love and greed; the one as beautiful as the other is unlovely and potent. Whether these are the only ruling passions need not be discussed, but they certainly are examples of two at least of the enduring elements in human nature. The young voices murmuring under the shadows of the great Pyramid in the days of Chefren, —

> "the whispers
> Of plighted youth and maid,
> In April's ivory moonlight
> Beneath the chestnut shade," —

so beloved, we are told, of Venus, did not differ in essence from the words and vows interchanged by maidens and youths in appropriate circumstances under our own superior and more refined civilization. We may also be sure that selfishness has always been an attribute of human nature. I note this here because nations of whose affairs and relations I am about to speak are but aggregations of human beings, and therefore selfishness is their attribute

also; but with this important difference, that in masses of men it is almost never controlled or conquered by the nobler emotions as it is constantly and very splendidly in the individual man.

So it is that when we come to attempting changes in society or government, it is well to remember that the prime condition of our problem, human nature, is a permanent one, and that the past, therefore, whether our guiding idea is most improbably new or is an old idea with a new adjustment, may possibly furnish some useful hints as to the method and outcome of such changes. I know by heart the reply to this suggestion: "Oh, that is all very well, but all these things happened a long time ago and everything is different now." As an objection, this, if I may venture to say so, has never appeared to me quite conclusive. The Ten Commandments happened a long time ago, but that does not seem to justify us in not inculcating them to-day. It is nearly two thousand years since the beautiful and immortal teachings of the New Testament were given to mankind, but no one, I imagine, would suggest that for that reason they should be laid aside. The Epistles of St. Paul, the dialogues of Socrates, the writings and discourses of Plato and Aristotle are all old as finite man computes time, but I should be sorry to dismiss them or refuse to consider them because of their age. The writings of these men dealt with what was most lasting in human nature, with right and wrong, with good and evil, with the highest morals, with things spiritual and things of this world. These thoughts were ancient at their birth and never have grown old. They are always old and always new. So it is with great men, the chosen exemplars of the race of man. Some of them at least have shown qualities which we may do well to study and imi-

tate, which it might be wise to apply to our own problems as they applied them to theirs. Thus, after a long circuit, I come back to where I began. We, most fortunate, have one of these great men, who was also a good man, a very shining figure in the forefront of our nation's life. He dealt with life on a very large scale with high and rare success. One of his most salient qualities was the power of seeing facts just as they existed, without fear or favor, and therefore of meeting them with clear veracity of purpose and with all the strength of mind which had been granted him.

A great quality this, a great power, always much needed, as I have said, in our daily life here in the United States, but more particularly demanded at this present moment when the world is facing one portentous and awful fact which has excluded almost everything else from the thoughts of men. For nearly a year that fact has been with us in the form of the most desolating and destructive war which has ever afflicted mankind. In this country, far removed from the scene of strife, with its daily existence flowing on untroubled, with its habits of life unbroken, untouched except in trade and commerce and its monetary interests by the war, the great conflict is none the less ever present in our minds. Its dark shadow falls across the pathway which from day to day is trodden by each one of us. We wake in the morning with that vague sense of trouble which anxiety brings and which defines itself in sharp outline as the merciful oblivion of sleep passes away. Like a personal sorrow there comes between our eyes and the page we read, or the sheet of paper on which we write, a vision of fighting men and blood-stained trenches, of women and children homeless, outraged, mutilated, dead; of the houses of God and man

shattered into hideous ruin. Our sympathies have been awakened as never before and have manifested themselves in a generous aid to the suffering across the ocean to a degree never shown by a neutral nation in all the recorded wars of history. To the unhappy and innocent people of Belgium, who in the twinkling of an eye have been deprived of a country and have found themselves cast forth, penniless wanderers upon the earth, we have held out our hands to lift them up with a generous kindness which will always be one of the best memories of the American people. If such has been the effect upon us, far distant, sheltered in our neutrality, how infinitely greater has been the effect upon the nations engaged in war and throughout those wide regions of Europe which for months have resounded with the clash of arms, and where the air has been rent by the thunder of cannon and darkened by the dust and smoke of ruined towns and desolated farms. In the presence of that vast struggle the interests, the habits of the life which seemed so permanent, have disappeared. The fantastic growths in art which absorbed the public attention and sought to make eccentricity pass for originality, the sexual novel, the effort to make us believe that clinical lectures and medical reports were drama, with much else of imaginary importance, have withered in Europe before the fierce heat of the struggle of nations for life. The veils of what we call civilization have been torn away. Those conventions — which are merely its manifestations, but which we are wont to mistake for fundamental principles — have been flung aside. An unrelenting, a grim reality stares us in the face. If we are to learn anything from it, if we are to do anything to prevent its return, we must first look at it with steady eyes and see just what it is. I am not concerned here with the

rights or wrongs, with the guilt or the innocence of those engaged in the war, nor by reality do I mean the horrors of war. Every man and woman who can think knows what those horrors are. Death, destruction, physical anguish, sorrow, misery, have been before our eyes for months. The vocabulary has been worn out in describing them. There is no need of repeating more exhausted words when all words are vain. What we need to look at is the great dominant fact which stands out in the midst of all the horrors and all the fighting. I read a letter not long since from a young French officer who said that the one thing which filled his mind was not the daily danger and the constant suffering, but the return of all about him, on both sides, to the condition of primitive man. In a few weeks they had crossed all the evolution of centuries with its slow upbuilding of civilization and returned to the state of mind which was of immemorial antiquity when the little space covered by our recorded history began. If we pause to think, although we ourselves are not engaged in the struggle, we shall realize that we have felt

> "That jar of our earth, that dull shock
> When the ploughshare of deeper passion
> Tears down to our primitive rock."

And now what is it that is disclosed? We can put it all into a sentence. What we see is unchained physical force multiplied beyond computation by all the inventions and discoveries of an unresting science, as potent in destruction as it is in beneficence.

How is such a use of physical force, unlimited in its power, terrible in its consequences, to be avoided? How is peace to be established and maintained hereafter among the nations of the earth? One thing is certain, it cannot

be done by words. Nothing will be accomplished by people who are sheltered under neutrality gathering outside the edges of the fight and from comfortable safety summoning the combatants to throw down their arms and make peace because war is filled with horrors and women are the mothers of men. The nations and the men now fighting, as they believe, for their lives and freedom and national existence know all this better than any one else, and would heed such babble, if they heard it, no more than the twittering of birds. In our Civil War, when we were fighting for our national life, England and France and other outsiders were not slow in telling us that the Union could not be saved, that the useless carnage ought to cease, that peace must be made at once. Except as an irritating impertinence we regarded such advice as of no more consequence than the squeaking of mice behind the wainscot when fire has seized upon the house. Neither present peace, nor established peace in the future for which we hope, is helped by fervent conversation among ourselves about the beauties of peace and the horrors of war, interspersed with virtuous exhortations to others, who are passing through the valley of the shadow, to give up all they are fighting for and accept the instructions of bystanders who are daring and sacrificing nothing and who have nothing directly at stake. Peace will not come in this way by vain shoutings nor by mere loudness in shrieking uncontested truths to a weary world. No men or women possessed of ordinary sense or human sympathies need arguments to convince them that peace among nations is a great good, to be sought for with all their strength, but the establishment and maintenance of peace cannot be accomplished by language proclaiming the virtues of peace and demonstrating the horrors of war. The many excellent people who may be described as habit-

ual if not professional advocates of peace appear to be satisfied with making and listening to speeches about it. They seem to think great advances are made if we put our official names to a series of perfectly empty and foolish agreements which it is charitable to describe as harmless follies, for they weaken and discredit every real treaty which seeks to promote international good-will and settle international differences. They are so vain and worthless that, when the hour of stress came, no one would think it worth while even to tear them up. Treaty agreements looking to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and which can be carried out, are valuable to the extent to which they go, but treaty agreements which go beyond the point of practical enforcement, which are not meant to be enforced, and which have neither a sense of obligation nor force to sustain that obligation behind them, are simply injurious. If we are to secure our own peace and do our part toward the maintenance of world peace, we must put rhetoric, whether in speech or on paper, aside. We must decline to be satisfied with illusions. We must refuse to deceive ourselves or others. We must pass by mere words and vague shows, and come clear-eyed to the facts and the realities. The dominant fact to-day, I repeat, is the physical force now unchained in this great war. Some people seem to think that if you can abolish force and the instruments of force you can put an end to the possibilities of war. Let us for a moment go to the roots of existing things. Let us make the last analysis.

When I was a very young man I saw a large part of my native city swept away by fire in a single night. The calamity brought with it an enormous destruction of property, of the accumulated savings of years and much consequent suffering, both direct and indirect. What was the

cause of this destruction and suffering? There was only one — fire. Not fire from the heaven above or the earth beneath, but fire produced and used by man, set loose without control. The abolition of fire would undoubtedly have prevented a repetition of this disaster, but no one suggested it. The impossibility of attempting to stop the destruction of life and property through fire by abolishing fire itself was as apparent as its absurdity. Somewhere in the dim, unwritten history of man upon earth a great genius, perhaps several great geniuses, discovered the production and control of fire. In the earliest traces of man there is, I think, as yet no proof of his existence without fire, and yet we know that at some period he must have discovered its production and control. Even when we come to the little fragment of time covered by man's recorded history, we find that the thought of the production and control of fire as the greatest of discoveries still lingered in the human mind and found its expression in symbolism of the beautiful Promethean myth. Fire, therefore, has probably been with man as his servant for a period which could only be expressed in the vast terms of geology. In large measure, society and civilization rest upon the use of fire. Without it, great spaces of the earth's surface would become not only useless to man but uninhabitable. Without it, the huge and intricate fabric of modern civilization in its present form would not exist. Therefore, no argument is needed to convince men that the miseries and misfortunes caused by uncontrolled fire cannot be escaped by the abolition of fire itself. Relief must be sought, not in abolition, but in a better and wiser control which will render it difficult at least for man's best servant at any time to become his master. It is unchained force, with the dread accompaniments of science, which is to-day destroying life

and limb, happiness, industry, property, and the joys and beauties of the art and devotion of the dead centuries. Is the terrible problem here presented to be solved by the abolition of the physical force possessed by nations? Go back again to the dark beginnings and study the comparatively few years, eight or ten thousand at the outside, of which we may be said to have a record.

In the dim light of that remote dawn we see men engaged in an unending conflict with the forces of nature, struggling with the wilderness, with wild beasts, with heat and cold, and continually fighting with each other. Gradually they emerge in tribes with leaders, and then come states, communities, kingdoms, empires. But among all these confused events which make up history we find, I think, that the one fact which marks the development of every organized society, whether rude or complicated, of every political entity, whether great or small, is the substitution of the will of the community and the protection of the community for the will of the individual and for the self-protection which each man naturally exercises. The one unfailing mark of what, for lack of a better word, we call civilization, is this substitution of the force of the community, embodied in law and administered by what we describe as government, for the uncontrolled sporadic force of each individual member of the community. Wherever man is left to his own protection and his own defence, there is nothing possible but personal fighting and general anarchy. The man possessed of the greatest physical force and the most effective weapons is the best protected. About him others gather and submit to his leadership and give him their support in return for his protection. Then we have the predatory band which found its highest expression in the feudal system. Grad-

ually one band or lordship conquers or unites with itself other bands, and they establish control over a certain territory; a state emerges, and the process is repeated on a larger scale by the conquest or union of other states. Physical is supplemented by intellectual force and we have at last the kingdom, the great republic, or the mighty empire. But under it all lies the replacement of the scattered force of the individual by the consolidated force of the community, and power, order, commerce, art, and peace rest in the last analysis upon the force of the community expressed in government of some sort, such government being merely its instrument and manifestation. You may carry your inquiry across the whole range of history and over the earliest human societies of which we have knowledge to the vigilance committees of the Far West and you will find that law, order, and peace were brought about by men coming together and exercising the united force of the community, great or small, in order to put an end to the chaos and disorders of uncontrolled force exercised by each individual. When the civilization and the society reach a high point of organization, the underlying force upon which the entire social and political fabric rests is exerted and is often effective through what may be called merely a symbol. The longest period of general peace covering a large region of the earth of which we have knowledge in historic times was probably that of the Roman Empire, which endured for some three centuries. There was fighting on the widely extended frontiers at intervals diminishing in length as the end approached. After the decline began there were internal wars also at intervals with the imperial purple as the prize, but on the whole through the first three centuries of our era the general condition of

the Roman Empire and throughout most of its extent was one of peace. That time is still referred to as the period of the Pax Romana.

In his romance of the "Last Days of Pompeii," Bulwer makes a dramatic point of the Roman sentry motionless at his post while the darkness and the flame and the burning flood were rushing down upon the doomed city. That solitary sentry was the symbol of the force of the Roman Empire. Peace, order, and law reigned throughout all western Europe, but it was the gleam upon the sword and corslet of the Roman legionary which made men realize that behind that law and peace and order was the irresistible force of the Empire of Rome. Let me take a more homely illustration. We have all seen in London and New York police officers stationed at points where the traffic is densest regulating and guiding its movement by merely raising one hand. They would be perfectly incapable of stopping the vehicles carrying on that traffic, by their own physical force. It could pass over them and destroy them in a moment, and yet it is all governed by the gesture of one man. The reason is simple; the policeman is the symbol of the force of the community against which no individual force can prevail, and of this the great mass of individuals are thoroughly if unconsciously aware. Law is the written will of the community. The constable, the policeman, the soldier, is the symbol of the force which gives sanction to law and without which it would be worthless. Abolish the force which maintains order in every village, town, and city in the civilized world and you would not have peace — you would have riot, anarchy, and destruction; the criminal, the violent and the reckless would dominate until the men of order and the lovers of peace united and restored the force of the community which

had been swept away. It is all obvious enough, it all rests on human nature, and if there was not somewhere an organized force which belonged to the whole community there would be neither peace nor order anywhere. No one has suggested, not even the most ardent advocates of peace, that the police of our cities should be abolished on the theory that an organization of armed men whose duty it is to maintain order, even if they are compelled often to wound and sometimes to kill for that purpose, are by their mere existence an incitement to crime and violence. If order, peace, and civilization in a town, city, or state, rest, as they do rest in the last analysis, upon force, upon what does the peace of a nation depend? It must depend, and it can only depend, upon the ability of the nation to maintain and defend its own peace at home and abroad. Turn to the Constitution of the United States. In the brief preamble one of the chief purposes of the Constitution is set down as provision for the "common defence." In the grant of powers to Congress one of the first powers conferred is to provide for the "common defence of the United States." For this purpose they are given specific powers: to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to provide for calling forth the militia, suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions. The States are forbidden to engage in war unless actually invaded, and the United States is bound to protect each of them against invasion and, on their request, to protect them also against domestic violence. In other words, the Constitution provides for the maintenance of order at home and peace abroad through the physical force of the United States. The conception of the Constitution is that domestic order as well as peace with other nations rests upon the force of the nation. Of the soundness of this proposition

there can be no doubt, I think, in the mind of any reasonable man. This obvious principle embodied in the Constitution and recognized by every organized government in the world is too often overlooked at the present moment in the clamor against armament. The people who urge the disarmament of one nation in an armed world confuse armament and preparation with the actual power upon which peace depends. They take the manifestation for the cause. Armament is merely the instrument by which the force of the community is manifested and made effective, just as the policeman is the manifestation of the force of the municipal community upon which local order rests. The fact that armies and navies are used in war does not make them the cause of war, any more than maintaining a fire in a grate to prevent the dwellers in the house from suffering from cold warrants the abolition of fire because where fire gets beyond control it is a destructive agent. Alexander the Great was bent on conquest, and he created the best army in the world at that time, not to preserve the peace of Macedonia, but for the purpose of conquering other nations, to which purpose he applied his instrument. The wars which followed were not due to the Macedonian phalanx, but to Alexander. The good or the evil of national armament depends, not on its existence or its size, but upon the purpose for which it is created and maintained. Great military and naval forces created for purposes of conquest are used in the war which the desire of conquest causes. They do not in themselves cause war. Armies and navies organized to maintain peace serve the ends of peace because there is no such incentive to war as a rich, undefended, and helpless country, which by its condition invites aggression. The grave objections to overwhelming and exhausting armaments are economic. A gen-

eral reduction of armaments is not only desirable, but is something to be sought for with the utmost earnestness. But for one nation to disarm and leave itself defenceless in an armed world is a direct incentive and invitation to war. The danger to the peace of the world, then, lies not in armament, which is a manifestation, but in the purposes for which the armament was created. A knife is frequently dangerous to human life, but there would be no sense in abolishing knives, because the danger depends solely on the purpose or passion of the individual in whose hand the knife is and not upon the fact that the knife exists. The peace of a nation depends in the last resort, like domestic order, upon the force of the community and upon the ability of the community to maintain peace, assuming that the nation lives up to its obligations, seeks no conquest, and wishes only to be able to repel aggression and invasion. If a nation fulfils strictly all its international obligations and seeks no conquest and has no desire to wrong any other nation, great or small, the danger of war can come only through the aggression of others, and that aggression will never be made if it is known that the peace-loving nation is ready to repel it. The first step, then, toward the maintenance of peace is for each nation to maintain its peace with the rest of the world by its own honorable and right conduct and by such organization and preparation as will enable it to defend its peace.

This should be our policy. We should show the world that democracy, government by the people, makes for peace, in contrast to the government of a military autocracy which makes for war. We should demonstrate this by our own conduct, by justice in our dealings with other nations, by readiness to make any sacrifices for the right and stern refusal to do wrong; by deeds, not words, and

finally by making the whole world understand that while we seek no conquests we are able to repel any aggression or invasion from without for the very reason that we love peace and mean to maintain it. We should never forget that if democracy is not both able and ready to defend itself, it will go down in subjection before military autocracy because the latter is then the more efficient. We must bear constantly in mind that from the conflict which now convulses the world there may possibly come events which would force us to fight with all our strength to preserve our freedom, our democracy, and our national life. But this concerns ourselves and will have only the slow-moving influence of example. What can be done now? What can we do in the larger sense toward securing and maintaining the peace of the world? This is a much more difficult question, but turn it back and forth as we may there is no escape from the proposition that the peace of the world can be maintained only, as the peace and order of a single community are maintained, as the peace of a single nation is maintained, by the force which united nations are willing to put behind the peace and order of the world. Nations must unite as men unite in order to preserve peace and order. The great nations must be so united as to be able to say to any single country, you must not go to war, and they can only say that effectively when the country desiring war knows that the force which the united nations place behind peace is irresistible. We have done something in advancing the settlement by arbitration of many minor questions which in former times led to wars and reprisals, although the points of difference were essentially insignificant, but as human nature is at present constituted and the world is at present managed there are certain questions which no nation would submit voluntarily to the

arbitration of any tribunal, and the attempt to bring such questions within the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal not only fails in its purpose, but discredits arbitration and the treaties by which the impossible is attempted. In differences between individuals the decision of the court is final, because in the last resort the entire force of the community is behind the court decision. In differences between nations which go beyond the limited range of arbitrable questions, peace can be maintained only by putting behind it the force of united nations determined to uphold it and to prevent war. No one is more conscious than I of the enormous difficulties which beset such a solution or such a scheme, but if we are to pass beyond the limits of voluntary arbitration it is in this direction alone that we can find hope for the maintenance of the world's peace and the avoidance of needless wars. It may well be that it is impossible, that we cannot go beyond voluntary arbitration. Even if we could establish such a union of nations there would be some wars which could not be avoided, but there might certainly be others which could be prevented.

It may be easily said that this idea, which is not a new one, is impracticable, but it is better than the idea that war can be stopped by language, by speech-making, by vain agreements which no one would carry out when the stress came, by denunciations of war and laudations of peace, in which all men agree; for these methods are not only impracticable, but impossible and barren of all hope of real result. It may seem Utopian at this moment to suggest a union of civilized nations in order to put a controlling force behind the maintenance of peace and international order, but it is through the aspiration for perfection, through the search for Utopias, that the real advances

have been made. At all events, it is along this path that we must travel if we are to attain in any measure to the end we all desire of peace upon earth. It is at least a great, a humane purpose to which, in these days of death and suffering, of misery and sorrow among so large a portion of mankind, we might well dedicate ourselves. We must begin the work with the clear understanding that our efforts will fail if they are tainted with the thought of personal or political profit or with any idea of self-interest or self-glorification. We cannot possibly succeed in any measure if we mix up plans for future peace with attempts to end this war now raging. We must be content to work within rigid limitations. We may not now succeed even in this restricted way, but I believe that in the slow process of the years others who come after us may attach to it some result not without value. At least we can feel that the effort and the sacrifice which we make will not be in vain when the end in sight is noble, when we are striving to help mankind and lift the heaviest burdens from suffering humanity.

III

FRANCE

ADDRESS BEFORE THE FRANCO-AMERICAN REPUBLICAN CLUB OF MASSACHUSETTS, SEPTEMBER 6, 1915

III

FRANCE

Extraits du discours prononcé par l'Honorable Sénateur Henry Cabot Lodge à la fete champêtre republicaine de Canobie Lake, le 6 septembre, 1915[1]

Encore quelques paroles avant de finir — quelques paroles dans la langue que vous parlez et que vous aimez, la langue que le monde entier admire.

Il y a trois cents ans que vos ancêtres ont abordé sur ce continent. Vous êtes des Américains de vieille souche; de vrais Américains et rien d'autre. Vous avez traversé une ligne invisible pour devenir citoyens des États-Unis. Vous devez à votre nouvelle patrie votre fidélité et votre loyauté. Par le temps qui court, entourés d'une guerre presque universelle, il est du devoir des États-Unis de maintenir la paix et une neutralité honnête. Mais la neutralité n'empêche pas la sympathie et l'admiration envers ces hommes si courageux qui se battent pour ce qu'ils tiennent de plus cher au monde. Vous aimez la France, le berceau de votre race et de votre langue. Nous autres, nous l'aimons, la France, parce que nous ne saurions oublier Lafayette, Rochambeau et tous les braves qui les

[1] La partie française du discours prononcé par l'Honorable Sénateur Henry C. Lodge à la fête champêtre tenue le 6 septembre, 1915, à Canobie Lake, près de Lowell, sous les auspices du Club Républicain Franco-Américain du Massachusetts.

ont suivis et nous ont prêté leur aide pour établir notre indépendance.

Vous ne pouvez, nous ne pouvons lui refuser notre sympathie dans cette heure sombre. Qui est-ce qui pourrait refuser ses hommages au peuple français qui se bat comme un seul homme, en silence, d'un courage indomptable, pour son indépendance, pour sa liberté, pour sa patrie? Ne les voyez-vous pas dans leurs tranchées ensanglantées, dans leurs villages ruinés, ces soldats intrépides, qui continuent à se battre avec tout le vieil élan français si justement célèbre?

Contemplez-les bien.

Au-dessus de leurs têtes, au-dessus des tranchées et des ruines, au milieu des forêts épaisses et sur la crête des montagnes, vous voyez flotter le drapeau qu'ils aiment. Les couleurs en sont pareilles aux nôtres. Leur drapeau, c'est le drapeau tricolore. C'est le drapeau de Valmy et de Jemappes, le drapeau sous lequel ont marché les armées de la première République en route pour la victoire. C'est sous ce drapeau que les légions de Napoléon ont ébranlé l'Europe. C'est le drapeau de liberté, d'égalité, et de fraternité. Le drapeau! Le drapeau! Découvrez-vous! Sous ce drapeau marche la France. Vive la France!

IV

ADDRESS AT THE UNVEILING OF THE SOLDIERS' MONUMENT, BROOKLINE, OCTOBER 9, 1915

IV

ADDRESS

At the Unveiling of the Soldiers' Monument
Brookline, October 9, 1915

The generations of men come and go but the monuments they build remain. The drawings and frescoes on the walls of caves, the work of pre-historic man, the pillars and columns, statues, and bas-reliefs, which existed at the dawn of recorded history, are still with us to-day to be studied by the scholar, gazed upon by the curious, and admired by the artist. They are often the only history we have of the men who first emerged from the darkness which surrounded for long ages the existence of the race before it had discovered the means of commemorating its presence upon the earth. The Pyramids have seen men of many races and diverse religions pass beneath them, seek shelter in their shadow, and then vanish forever, while they still towered immovable among the sands of the desert. Egyptian obelisks stand forth to-day in sharp outline upon the hills of Rome, in Paris, in London, in New York. These simple granite shafts pointing upward now to alien skies were ancient when the sites of those vast cities were untrodden wilderness, or held only the huts of wandering savages. The winged Bulls of Assyria, the strange figures of the Hittites, the solemn gods of the people of the Nile, and the grave and stately statues of the Egyptian kings, which have gazed upon mighty empires and great civilizations that have passed like a

watch in the night, still look down upon us, the children of races of which their builders and their worshippers never dreamed. We are too apt to forget this lasting character possessed by monuments and statues of stone and bronze. We too often are unmindful of the fact that, while we soon pass away, the monument we have erected survives and that we are imposing it upon succeeding generations for centuries yet to come. We disregard the responsibility which this implies. It ought always to be borne in mind that a memorial expressed in stone, or marble, or metal is justified for the future only when it commemorates men or events which will live in history without material recognition, or when it is a great work of art. It is best to have both conditions fulfilled, but either is sufficient warrant for the monument. A thing of beauty is a joy forever, and art is its own all-sufficient excuse for being. That Michael Angelo's great statue called Meditation is supposed to represent one of the most unimportant of an evil and worthless family is of little consequence. The work itself is a priceless gift to art and to mankind. The famous black stone of the Roman Forum has no quality of art, but it is a memorial of the foundation of a great empire. But when a heap of stone or a mass of metal is put together in honor of a man or an incident which in fifty years will require explanation, which has no merit as a work of art, but is merely a burden to the patient earth, then we are guilty of a grievous wrong both to ourselves and to posterity. No doubts or questions of this kind disturb us here to-day. We raise on this spot a monument to the men of the Civil War, and if any event of the nineteenth century deserves commemoration it is that war. No explanation is necessary, for it is blazoned upon all the pages of history

which tell of that fateful time. It was an event which decided the fate and the future of the United States, and which deeply affected mankind because it vindicated democracy and upheld the right of human beings to freedom and self-government. This monument then has an all-sufficient reason for existence, as have its companions everywhere.

But we cannot stop here. There is something more to be considered and never to be forgotten, for this is not merely a monument to commemorate an event but one raised in honor of certain men who helped to bring that event to pass. Why do we honor these soldiers and desire that so far as it is in our power their names shall always be freshly remembered? They were men who gave up their lives in war. They fought, they ventured all, for the great prize of death in battle. When Sumter fell they did not suggest that there should be a year of delay while we discussed the merits of slavery, the rightfulness of secession and the advantages or disadvantages of a divided country. They took up their arms and went forth to sustain their government and save the nation, as they put it in their simple direct fashion of thought and speech. It was the saddest of all wars, because it was a civil war, the war of fellow citizens, of brethren. Yet they went. Were they right in going out to fight in this cause? I do not mean was the cause right for which they fought. That cause was eternally right and history for fifty years has demonstrated it. With a righteous cause were those men right to go out and fight in order to assure its triumph? In other words does any cause justify war, is any cause worth fighting for and sufficient to demand as of right the death of men? That is the question. Perhaps it seems startling even to ask it. Who doubts that those men were

right in what they did? Not I for one. If I doubted I should not only be unfit to speak to you to-day but unworthy to be an American. But unless we are not only prepared to declare that these dead soldiers of the Civil War, these men who died fighting, were immortally right in so doing, unless we are ready to sustain and continue their work and in like need and stress follow their example, the monuments we raise to their memories are stone and bronze hypocrisies and the words we utter in their praise ignoble lip-service.

We cannot afford to pass by such ceremonies as these as agreeable and interesting occasions which touch our patriotic sentiments, recall our history and have no other or deeper meaning. Just now this is peculiarly unfitting, for at this very time there are those who seem to advocate peace at any price. There are men, who, having accumulated uncounted millions, appear to think that on this account alone they are raised up by wealth to speak with an authority to which they have no claim upon subjects where their opinion is of no especial value. Millions are to be used to disseminate the doctrine that the world in which those millions have been heaped up must not be disturbed, that the gathering of millions is the highest glory to be attained by man, that every sacrifice, no matter what, even if it should mean the loss of independence, of liberty, of honor, must be made for peace, and that any sacrifice entailed by war is little short of criminal. There are also very many, lovers of their country and of their fellow men, who think such doctrines not only pernicious and cowardly but debilitating and degenerate. One thing, however, is certain. If doctrines such as these are right, then the men who fought the Revolution, who won the sea-fights of 1812, who fell in battle in the Civil War,

like those to whom we erect this monument, were wrong. For those men believed profoundly that they fulfilled a high and noble duty by offering their lives for their country and by fighting against their country's enemies. Between these contending theories of life and conduct we must choose, for both can by no possibility be right. Between the doctrine of the peace-at-any-price teachers and the dictation of mere money as the goal of our highest aspirations, on the one side, and the deep and simple faith of the men of half a century ago, to whom we now build monuments, we must decide.

A just hatred of war is no new thing. As soon as men reached a high stage of civilization some of the wisest and best among them, brave and patriotic men, expressed in unmeasured terms their detestation of war and their love of peace. Cicero says in a letter to Atticus, speaking of civil war: "Equidem pacem hortari non desino, quae vel injusta utilior est quam justissimum bellum" — "I never cease from urging peace, for an unjust peace is better than the justest war." — Yet Cicero had commanded the Armies of Rome and after this letter was written joined Pompey in his fight against Cæsar. Our own Franklin, one of the greatest men of the eighteenth century, wrote: "There never was a good war or a bad peace," a sentence which the advocates of peace at any price are much given to quoting. And yet before this letter was written Franklin had organized and equipped supply trains for the British Armies when they marched against the French and afterwards was one of the makers of the American Revolution which lasted seven years and in its course lighted the flames of a world-wide conflict. Cicero and Franklin were both wise men, sincere in their dread and hatred of war, and both showed by their lives that they also believed

that conditions were possible in which the sacrifice of life in war was not only justified but necessary.

With the great struggle in Europe staring us in the face there is no need to assert the horrors of war. All men and women at this minute realize them only too well. All who think and feel agree that the military autocracy responsible for this war now raging has committed the greatest crime against humanity which the blood-stained annals of the race can show. There is no need in the face of the spectacle of carnage, desolation and misery, which has been unrolled before our eyes during the past year, to dwell upon the blessings of peace. Black crimes, it is true, have been committed in the name of Peace as they have been committed in the name of Liberty. That does not in the least alter the fact that Liberty is better than Slavery and Peace better than War. But this is not the question which comes insistent to us of the present generation, from every battle-field of the Civil War, from every soldier's headstone and every soldier's monument, in the South as well as in the North, and which must be answered. The one dominant question is whether we believe, as those dead soldiers believed, that there are rights and duties and faiths in defence of which men should be prepared to fight and to give up their lives in battle. We too must be ready to say, must determine in our own hearts and minds whether there are certain things for which men are justified in going to war and in sacrificing if need be their own lives and those of others. These men of half a century ago, who loved peace and hated war as we do, thought that there were such things. They thought that the life of the nation was more precious than their own lives; they thought the Union, and freedom and democracy, were worth dying for if in no other way could they be

preserved. They saw no dollar mark upon the flag they followed but only stars gleaming with the light of a great past filled with service and sacrifice. By their fighting, by their lives, by their sufferings and by their deaths, they put into deeds what Emerson had expressed in immortal verse: —

> "Though love repine, and reason chafe,
> There came a voice without reply, —
> 'T'is man's perdition to be safe,
> When for the truth he ought to die.'"

Do we agree with these men of the Civil War? Deeply, most deeply, I believe we do. I believe the great mass of the American people have highly resolved, as Lincoln bade them, that these dead in battle for a united country shall not have died in vain. If I did not so believe I should despair of the Republic, and that is to me impossible. These men fought for the country, thought war better than clinging to a shameful peace and a degrading safety, whence freedom and honor, union and democracy, had fled. They had faith that right would triumph and were ready to die that the country might live. The voice of the time came to them and asked, Are there great principles, great rights, great faiths, now worth fighting for when peril threatens them? Their answer can be read in the pages of history and in every graveyard in the land. Was that answer right? Yes a thousand times, Yes, and we must be true to their memory and to their creed. They gave their lives to their country when their country called.

> For thee their pilgrim swords were tried,
> Thy flaming word was in their scrips,
> They battled, they endured, they died
> To make a new Apocalypse.
> Master and Maker, God of Right,
> The soldier dead are at thy gate,
> Who kept the spears of honor bright
> And freedom's house inviolate.

V

AMERICAN RIGHTS

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, DECEMBER 10, 1915

V

AMERICAN RIGHTS

The Secretary read the resolution (Sen. Res. 12) submitted by Mr. Smith of Georgia on the 7th instant as follows: —

Whereas the Executive Department, through the Secretary of State, has protested the legality of the orders of Great Britain virtually blockading the neutral ports of northern Europe; and

Whereas the responsibility for the preservation of the commercial rights of citizens of the United States rests upon the Congress as well as upon the Executive Department: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations be requested to investigate the subject and to suggest to the Senate the action, if any, they may deem advisable.

Mr. Lodge offered the following amendment to the resolution of Mr. Smith: —

The Secretary. It is proposed to add to the resolution: —

Resolved further, That the Committee on Foreign Relations be also requested to investigate and report upon the law and the facts involved in the attacks upon or the destruction by belligerents of the following vessels: The Gulflight, Falaba, Lusitania, Arabic, Ancona, Hesperian, and Petrolite. And also to investigate and report upon the law and the facts involved in the incidents referred to by the President of the United States in his annual message, when he said, referring to certain persons: "They have formed plots to destroy property; they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government; they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own."

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I have no intention at this moment of discussing any of the many points raised by the Senator from Georgia in his very elaborate and able argument, but I desire to offer an amendment to his resolution extending the scope of the inquiry and investigation if

they are to be ordered by the Senate and made by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I think, Mr. President, that all neutral rights possessed by us should be insisted upon and investigated in every place where it can be proved that they have been violated, but I think also that we are equally bound to fulfil our neutral duties rigidly and strictly, although I have observed in some quarters that our sense of our rights is a little more vivid than our sense of our duties.

I wish to extend the scope of the resolution by my amendment, because if we are to take up this question of the violation of our rights, I want to put it not on the lowest ground alone, but on the highest ground as well. I think it is of great importance that we should vindicate our rights as a neutral in trade if those rights have been violated, but I think it is far more imperative that we should extend protection and assure security to American citizens wherever they rightfully are, for I do not believe that any government can long retain the respect of its own people if it does not give them the protection to which they are entitled. I believe that Americans should be protected in their lives and in their liberty everywhere. I do not think that they ought to be murdered in detail and obscurely in Mexico or openly and wholesale on the high seas.

Although I am as anxious as any one can be to care for our rights in trade if they are violated, to me American lives are more important than American dollars. The body of an innocent child floating dead upon the water, the victim of the destruction of an unarmed vessel, is to me a more poignant and a more tragic spectacle than an unsold bale of cotton.

If this investigation is to go on, and especially if Con-

gress is to take action, I wish it to include all the violations of our rights that may have occurred. The most important is the violation which has affected American lives or the security of an American citizen, — man, woman or child, — and the next most important are those pointed out by the President of the United States in his message the other day, when he referred to the destruction of property, accompanied by destruction of life, in the United States, and stated that conspiracies in alien interests were going on within our own borders.

I think if we are to investigate and inquire with a view to action, such deeds as these should not be omitted. I am not willing to fly into a passion over an interference with our trade and then allow American citizens to lose their lives and pass the murders by in frigid silence.

I do not wish to see this country when it looks into the book of time close the pages on which are written the outrages which have been committed against American citizens in Mexico and on the high seas and be blind to what is written there and then fix its whole attention on the pages where is reckoned up the profit and loss account in dollars. I hope and have always believed that the United States stands for something higher in the world than mere trade and mere dollars. I do not wish to see our citizens wronged in their property, but I think we should also stand, and above all, for morality and humanity in the dealings of nations with each other.

These are the reasons, Mr. President, why I desire to have the scope of this inquiry enlarged. I shall be very glad if the Senator will allow the resolution to go over so that my amendment may be printed and that the Senate before it votes may have an opportunity to read it.

VI

NATIONAL DEFENCE

ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE AT WASHINGTON, JANUARY 22, 1916

VI

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply interested in the purpose for which this National Security League has been formed. I believe your meeting here cannot fail to do good in moulding and making public opinion. But I think you will agree with me that the most important thing is that this league should so work and should use its power in such a way as to bring practical results in the shape of legislation for national defence. Even were I master of eloquence, I should not attempt it to-night. I merely wish to offer to you a few practical suggestions drawn from some years of observation in Washington. There are two kinds of questions which it is extremely difficult to argue. One is where the question is new, doubtful, intricate, and complicated. The other is when a question is so simple that it is difficult to understand how there can be any difference of opinion in regard to it. The subject of national defence belongs, to my mind, in the latter class. The proposition, as I should put it, is something like this: Every nation should have sufficient military and naval defence to maintain its own peace and security. This nation has not such defence. Therefore it is the duty of this nation to look to it that suitable provision is made. It appears to me that this little syllogism is so simple and so obvious that almost any one with the sight of an average mole could see it. And yet I know

that there is a great deal of opposition, in certain quarters, to the proposition.

I quite agree that it is not a party question. I should be sorry, indeed, to think that national defence could be a party question. But I will say this that if those gentlemen, of either party or of both parties, who are now standing in the way of national defence do not look to themselves a party will arise somewhere which will carry national defence to completion. I am not going to enter into details. I shall not attempt to argue that little syllogism which I just ventured on as it might be argued. I could easily keep you here well over Sunday if I should enter upon details relating to either branch of the service. All I desire now is to call your attention to certain facts vividly illustrating what the present condition is and just where you want to go to work. The first thing is to know the facts. There is fortunately no difficulty in knowing the facts about the army. We have a Secretary of War to whom as an American I feel under great obligations, because he has told us the facts. He has laid his cards on the table. I do not know whether the scheme that he proposes, and which is known as his plan, is the ideally perfect plan to his mind, — I very much doubt it, — or whether, like other men charged with great responsibility, he is laboring for the best that he can hope to get. But, above all things, he is telling us all about the War Department. And what is it that we know, when all is told? That we have no army sufficient to defend the United States. We cannot build coast defences to protect ten thousand or twelve thousand miles of coast; that is an absurdity. We can protect, we have partially protected, perhaps, some few great ports. But the defence of the United States by land must lie in a large mobile force. We have no such

force. I for one believe that the recommendation of General Leonard Wood and of the War College experts, that we should have a regular army to start with of 210,000 men, is right; that that is the least number.

I believe that behind that regular army there should be a large reserve mobile force. Mr. Putnam has told you — what we all know, I think — that in one foreign country, at least, plans have been made with a view to landing in this country, and that in forty days they could land an army of 360,000 men, thoroughly equipped. Now, the only way to repel such a force is to have a mobile army to meet them wherever they land. You cannot, I repeat, have fortifications everywhere. You must have your mobile force. Last year our mobile force, all regulars, was 24,000 men. You ought to have an army outnumbering by at least two to one any hostile force that can be landed. How, as a preliminary, are you going to find out where the enemy is, and where they are going to land? We have no aeroplanes. How are you going to move your men and supplies once you leave the railroads? You have not even got motor trucks in your army. We are deficient in field artillery. We have no large reserves of ammunition upon which success in war now depends. Above all, I repeat, you have not got the men. You ought to have at least a million men who can at any moment be called to the colors as a reserve. Whether it can best be done by the federalization of the militia — a matter of some constitutional difficulty — or whether, as I believe it must be eventually done, by a national force, it ought to be, it must be, done. Every citizen in a democracy ought to have the same rights and the same duties. We all ought to bear the burdens equally, the burdens of taxation and of military service. The universal liability to military service does not, how-

ever, necessarily mean that we must carry out the Swiss system to the fullest extent, and have an army of twelve or fifteen millions, but with that universal liability we must have and we can get the million men we want.

We have not got them now. We have practically no military defence on land. It is an ugly thing to say, but we could be conquered to-morrow by any nation able to land on our coast 300,000 to 400,000 men thoroughly equipped in the best modern way. We are as brave a people as live, as the mayor of New York so justly said, but bravery unarmed means useless sacrifice of the best men. We are ready to fight, but an unarmed people cannot fight a fully armed and equipped body of 400,000 men. And how are the bravest people in the world to spring to arms when they have no arms to spring to? That is why I say that we are defenceless by land, and defence we must have, and we must have it at once.

I now come to the navy. Let me repeat that I speak in no party sense, and that I do not regard this as a party question; but I have been in Congress more years than I am eager to confess, and I think that I know Congress fairly well, and where the blame rests for our not being defended as we ought to be at this moment. Administrations come and go. With scarcely an exception let me say that the Secretaries of War and the Secretaries of the Navy whom I have known have tried — some more vigorously, some more successfully, than others, of course, but they have all tried, hitherto at least — to build up the forces entrusted to their charge. The responsibility for not being defended to-day as we ought to be lies primarily at the door of Congress. I am ready to take my blame with the rest, but I know where the blame lies. It is no new thing. When Washington was on the eve of final victory,

just before the siege of Yorktown, perhaps you do not recall what Congress were proposing to do? They were proposing at that moment to reduce the army. Some things change and others do not.

I served some years ago on the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives. I am at this moment a member of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, and ever since I have been in Washington I have tried to inform myself in regard to the navy. I do not know as much about it as my friend Mr. Padgett, chairman of the House Naval Committee, who, I think, has as thorough a knowledge of naval affairs as any man in public life — more thorough, indeed. I have had the honor to serve with him on conference committees, and I know the extent of his knowledge. Yet even in his presence I venture to say that I know something about the navy, although I am far from knowing it all, and the country knows very little. We see a display of naval vessels in the Hudson River, and the people go home with a comfortable feeling that they have got a great and splendid navy, because they do not at all understand what a really complete and efficient navy is. During the Spanish War there was a New England port, which shall be nameless, one of many, where they felt that they were in danger of attack from the Spanish cruisers. It was not exceptional, because that feeling existed in all Atlantic ports, south as well as north, and in common with many other ports this one wanted protection. I labored to get them protection. I finally secured for this particular port an old Monitor of the Civil War, with one large smoothbore gun. It was towed down to that port with some difficulty and anchored in the harbor, and the people were perfectly satisfied. The moral is that a navy may have some very fine ships and yet be wholly inadequate as a

fighting force, and it is not to be expected that the people generally will understand the real condition of the navy unless it is honestly explained to them.

The difficulty of obtaining accurate knowledge is shown by the fact that those who are most immediately charged with the care of the navy are guilty of mistakes. The President said in his message: —

> If this full programme should be carried out, we should have built or building in 1921, according to the estimates of survival and standards of classification —

I call your attention to that language —

> followed by the General Board of the department, an effective navy consisting of twenty-seven battleships of the first line, six battle cruisers, and twenty-five battleships of the second line.

The Secretary of the Navy in his annual report says: —

> If this programme is carried out, accepting the General Board estimates of survival for present vessels —

That is twenty years; some say fifteen, but we will take it at twenty as the life limit of a modern battleship —

> the Navy will be composed of the following vessels, built or building, in 1921: Battleships, first line, twenty-seven; battle cruisers, six; battleships, second line, twenty-five.

There can be no mistake about the battle cruisers, because we have none, and those six are in the President's programme, and there is no item of his programme which is better than that. Battleships of the first line, twenty-seven — that includes seventeen ships now built or building, and ten according to the programme; but the twenty-five battleships of the second line puzzled me. I wrote to the Secretary of the Navy and asked him if he would give me the names of the battleships of the second line. He

replied, very kindly, that I could find them in the report of the General Board annexed to his report. I wrote back to him that I had already read that appendix, but that the report of the General Board did not seem to me to agree with his statement, and that was why I asked for the names of the ships. I have had no answer to this last letter.

But here is what the General Board said, to which the Secretary referred me: —

Dreadnaughts of the first line, seventeen.

Then there are the ten added under the programme, making a total of twenty-seven; correct.

Dreadnaughts of the second line —

I am reading from the report of the General Board now —

Dreadnaughts of the second line, thirteen.
Superannuated dreadnaughts of the third line —

Ships that will then be over twenty years old, each one —

nine.
Harbor-defence battleships, three —

The Indiana, the Massachusetts, and the Oregon, authorized in 1890, commissioned in 1895.

The twenty-five of the second line as given by the President and the Secretary of the Navy were made up of thirteen put in that line by the General Board, of nine excluded from that line by the General Board because they were not in accordance with their estimates of survival, and of three now more than twenty years old, which the General Board rank as only fit for harbor defence. I am merely calling attention, by giving you these varying

statements, to some of the difficulties in the way of getting at facts.

Now, take the submarines. I could talk about the submarines all night. One hundred and fifty-seven in 1921 was the number given us by the President and the Secretary. Dear old boats some of them will be then. That one hundred and fifty-seven includes every submarine that has been built from the beginning starting in 1902. Some of them are absolutely useless now, and everybody knows it. There is not a seagoing submarine among those now existing. I believe F–4, which sank in the harbor of Honolulu, is no longer carried on the list. But it was carried on the list as late as last August.

Then there is the shortage of men. The Secretary has sent in the report of Admiral Fletcher, made on the 15th of August last, and in that report he describes the shortage of men. At the June inspection one division was short 1350 men. Mine-layers were twenty-five per cent short in their complement. The department has reduced the complement of destroyers by twenty-five per cent. It is reported that at the battle-efficiency inspection of the Utah a chief petty officer was in charge of one turret and an ensign of 1914 in charge of another. The Florida was short twenty-nine officers, the Utah twenty-eight, the Michigan twenty-one, and the South Carolina sixteen. A pay clerk and a yeoman were in charge of the plotting room, doing the work which should have been done by commissioned officers. Admiral Fletcher, the commander-in-chief, says that such reports are of frequent occurrence, and in his own conclusions points out specifically that the fleet needs more officers and more men; that whatever be the number of men available for complements of the ships in the active fleet should be kept full, and that if ships

cannot be kept fully in commission with full complement they should be put in reserve. He says, also, in this same report, that we need mine-laying and mine-sweeping vessels. He gives a comparison between the Delaware and the Bellerophon and the Heligoland, which I need not go into, as to the number of officers. He refers to the unsatisfactory condition of the submarines, their limitations of mobility, the lack of air craft, the lack of any radio direction finder, the lack of mine-laying and mine-sweeping vessels.

I need not go on. The report is worthy your consideration if you want to get at the facts and learn how absolutely inadequate and how far from high efficiency our navy is. We have no scouts. We have no fast battle cruisers. The Blucher, which was sunk in the North Sea, was sunk because she was the slowest of the German ships. She was faster than any ship in our navy! We need battle cruisers; we need scouts; we need aeroplanes, and we need speed in supplying these deficiencies.

The Secretary of the Navy said the other day before the House committee, if he was correctly reported, that it took three years to build a battleship. Let me ask your attention — these are dry but important facts — to the history of the two last superdreadnaughts authorized, battleships Nos. 43 and 44, authorized on March 3, 1915. Congress did its duty, let me say, as to those two battleships. The Secretary of the Navy decided to build these ships at the New York and Mare Island Navy Yards. It is now nearly a year since the authorization. The material for No. 43, to be built at the New York Yard, has been ordered, I believe, and is in process of being assembled. The California is on the ways at the New York Navy Yard, however, and is not expected to be off the

ways before September or October. I take the Secretary's own statement. Therefore No. 43, authorized March 3, 1915, cannot have her keel laid before that time — eighteen months after her authorization! It may be possible that we cannot build a battleship in two years, as England and Germany do; but we can build it in three years, and we ought to be able to get rid of those eighteen months which make it four and a half years for an American battleship.

No. 44 is to be built at Mare Island. There are ways there, but they are not large enough to take a superdreadnaught, and must be extended. There is not money enough to do it. Congress must either appropriate money especially for that purpose or authorize the Secretary to use some of the money appropriated for the ships. I do not think this authority has yet been given. It may have passed the House.

Representative Padgett. No, sir; it is pending in the House. It has been reported by the committee.

Senator Lodge. It is pending in the House, then. The ship now on the ways, which it will be necessary to have off the ways before the superdreadnaught can be begun, will probably be launched in September, 1916. If the money is authorized for the extension of the ways — and I hope and believe it will be — that can be accomplished before the launching of the ship now on the ways; but if the money is not obtained there will be still further delay.

It is said on good authority that England and Germany have been building seagoing submarines of eight hundred or one thousand tons, capable of going around the north of England or into the Mediterranean, at the rate of one a month. We then hear flourishing statements

about our great seagoing submarines. Yes; three have been authorized, but we have not got them. I am glad they are authorized, but I want them in the water, where they can be used, and not simply floating harmlessly in acts of Congress. The Schley was the first large submarine authorized. It was authorized on the 30th of June, 1914. The contract was let the following March — March of 1915. In the bulletin of January 10, 1916, it appears that nothing has been done upon her yet. How long do you think is the contract time for the Schley, the first of our seagoing submarines? I was astonished to find out. Thirty-six months — three years! She is not contracted to be delivered until March, 1918; and if we want submarines, we want them now! As for the two authorized last year, nearly a year ago — 60 and 61 — nothing has been done about them at all. These are all mere illustrations. But they are the facts and do not forget that the worst thing that can befall us is to be deceived by others or deceive ourselves as to our navy.

The House Naval Committee is hard at work preparing its bill, having the valuable hearings which it is necessary to have, and working as hard and intelligently on the bill as it is possible, I know. The House Military Committee, unless I am misinformed, is considering a bill which appropriates for exactly the same army that we have now. The Senate Military Committee is holding hearings and is doing excellent work. It has had before it General Wood, General Carter, and other officers of the army, who are telling the committee and telling the country the exact truth and what the country needs. That committee is preparing good work. The Senate Naval Committee is engaged upon the great and burning question of building an armor plant. Now, I recognize that perhaps it may be

necessary by and by to have an armor plant. I am very doubtful about it at any time, but I am certain that we do not want to put ten millions into an armor plant now. What we want now are ships and men and submarines and aeroplanes. I know there is a great argument behind the armor plant. I know that if the armor plant is not built it is possible — perhaps probable, but certainly possible — that some great industrial plant in private hands may make some money out of the manufacture of armor. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is more important to keep the enemy from our shores than to devote our attention to preventing Americans from making money. I know well the immense time and thought which has been given to that question of preventing Americans from making money, and I do not underrate its importance; but I think that at this moment what we want to do is to give the navy the things of which it is in such sore need. The navy is the first line of defence. While we control the seas, the United States is safe. We have two long coasts to defend. I do not quite agree with my friend Mr. Putnam about Chicago's indifference to New York and Boston. As an American, the knowledge that San Francisco or New Orleans or Chicago is in danger from an enemy or damaged by a foe comes just as near home to me as if Boston were attacked. I was born in Boston. I have lived there. I love it. But there is something I love more, and that is the whole great country; and any enemy who touches any part of that country touches me.

Now, a word as to the sources of the opposition which you will have to meet, which you will have to deal with, representing as you do the people, the voters of this country. It is of various sorts in Congress. There are some who think that the first thing to be done is to put the

Government into business in every direction, — into munitions, into armor, into everything, — resting, as I say, on the broad and noble principle that if they do not some private American citizen may make money. Then there are those who want to spend the people's money elsewhere, to scatter it through the country in the name of good roads, to improve rivers and harbors, and to build public buildings. You will see the newspapers refer in their graceful way to such legislation as the "pork barrel"; and you would suppose, from what you read in the newspapers, that all this was due to the natural depravity of Congressmen and Senators — that they wanted to have public buildings and river and harbor appropriations for unnavigable streams and impossible harbors, because they themselves were naturally bad and rejoiced in evil for its own sake. I assure you that is a very great mistake. The amount of pleasure — even among those Congressmen and Senators who are fond of art — the amount of architectural pleasure which they derive from a post-office in a country town is not enough to govern their votes. They want those things for the very simple and human reason — I know; I have been one of them for a long time — that they think their constituents want them, and they think procuring them means votes. And just as long as Congressmen and Senators, or any considerable number of them, think there are more votes in river and harbor appropriations and public buildings appropriations than there are in appropriations for the national defence, they will continue to give the preference to the former.

That seems a harsh thing to say. The truth is not infrequently both harsh and unpleasant. I know well that there are many men in both Houses who will vote for great appropriations for national defence without a thought

as to whether it is going to benefit them personally or not. I dare say there are many men in both Houses who would vote for appropriations for rivers and harbors and public buildings without a thought as to whether it would benefit them or not, although I must confess that that proposition is perhaps not quite so certain as the other. But if you would have Congress take up national defence, both for the army and for the navy, as you think it ought to be taken up, you will let them understand that there is a great body of voters in this country, north, south, east, and west, who are determined that their country shall be defended!

I have no doubt that the great mass of the American people wish their country to be put in a state of proper defence. You all believe so. Bring this fact home, then, to those who represent them. Make the Senators and Congressmen understand it. Begin at the primary and go with them to the polls in support if you can, in opposition if you must, and you will be surprised at the rapidity of the educational process, and you will get plenty of support at the Capitol. But you must come down to that practical side, as every great question has to come to it finally. You must demonstrate to the Representative or the Senator that the people who send him here want this thing done; and when the American people make it clear to the House and Senate that they are in earnest about national defence you will have it, and you are not likely to get it much sooner in a proper and sufficient way.

I have taken far more time than I intended, and I only desire to say one word in conclusion. No one can think that provision for national defence is more essential, more vital, than I do. Yet there is a side to it which goes even deeper. It has been alluded to by the mayor of New

York, and I can do little more than repeat his words; but they are words which cannot be too often repeated. In this question of national defence lies a test of democracy, whether it is worthy to live, whether it has the foresight, the self-control, the spirit of unity which will lead it to take these precautions which it must take if it is to survive at all in a world so uncertain and so perilous as this.

We covet no one's territory. We seek no adventures. We have an immense domain of our own, still to be developed. We desire, if we can, to distribute the riches of our heritage so that all shall benefit and not merely a few. We would fain, if we could, turn our attention to the needs of the great classes of our own people to whom life is hard. We would like to do something to help old age. We would like to improve in every way possible the condition of our own people. What is necessary for us in order to achieve that which we desire? Peace and security. They speak of the Monroe Doctrine as a foreign policy. It is not a foreign policy; it is our policy, and it rests on the law of self-preservation. We wish to be at peace and we wish to be secure.

Now, these being our desires, have we made our acts and our policies correspond with them? You wish to have peace and security. Have you done what is necessary to make sure that you and those who come after you will have peace and security? You certainly have not done it yet. You lie open to the world, rich, tempting, an easy prey to the armed. There are those who say, "Exhausted Europe will never attack us." That is the argument of the "did n't-know-it-was-loaded" gentlemen who add so largely to the bills of mortality. Not attack us! There is no nation on earth so dangerous as a nation fully

armed and bankrupt at home. The only time in our history when we were fully prepared was at the close of the Civil War. We had a great veteran army. We had the largest fleet in existence. We had a debt of $3,000,000,000, which looked enormous then. Our currency seemed to be hopelessly depreciated. Financially speaking, we were bankrupt. Yet there never was a moment in the history of the United States when she was so dangerous to her neighbors as in 1865.

You can always get money, apparently, in this world for powder and shot. When the war is ended in Europe, a nation there armed to the teeth, crippled financially, with large claims growing out of Mexico; shall I go on? Do you think that presents a safe condition? Such a condition is highly dangerous. No nation is safe while the world is as it is; and our duty is to make sure of our peace, our security, our freedom. Is the ideal of democracy merely to accumulate money, to live in comfort, to amuse ourselves from day to day? Is that the true ideal of democracy? Not to my mind. I believe that the ideal of democracy is written in the American Revolution and in the Civil War; the great ideal which Abraham Lincoln typified, that life, that wealth, that everything was as nothing compared to liberty and freedom; and that this nation should be free and remain free; that we should be able to continue the democracy which we have set up. And now, with other democracies fighting for their lives, are we to remain still and do nothing to preserve our own?

> "In the long vista of the years to roll,
> Let me not see my country's honor fade;
> Oh! let me see our land retain its soul!
> Her pride in Freedom, and not Freedom's shade."

VII

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 18, 1916

VII

ARMED MERCHANTMEN

The Secretary read the resolution (Sen. Res. 100) submitted by Mr. Sterling on the 15th instant, as follows: —

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States views with anxious concern the late order of the German Admiralty that armed merchant ships of any of the Entente Allies, without distinction as to whether armed for merely defensive purposes or not, may be torpedoed and sunk without warning after the 29th of the present month; that such order, if put into effect, will constitute a more serious menace to the legitimate commerce of all neutral nations, and particularly to that of the United States, than any act of any of the belligerents in the present European war, and will be in contravention of a right long recognized by the principal commercial nations of the world, including our own; that the protection of the interests of neutral commerce on the high seas in time of war has been the subject of many treaties and conventions and is a favored subject in international law, and that through these instrumentalities the freedom of such commerce and the cause of civilization itself have been greatly promoted; that any recognition on the part of the United States of the claim that the necessities of war in general or the exigencies and conditions of modern submarine warfare are warrant for the order of the German Admiralty would be a step backward and so far an abandonment of our contention for the freedom of the seas. Moreover, such recognition would contravene the policy of the Government of the United States as expressed in the notes of our State Department to the British and German Governments, respectively, on the 19th of September and November 7, 1914; and that at this time, in the history of the present war, there should be no acquiescence in the order of the German Admiralty on the part of this or any other neutral power.

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I cannot hope to add anything to the admirable and forcible argument to which the Senate has just listened, but the question involved in the

resolution of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Sterling] is of such very great importance that I think it can do no harm if, in my own way, I briefly reiterate some of the arguments which he has so well and strongly presented.

There have been reports lately in the newspapers and also some discussion in the press as to the question of armed merchantmen. There have also been unofficial intimations that the Administration was considering a change of the attitude of this Government upon the subject. Indeed, this has gone so far that there was printed in the "Chicago Herald" what purported to be a note from our Government addressed to belligerents in regard to the status of the armed merchantman. I am aware that this publication is not official, but we have fallen under this Administration into the deplorable practice of receiving all our communications as to foreign relations through the newspapers. It is very difficult to believe that this letter, which I shall not read in full, but which I shall ask to have printed at this point as a part of my remarks, can be correctly given.

THE VICE-PRESIDENT. In the absence of objection, the article referred to by the Senator from Massachusetts will be printed in the "Record." The Chair hears none.

The article referred to is as follows: —

NEW UNITED STATES NOTE DENIES RIGHT TO ARM LINERS FOR DEFENCE — USE OF SUBMARINES IS UPHELD[1]

The "Chicago Herald" presents herewith the note which, by direction of the Secretary of State, American ambassadors addressed to the European belligerents in connection with the recognition of submarines as commerce destroyers and the desirability of the disarmament of belligerent merchantmen.

[1] This newspaper version is a correct transcript of the note sent by Mr. Lansing to the belligerent powers and dated January 18, 1916.

The note was dated January 18 and has been received by the "Herald" from a European correspondent. Its text is as follows: —

> It is a matter of the deepest interest to my Government to bring to an end, if possible, the dangers of life which attend the use of submarines as at present employed in destroying enemy commerce on the high seas, since on any merchant vessel of belligerent nationality there may be citizens of the United States who have taken passage or members of the crew in the exercise of their recognized rights as neutrals. I assume your Government is equally solicitous to protect their nationals from the exceptional hazards which are presented by their passage on merchant vessels through these portions of the high seas in which undersea craft of the enemy are operating.

UPHOLDS SUBMARINES' USE

> While I am fully alive to the appalling loss of life among non-combatants, regardless of age or sex, which has resulted from the present method of destroying merchant vessels without removing the persons on board to places of safety, and while I view that practice as contrary to those humane principles which should control belligerents in the conduct of their naval operations, I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the invasion of commerce, since those instruments of war have proved their effectiveness in this practical branch of warfare on the high seas.
>
> In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules of international law and the principles of humanity without destroying their efficiency in their destruction of commerce, I believe that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight modification of the precedent generally followed by nations prior to the employment of the submarines, will appeal to the sense of justice and fairness of all the belligerents in the present war.
>
> Your Government will understand that in seeking the formula or rule of this nature I approach it of necessity from the point of view of a neutral, but I believe that it

will be equally efficacious in preserving the lives of non-combatants on merchant vessels of belligerent nationalities.

BASIS OF PROPOSALS

My comments on this subject are predicated on the following propositions: —

First. A non-combatant has a right to traverse the high seas in a merchant vessel entitled to fly a belligerent flag, to rely upon the observance of the rules of international law and principles of humanity, and if the vessel is approached by a naval vessel of another belligerent, the merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be attacked without being ordered to stop.

Second. An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a belligerent submarine, should immediately stop.

Third. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist. In case it ceases to flee or resist, the attack should be discontinued.

Fourth. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew on board of an enemy merchant vessel or to convoy it into port, the vessel may be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been removed to a place of safety.

OBSTACLES FOR SUBMARINES

In complying with the foregoing principles, which, in my opinion, embody the principal rule, the strict observance of which will insure the life of a non-combatant on a merchant vessel which is intercepted by a submarine, I am not mindful of the obstacles which would be met by undersea craft as commerce destroyers.

Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy commerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers carrying heavy armaments. In these conditions international law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry armament for defensive purposes without lessening its character as a private merchant vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have

been dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively in offence against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers.

POWERLESS IN DEFENCE

The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its power to submerge, is almost defenceless in point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small-calibre gun would be able to use it effectively for offence against the submarine.

Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels of the sea and privateering has been abolished. Consequently the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present date of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament.

If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant vessel on the high seas, and in case it is found that she is of an enemy character and that conditions necessitate her destruction and the removal to a place of safety of persons on board, it would not seem just nor reasonable that the submarine should be compelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant vessel.

INNOCENT LIVES AT STAKE

It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as

prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited from carrying any armament whatsoever.

In proposing this formula as a basis of conditional declarations by the belligerent Government, I do so in the full conviction that each Government will consider primarily the humane purposes of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the insistence upon doubtful legal rights which may be denied on account of new conditions.

STAND ON QUESTION SOUGHT

I would be pleased to be informed whether your Government would be willing to make such a declaration conditioned upon their enemies making a similar declaration.

I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of the submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly.

Mr. Lodge. I repeat, Mr. President, that it is difficult to believe that this note can be correctly given. It is a hesitating and faltering argument in behalf of clearing away all the laws which have been established by the general assent of civilized nations and by the dictates of humanity in favor of the protection of the lives of neutrals who may have taken passage on a belligerent merchantman. It contains, moreover, one or two statements which it seems incredible should have been put forward by the very accomplished international lawyer who is now our Secretary of State; as, for instance, when he says, according to the newspaper report, that: —

Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels of the sea and privateering has been

abolished. Consequently, the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present date of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them.

The Secretary of State must be perfectly aware that the arming of merchantmen for defensive purposes was not confined to defence against pirates and privateers. Nothing is better settled, as I shall show, than that it carried the defence of the belligerent merchantman in case of war against the enemies of its country.

Very recently, it must be said, — within the last few days, indeed, — contradictions of these reports and of the ground taken in this note, which I have asked to have printed, have appeared; but we have no official information in regard to the matter, and the question is one of such gravity and the issues involved are so serious that I shall venture briefly to call the attention of the Senate to the well-established laws of nations in regard to armed merchantmen and the consistent attitude of this country with reference to this question from the establishment of the Government to the present time.

The armed merchantman — that is, the ship engaged primarily in trade, but carrying armament for its own defence — goes back to a very remote period. The traders of the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages were all armed, because in the unsettled conditions of that time and in waters infested by Barbary pirates a defenceless trader would have had no chance of survival. After Vasco da Gama had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and opened the route to the Far East, after Columbus had discovered America and shown the road to the new West, the merchantmen of Europe began to make their way into these vast regions hitherto unknown. Every voyage was an ad-

venture, and every trader was an explorer and discoverer. The bold men who in search of the profits of commerce made their way into these unknown seas went armed; no other course was possible. They were likely to encounter pirates, savages, and hostile nations, and their safety depended on nothing but their own powers of combat and defence. As the centuries passed trade routes were established and regular lines of commerce were opened, but the dangers encountered by merchantmen in traversing the Pacific and in making their way among the islands of the Orient and of the southern seas were but little diminished. To these perils were added as time went on dangers from the development of privateers whenever there was war between the nations of Europe. Armed merchantmen therefore became of great moment to the commerce of every country. To illustrate the importance attached to this situation it may be noted that the arming of merchantmen was made compulsory in England in the seventeenth century. In 1625 Charles I issued a proclamation compelling merchantmen to arm, and an Order in Council, under Charles II, on the 14th of December, 1672, made it compulsory upon all merchantmen to be properly armed for self-defence. Similar orders were issued in the eighteenth century so as to save the necessity of convoy, which, of course, limited the possibilities of trade. Under these conditions there grew up as a matter of course a body of law defining the character of armed merchantmen. This practice of arming merchantmen went on with fluctuations, and was so generally recognized that in 1815 Chief Justice Marshall said, in a case to which I shall refer later and more fully: —

> In point of fact, it is believed that a belligerent merchant vessel rarely sails unarmed.

Nor did this practice of arming end at that time with the Napoleonic Wars. It continued through a large part of the nineteenth century. The New England clipper ships which in such large numbers carried on the East Indian and China trade during the first half of the nineteenth century all went armed, for they were exposed, not only to dangers among the savages of Polynesia, but to those which arose from the swarms of Chinese pirate junks, which infested the China seas. In many families in New England to-day there are preserved specimens of the old chests of muskets which these merchantmen carried. They often had carronades to repel the assaults of pirates attacking them in small boats, and not infrequently they carried a brass gun, familiarly known as a "Long Tom." I well remember as a boy seeing on the ships owned by my father, which were engaged in the China trade, these long chests filled with muskets and placed in positions convenient for use in time of danger.

I have briefly described these conditions because, in the centuries during which they existed, they gave rise to a body of international law in which the rules affecting the status of the armed merchantmen were probably better defined by the general usage and assent of nations than in almost any department of international jurisprudence. It was established by practice and by universal assent that a merchantman armed only for defence did not thereby lose her character as a merchantman, and that when war existed the armed merchantman, both of the belligerent and the neutral, retained all the privileges and rights which belonged to the merchantman when entirely unarmed. I shall not, however, enter upon a general survey of the codes or the opinions and practice of other nations in this respect. I shall content myself with tracing as

briefly as I can the course and the position of the United States upon this very important matter. There was never any doubt as to the broad rule that a merchantman armed for defence did not lose her character as a peaceful trader. The only point to be determined was whether by her acts or by the character of her armament and the numbers of her crew she was within the rules applying to the merchantmen or whether she had taken herself out of those rules and had come within the class of the ship of war or the privateer. It was universally agreed by all authorities that the armament of the merchantman could be used only in self-defence, although that self-defence might extend to capturing the vessel which attacked.[1] If an armed merchantman took the offensive she at once passed out of the category of merchantmen and not having any commission or letters of marque, like a privateer, she would have been treated not merely as a ship of war but would have been within range of the definition of piracy.

The first qualification, therefore, was that the armament of the merchantman could be used only for defence. The next qualification was the character of the armament, and that had to be determined in each case. It was a question of fact. No exact line as to the amount of armament has ever been drawn. In the case of the Charming Betsy (2 Cranch, 120–21), Chief Justice Marshall said: —

> The degree of arming which should bring a vessel within this description has not been ascertained, and perhaps it would be difficult precisely to mark the limits, the passing of which would bring a captured vessel within the description of the acts of Congress on this subject.

[1] This is recognized by our own law passed in 1819 and still upon the statute book.

This probably expresses the exact state of the law of that period. With the changes which time has brought there have been alterations, of course, in the arming of merchantmen, but the principles have remained unchanged. For example, Professor Snow, in his "International Law," said in 1888: —

It may be reasonably expected in coming naval wars that steamers of the great mail lines will be armed so as to defend themselves from attack rather than seek convoy, and the defence will be legitimately carried to the point of seizure of the attacking vessel or a recapture if once taken. Without a proper commission a private vessel, however, should act only directly or indirectly on the defensive, and not go out of the way to capture enemy vessels. It cannot, of course, take any belligerent action toward vessels of a neutral power. (P. 83.)

This statement may be taken as embodying the rule generally acknowledged by English and American judges and writers. The same principles are recognized in the different codes with reference to the armed merchant ships of belligerents, with which I am here alone concerned. The Italian Code of 1877 says: —

Merchantmen, on being attacked by other vessels, including war vessels, may defend themselves against and even seize them.

The Russian Prize Regulations of 1895 say: —

The right to stop, examine, and seize hostile or suspected vessels and cargoes belongs to the ships of the Imperial Navy. Vessels of the mercantile navy have a right to do so only when they are attacked by hostile or suspected vessels.

The United States Naval War Code of 1900 says: —

The personnel of merchant vessels of an enemy, who, in self-defence and in protection of the vessel placed in their charge, resist an attack, are entitled if captured to the status of prisoners of war.

The right of a belligerent merchantman to defend itself is also recognized by writers of weight and authority of our own and of other countries. The Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Oxford in 1913, laid down the following rule: —

> It is always permitted, both to public and private ships, to employ force to defend themselves against the attack of an enemy.

This general statement of the Institute shows that the defence of the merchantman is not confined to pirate and privateer. "Attack of an enemy" is the expression used, and that means the enemy in war.

I make brief reference to these codes merely to demonstrate that the broad principle established in past centuries as to the right of a merchantman to be armed without thereby losing its character has not changed in modern times with the new conditions of modern commerce and warfare.

I now come to the more important question which most immediately concerns us, the right of a neutral to ship cargo or take passage on the merchantman of a belligerent in time of war, when that merchantman is armed solely for self-defence, the authorities all holding that the arming does not alter the character of the vessel. The most important decision is given in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of the Nereide (9 Cranch, 388). I should like to read the whole decision to the Senate, for it is a most masterly opinion. I should particularly like to read the paragraph at the end where, in describing the brilliant argument of Mr. Pinkney, the great Chief Justice displays the humor and satire of which he was capable but which he rarely used. There were many points in the decision, however, which do not concern the

immediate question, so I shall confine myself to quoting that portion of it which treats of the rights of a neutral to ship goods or take passage on an armed belligerent merchantman. The principles laid down by Chief Justice Marshall are, I may say, just as applicable to-day as they were then, for they rest on the broadest doctrines of law.

Chief Justice Marshall says: —

The next point to be considered is the right of a neutral to place his goods on board an armed belligerent merchantman.

That a neutral may lawfully put his goods on board a belligerent ship for conveyance on the ocean is universally recognized as the original rule of the law of nations. It is, as has already been stated, founded on the plain and simple principle that the property of a friend remains his property wherever it may be found. "Since it is not," says Vattel, "the place where a thing is which determines the nature of that thing, but the character of the person to whom it belongs; things belonging to neutral persons which happen to be in an enemy's country or on board an enemy's ships are to be distinguished from those which belong to the enemy."

Bynkershoek lays down the same principles in terms equally explicit and in terms entitled to the more consideration, because he enters into the inquiry whether a knowledge of the hostile character of the vessel can affect the owner of the goods.

The same principle is laid down by other writers on the same subject and is believed to be contradicted by none. It is true there were some old ordinances of France declaring that a hostile vessel or cargo should expose both to condemnation. But these ordinances have never constituted a rule of public law. It is deemed of much importance that the rule is universally laid down in terms which comprehend an armed as well as an unarmed vessel, and that armed vessels have never been excepted from it. Bynkershoek, in discussing a question suggesting an exception, with his mind directed to hostilities, does not hint that this privilege is confined to unarmed merchantmen.

In point of fact, it is believed that a belligerent merchant vessel rarely sails unarmed, so that this exception from the rule would be greater than the rule itself. At all events, the number of those

that are unarmed and who sail under convoy is too great not to have attracted the attention of writers on public law, and this exception to their broad general rule, if it existed, would certainly be found in some of their works. It would be strange if a rule laid down, with a view to war, in such broad terms as to have universal application, should be so construed as to exclude from its operation almost every case for which it purports to provide, and yet that not a dictum should be found in the books pointing to such construction.

The antiquity of the rule is certainly not unworthy of consideration. It is to be traced back to the time when almost every merchantman was in a condition for self-defence, and the implements of war were so light and so cheap that scarcely any would sail without them.

A belligerent has a perfect right to arm in his own defence, and a neutral has a perfect right to transport his goods in a belligerent vessel. These rights do not interfere with each other. The neutral has no control over the belligerent right to arm — ought he to be accountable for the exercise of it?

By placing neutral property in a belligerent ship that property, according to the positive rule of law, does not cease to be neutral. Why should it be changed by the exercise of a belligerent right, universally acknowledged and in common use when the rule was laid down, and over which the neutral had no control?

The belligerent answers that, by arming, his rights are impaired. By placing his goods under the guns of an enemy the neutral has taken part with the enemy and assumed the hostile character.

Previous to that examination which the court has been able to make of the reasoning by which this proposition is sustained, one remark will be made which applies to a great part of it. The argument which, taken in its fair sense, would prove that it is unlawful to deposit goods for transportation in the vessels of an enemy generally, however imposing its form, must be unsound because it is in contradiction to acknowledged law.

. . . . . .

To the argument that by placing his goods in the vessel of an armed enemy he connects himself with that enemy and assumes the hostile character, it is answered that no such connection exists.

The object of the neutral is the transportation of his goods. His connection with the vessel which transports them is the same whether that vessel be armed or unarmed. The act of arming is not his; it is the act of a party who has a right to do so. He meddles not with the armament nor with the war. Whether his goods were on board or not, the vessel would be armed and would sail. His goods do not contribute to the armament further than the freight he pays and freight he would pay were the vessel unarmed.

It is difficult to perceive in this argument anything which does not also apply to an unarmed vessel. In both instances it is the right and the duty of the carrier to avoid capture and to prevent a search. There is no difference except in the degree of capacity to carry this duty into effect. The argument would operate against the rule which permits the neutral merchant to employ a belligerent vessel without imparting to his goods the belligerent character.

The argument respecting resistance stands upon the same ground with that which respects arming. Both are lawful. Neither of them is chargeable to the goods or their owner where he has taken no part in it. They are incidents to the character of the vessel, and may always occur where the carrier is belligerent.

. . . . . .

If the neutral character of the goods is forfeited by the resistance of the belligerent vessel, why is not the neutral character of the passengers forfeited by the same cause? The master and crew are prisoners of war; why are not those passengers who did not engage in the conflict also prisoners? That they are not would seem to the court to afford a strong argument in favor of the goods. The law would operate in the same manner on both.

It will be observed that the Chief Justice takes the passenger as exercising an absolutely unquestioned right, and that he is not subject to the law which makes the crew and the officers prisoners.

In the same case, Mr. Justice Johnson, who agreed in the decision but on somewhat different grounds, said: —

The general rule, the incontestable principle, is that a neutral has a right to employ a belligerent carrier. He exposes himself thereby to capture and detention, but not to condemnation.

. . . . . .

Every writer on international law acknowledges the right of the neutral to transport his goods in a hostile bottom. No writer has restricted the exercise of that right to unarmed ships.

. . . . . .

And what is the decision of reason on the merits of these conflicting pretensions?

Her first and favorite answer would be that were the scales equally suspended between the parties the decision ought to be given in favor of humanity.

Already is the aspect of the world sufficiently darkened by the horrors of war. It is time to listen to the desponding claims of man engaged in the peaceful pursuits of life.

But there are considerations in favor of the neutral to which the heart need not assent; they are addressed to the judgment alone.

Admit the claim of the belligerent and you fritter away the right of the neutral until it is attenuated to a vision.

Admit the claim of the neutral and it is attended with a very immaterial change in the rights and interests of the belligerent.

Where are we to draw the line? If a vessel is not to be armed, what is to amount to an exceptionable armament? It extends to an absolute and total privation of the right of arming a hostile ship. Resistance, and even capture, is lawful to any belligerent that is attacked.

On the other hand, what injury is done to the belligerent by recognizing the right of the neutral; the cargo of a belligerent neither adds nor diminishes his right to resist. If empty, he must be subdued before he can be possessed; and, if laden, the right or faculty of resistance is in no wise increased. It is inherent in her national character and can be exercised by strict right without any reference to the cargo that she contains. Suppose the case of a vessel and cargo wholly neutral; even she possesses a natural right to resist seizure, but her resistance must be effectual or international law pronounces her forfeited. What injury results to the belligerent cruiser? If the cargo be really neutral, the exercise of his right or judgment becomes

immaterial; and if it be contraband, or otherwise subject to condemnation, what reason in nature can be assigned why the neutral owner should not throw himself upon the fortune of war and rely upon the protection of your enemy? You treat him as an enemy if captured, and why should not he regard you as an enemy and provide for his defence against you? I can very well conceive that a case may occur in which it may become the policy of this country to throw down the gauntlet to the world and assert a different principle. But the policy of these States is submitted to the wisdom of the legislature, and I shall feel myself bound by other reasons until the constitutional power shall decide what modification it will prescribe to the exercise of any acknowledged neutral right.

This decision was confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Atalanta (3 Wheaton, p. 400).

In these decisions it may be justly said, I think, that the court did not lay sufficient emphasis on the difference between a commissioned and an uncommissioned merchantman, but there can be no question as to the breadth and strength of the decisions as to the right of the neutral to place goods or take passage upon an armed belligerent merchantman, provided that the merchantman came within the rules affecting the armament of merchantmen. But little is said about passengers, because it had never then occurred to any one that a passenger on a belligerent merchantman armed for defence was not there in the exercise of an undoubted right. The rule that the crew of a captured belligerent merchantman were to be treated as prisoners of war and neutral passengers were to be set free at the first opportunity, and that all alike were to be taken on board the captor and kept there in safety, was never questioned for a moment by any authority. If you will take the trouble to turn to Moore's "International Law" (vol. VII, p. 490) and read the discussion on the

subject of the destruction and sending in of prizes, you will see that the protection of the lives, not only of the neutral passengers, but of the crew of the captured ship, is taken as a matter of course, and that any other action looking to the destruction of the crew and passengers has always been regarded in the past as differing in no respect from murder and piracy. We may, therefore, take it as demonstrated by the decisions of the courts and the opinions of all the best writers on international law that a neutral has a clear right to take passage and ship goods on a belligerent merchantman, and that the merchantman being armed for self-defence does not impair this right in the slightest degree or take the merchantman out of the class or deprive it of the privileges of the unarmed trading vessel.

Now let us see what the attitude of our own Government has been in practice. In August, 1862, the British Chargé d'Affaires represented to our Government, on information received from naval officers, that a British steamer had been chased and fired on by a United States cruiser which had not displayed her colors, and had then been captured without search. This led Mr. Lincoln to direct that the following instructions be issued to our vessels of war: —

> Secondly. That while diligently exercising the right of visitation on all suspected vessels, you are in no case authorized to chase and fire at a foreign vessel without showing your colors and giving her the customary preliminary notice of a desire to speak and visit her.

Mr. Lincoln made it evident by these instructions that he was utterly opposed to having a ship of the United States creep up under false colors, or in any disguise, upon a merchantman and capture or destroy her without

visit and search. I think we may say with certainty that that great President would never have assented to having a United States submarine crawl up under water to a merchantman and destroy her, with all on board, including neutral and non-combatant men, women, and children, without giving them any opportunity to escape. The difference in the instrument of destruction makes no difference in the principle laid down by Lincoln in the instructions I have just quoted.

In the next war in which the United States was engaged, the war with Spain, President McKinley issued the following instructions (General Orders, No. 492, June 20, 1898; Foreign Relations, 1898, 781):—

> This right should be exercised with tact and consideration and in strict conformity with treaty provisions wherever they exist. The following directions are given, subject to any special treaty stipulations: After firing a blank charge and causing the vessel to lie to, the cruiser shall send a small boat, no larger than a whaleboat, with an officer to conduct the search. There may be arms in the boat, but the men should not wear them on their persons. The officer, wearing his side arms and accompanied on board by not more than two of his boat crew, unarmed, should first examine the vessel's papers to ascertain her nationality and her ports of departure and destination. If she is neutral and trading between neutral ports, the examination goes no further. If she is neutral and bound to an enemy's port not blockaded, the papers which indicate the character of her cargo should be examined. If these show contraband of war, the vessel should be seized; if not, she should be set free, unless, by reason of strong grounds of suspicion, a further search should seem to be requisite.

Contrast these instructions of Lincoln and McKinley, with their humanity, morality, and respect for law, with what was actually done in the cases of the Lusitania, the Arabic, and the Ancona.

We now come to the position taken by our Government in the present war. At the very beginning, on the 19th of September, 1914, Mr. Lansing sent to all the representatives of foreign powers the following circular, defining the status of armed merchant vessels: —

(A) A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defence without acquiring the character of a ship of war.

(B) The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a merchant vessel creates the presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defence.

(C) Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament is solely for defence and will not be used offensively, whether the armament be mounted or stowed below, must be presented in each case independently at an official investigation. The result of the investigation must show conclusively that the armament is not intended for and will not be used in offensive operations.

Indications that the armament will not be used offensively are: —

1. That the calibre of the guns carried does not exceed six inches —

That is a pretty formidable gun —

2. That the guns and small arms carried are few in number.

3. That no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel.

4. That the quantity of ammunition carried is small.

5. That the vessel is manned by its usual crew and the officers are the same as those on board before war was declared.

6. That the vessel intends to and actually does clear for a port lying in its usual trade route or a port indicating its purpose to continue in the same trade in which it was engaged before war was declared.

7. That the vessel takes on board fuel and supplies sufficient

only to carry it to its port of destination or the same quantity substantially which it has been accustomed to take for a voyage before war was declared.

8. That the cargo of the vessel consists of articles of commerce unsuited for the use of a ship of war in operations against an enemy.

9. That the vessel carries passengers who are as a whole unfitted to enter the military or naval service of the belligerent whose flag the vessel flies, or of any of its allies, and particularly if the passenger list includes women and children.

10. That the speed of the ship is slow.

(D) Port authorities, on the arrival in a port of the United States of an armed vessel of belligerent nationality claiming to be a merchant vessel, should immediately investigate and report to Washington on the foregoing indications as to the intended use of the armament, in order that it may be determined whether the evidence is sufficient to remove the presumption that the vessel is and should be treated as a ship of war. Clearance will not be granted until authorized from Washington, and the master will be so informed upon arrival.

(E) The conversion of a merchant vessel into a ship of war is a question of fact which is to be established by direct or circumstantial evidence of intention to use the vessel as a ship of war.

Mr. Sutherland. Will the Senator give the date of those instructions?

Mr. Lodge. The 19th of September, 1914.

Mr. Thomas. The Senator stated that it was Mr. Lansing?

Mr. Lodge. Mr. Lansing. He was Acting Secretary of State at that time and signed the circular.

Nothing could have been more explicit. This circular in all its terms follows exactly the practice of nations for many centuries, adopts the rules which had been evolved in regard to the treatment of armed merchantmen and their status and adheres to the policy pursued by our own Government, not only as exhibited in the decisions of our

courts, but in the instructions to our officers in time of war. This circular shows that in the opinion of our Government a merchantman does not lose its character by carrying defensive armament, that the only question is one of fact as to the amount of that armament, the uses to which it is put, and the general character of the ship; that if the armed merchantman conforms to the limitations embodied in law and expressed in the circular, she does not lose her status as a merchantman, and the fact that she is armed for self-defence does not impair in the slightest degree the right of the neutral to ship goods or take passage on such a ship.

A little later, on the 7th of November, 1914, Mr. Lansing sent the following note to Mr. Gerard, our ambassador at Berlin: —

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 7, 1914.

Your 515, October 15. The Government of the United States is obliged to dissent from the views of the German Government as expressed in your telegram in regard to the treatment to be accorded armed merchant vessels of belligerent nationalities in neutral ports. The practice of a majority of nations and the consensus of opinion by the leading authorities on international law, including many German writers, support the proposition that merchant vessels may arm for defence without losing their private character and that they may employ such armament against hostile attack without contravening the principles of international law.

The purpose of an armament on a merchant vessel is to be determined by various circumstances, among which are the number and position of the guns on the vessel, the quantity of ammunition and fuel, the number and sex of the passengers, the nature of the cargo, etc. Tested by evidence of this character the question as to whether an armament on a merchant vessel is intended solely for defensive purposes may be readily answered, and the neutral Government should regulate its treatment of the vessel in accordance with the intended use of the armament.

This Government considers that in permitting a private vessel having a general cargo, a customary amount of fuel, an average crew, and passengers of both sexes on board, and carrying a small armament and a small amount of ammunition to enjoy the hospitality of an American port as a merchant vessel, it is in no way violating its duty as a neutral. Nevertheless it is not unmindful of the fact that the circumstances of a particular case may be such as to cause embarrassment and possible controversy as to the character of an armed private vessel visiting its ports. Recognizing, therefore, the desirability of avoiding a ground of complaint, this Government, as soon as a case arose, while frankly admitting the right of a merchant vessel to carry a defensive armament, expressed its disapprobation of a practice which compelled it to pass upon a vessel's intended use, which opinion if proven subsequently to be erroneous might constitute a ground for a charge of unneutral conduct.

As a result of these representations no merchant vessels with armaments have visited the ports of the United States since the 10th of September. In fact, from the beginning of the European war but two armed private vessels have entered or cleared from ports of this country, and as to these vessels their character as merchant vessels was conclusively established.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the German Government, and in doing so express the hope that they will also prevent their merchant vessels from entering the ports of the United States carrying armaments, even for defensive purposes, though they may possess the right to do so by the rules of international law.

It will be seen by this note that although Mr. Lansing expresses the hope that merchantmen may not be armed because armament gives rise to many questions of fact, he admits in the fullest way the right of the merchantman to arm for self-defence without losing her character, and the right of the neutral to take passage or ship goods on the merchantman remains unimpaired by the fact that the merchantman possesses a defensive armament.

Again, in the President's note of May 13, 1915, after

the Lusitania disaster, which was signed by Mr. Bryan, it is said: —

> American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in travelling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

That was no longer ago than May, 1915.

Such, in outline, has been the practice of all nations in regard to the armed merchantman. Such has been the position of our own Government down to less than a year ago. It seems utterly incredible that this position should be in any way altered now or that our Government should be ready to surrender the unquestioned rights of Americans to travel or ship goods on a belligerent merchantman subject to all the rules which have been established by the courts and by all international authorities for at least two centuries. The just rights of the citizens of any nation cannot be maintained by their surrender.

The abandonment of those rights by any neutral Government, on the theory that the invention of submarines with the necessary limitations upon the powers of capture possessed by those boats has made those rights indefensible, is inconceivable. Such abandonment could only rest on the ground that the rights of neutrals, the rules which for centuries have been agreed upon by all nations for the protection of innocent lives upon vessels captured in war, must be thrown aside and discarded in order that a new instrument of maritime destruction shall not be impeded in its work of death and murder. Such a doctrine is re-

volting to every instinct of humanity, to every principle of law and justice.

There is, however, another side to this matter which is of even graver importance. There can be no question that any act by a neutral which alters conditions created by the war is an unneutral act and places the neutral upon the side of one belligerent or the other. This is eminently true of any form of embargo, and there is no need that I should repeat the unanswerable argument on this point embodied by Mr. Lansing in his note of last August to the Government of Austria-Hungary. The war, and the war alone, has also created conditions under which any change at this time in the attitude which we took officially at the outset of the war in regard to armed merchantmen would be an unneutral act. The merchantmen of one belligerent have been swept from the seas. Therefore if we should abandon all the principles on this subject which we have always hitherto sustained, if we should abandon the rules laid down by Mr. Lansing in his circular of September, 1914, and declare that our ports were closed to armed merchantmen, or that goods and passengers from the United States could not be placed on an uncommissioned merchantman, armed solely for self-defence, our action would affect only one belligerent; it would alter conditions created by the war, and would therefore be unneutral. It would make us at once the ally of the belligerent whose merchant marine has been driven from the ocean. It would put us in a position of hostility to those belligerents whose merchant marine still freely sail the seas. It would make us the ally of one belligerent and expose us to the just hostility of the others. It would be a step toward war with the Allies and would place us on the side of Germany. For these reasons I cannot believe that the reports which have been

published in the press can possibly be true, and I hope the somewhat confused contradictions are well founded. I cannot believe that the Administration thinks for a moment of altering, weakening, or impairing the well-defined position which it took at the outset of the European war, and I believe that it must stand as firmly on this question as it has on the question of the embargo. Should it act otherwise it would accept a humiliation and incur a danger of war from which even the boldest and the most unscrupulous would shrink, and therefore such a course as has been discussed in the newspapers seems to me wholly inconceivable.

APPENDIX

Authorities and Opinions as to the Status of Armed Merchantmen

The conversion of a merchant vessel into a ship of war is a question of fact which is to be established by direct or circumstantial evidence of intention to use the vessel as a ship of war. (The American Journal of International Law. Supplement, January, 1915. Official documents, pp. 121, 122.)

"In answer to your request for an expression of opinion in regard to Mr. Ogden's question whether a vessel which he is said to be fitting out for a trading voyage to the South Sea Islands can carry two guns and other arms for protection and defence against the natives, I am not aware of any international prohibition or of any treaty provision which would prevent a vessel trading amid the groups of islands of the South Sea from carrying a couple of guns and arms for the proper and necessary protection of the vessel against violence on the part of lawless or partially civilized communities, or of the piratical crews which are represented to occasionally frequent those waters, providing always that the vessel carrying such guns and arms itself be on a lawful voyage and be engaged in none other than peaceful commerce, and that such guns and arms be intended and be used solely for the purpose of defence and of self-protection." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Morrill, Feb. 8, 1877; 117 Dom. Let. 54.)

"A copy of your No. 23, of the 10th instant, in regard to the case

of the American schooner Water Witch, which arrived in Haitian waters with two cannon and sixty pounds of powder on board, having been transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, that official has replied to your inquiry whether sailing vessels of the United States are allowed to carry any armament as ship's stores or otherwise that the laws do not forbid the carrying of articles of the character mentioned, provided there shall be no violation of chapter 67 of the Revised Statutes." (Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to Mr. Smythe, Minister to Haiti, Jan. 31, 1894. For. Rel., 1894, 337; MS. Inst. Haiti, III, 375.)

Chapter 67, Revised Statutes, embracing sections 5281 to 5291, relates to neutrality. Section 5289 reads as follows: —

"SEC. 5289. The owners or consignees of every armed vessel sailing out of the ports of the United States, belonging wholly or in part to citizens thereof, shall, before clearing out the same, give bond to the United States, with sufficient sureties in double the amount of the value of the vessel and cargo on board, including her armament, conditioned that the vessel shall not be employed by such owners to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace."

"It should also be borne in mind that a merchant vessel using arms for acts of destruction on the high seas unless duly commissioned for the purpose, may expose herself to a charge of piracy.

"The law does not prohibit armed vessels belonging to citizens of the United States from sailing out of our ports; it only requires the owners to give security that such vessels shall not be employed by them to commit hostilities against foreign powers at peace with the United States." (United States *v.* Quincy, 6 Pet., 445.)

The seizure by France of an American merchantman and her condemnation cannot be justified by the fact that she was armed for defensive purposes. (Cushing *v.* United States, 22 Ct. Cl., 1; Hooper *v.* United States, 22 Ct. Cl., 408; Moore, J. B., A digest of international law, vol. 2, pp. 1070, 1071.)

Non-commissioned vessels have a right to resist when summoned to surrender to public ships or privateers of the enemy. The crews therefore which make such resistance have belligerent privileges; and it is a natural consequence of the legitimateness of their acts that if they succeed in capturing their assailant the capture is a good one for the purpose of changing the ownership of the property taken and of making the enemy prisoners of war. (Harg. Law T., 245, 246, 247; W. E. Hall, International Law, 6th ed., pp. 524–525; London, 1909.)

Sir Matthew Hale held it to be depredation in a subject to attack the enemy's vessels, except in his own defence, without a commission.

(Harg. Law T., 245, 246, 247.) The subject has been repeatedly discussed in the Supreme Court of the United States (Brown *v.* United States, 8 Cranch, 132–135; the Nereide, 9 Cranch, 449; the Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat., 76, and 10 Wheat., 306; the Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat., 1), and the doctrine of international law is considered to be that private citizens cannot acquire a title to hostile property unless seized under a commission, but they may still lawfully seize hostile property in their own defence. (Kent's Commentary on International Law, edited by J. T. Abdy, 2d ed.; 1878; pp. 225, 226.)

To enable a vessel to make captures which shall enure to the benefit of the captors it is necessary that she should have a commission of prize. But noncommissioned vessels of a belligerent nation may not only make captures in their own defence, but may, at all times, capture hostile ships and cargoes without being deemed by the law of nations to be pirates; though they can have no interest in prizes so captured. (2 Brown's Civ. and Adm. Law, 524; Caseregis, Disc., 24, No. 24; 2 Woodes, Lect., 432; Consolato del Mare, ch. 287, 288; 3 Buls., 27; 4 Inst., 152, 154; Zouch. Adm. Jurisd., ch. 4, 101; Com. Dig. Admiralty, E. 3; the Georgiana, 1 Dodson, 397; the Diligentia, id., 403; the Emulous, 8 Cranch. 131; the Nereide, 9 Cranch. 449; the Dos Hermanos, ante, 76; 2 Wheat. [U.S.] Appendix, p. 7.)

Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships

(Signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907)

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc.:

Whereas it is desirable, in view of the incorporation in time of war of merchant ships in the fighting fleet, to define the conditions subject to which this operation may be effected;

Whereas, however, the contracting powers have been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this agreement and is in no way affected by the following rules;

Being desirous of concluding a convention to this effect, have appointed the following as their plenipotentiaries:

(Here follow the names of plenipotentiaries.)

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. A merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and duties accruing to such vessels unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the power whose flag it flies.

Art. 2. Merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality.

Art. 3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must figure on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet.

Art. 4. The crew must be subject to military discipline.

Art. 5. Every merchant ship converted into a warship must observe in its operations the laws and customs of war.

Art. 6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of warships.

Art. 7. The provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention.

Ratifications, Adhesions, and Reservations

The foregoing convention was ratified by the following signatory powers on the dates indicated: —

Austria-Hungary, November 27, 1909; Belgium, August 8, 1910; Brazil, January 5, 1914; Denmark, November 27, 1909; France, October 7, 1910; Germany, November 27, 1909; Great Britain, November 27, 1909; Guatemala, March 15, 1911; Haiti, February 2, 1910; Japan, December 13, 1911; Luxemburg, September 5, 1912; Mexico, November 27, 1909; Netherlands, November 27, 1909; Norway, September 19, 1910; Panama, September 11, 1911; Portugal, April 13, 1911; Roumania, March 1, 1912; Russia, November 27, 1909; Salvador, November 27, 1909; Siam, March 12, 1910; Spain, March 18, 1913; Sweden, November 27, 1909; and Switzerland, May 12, 1910.

Adhesions: Liberia, February 4, 1914; and Nicaragua, December 16, 1909.

The following powers signed the convention, but have not yet ratified: —

Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Servia, Turkey, and Venezuela.

Reservation: (This reservation was made at signature.) Turkey. Under reservation of the declaration made at the eighth plenary session of the conference of October 9, 1907.

[Extract from the procès-verbal.]

The Imperial Ottoman Government does not engage to recognize as vessels of war ships which, being in its waters or on the high seas under a merchant flag, are converted on the opening of hostilities. (Actes et documents, vol. i, p. 277.)

Criteria of a war vessel

	Italy	*Netherlands*	*Russia*	*United States*
Command	Officer of the navy.	Military commander.	Naval officer in active service.	Regularly commissioned officer.
Crew.....	Subject to all rules of military discipline.	Military crew wholly or in part.	Subject to all Military laws.	Subject to military law and discipline.
Registration..	.....	.....	In the list of war ships.	
Flag.....	.....	Naval ensign and pennant at bow and masts.	Naval ensign.	
Ship's papers.	.....	Commission from the competent national authorities.	.....	
Compliance with laws and customs of war.	.....	Yes.....	.....	

Great Britain: A warship is every vessel which sails under a recognized flag and which has been armed at the expense of the State for use against the enemy, and whose officers and crew have been commissioned by their competent authorities for that purpose. A vessel may receive this character only before sailing from a national port and may give it up only after the return into a national port. Auxiliary cruiser is every enemy or neutral merchant ship which is used for transportation of marines, munitions of war, fuel, foodstuffs, water, or other ammunitions of war for a fleet, or which is commissioned to make repairs, to deliver dispatches, for reconnoitring, in so far as it must follow the sailing directions directly or indirectly given by the navy. This definition covers also every vessel which is used for transportation of troops.

(Source: Kriege, Dr. Walter. "Die Umwandlung von Kauffahrteischiffen in Kriegschiffe." In Niemeyer's Zeitschrift für Internationales Recht., v. 26, no. 1–2, München, 1915.)

Germany: The necessary characteristics of warships are: The naval ensign (as a rule, the pennant), a Government-appointed commander whose name is entered on the service list of the navy, and a crew under military discipline (see secs. 2–4 and 6 of Agreement VII of the Second Hague Conference.) (From chap. 1, sec. 2, of German Prize Law of Sept. 30, 1909, promulgated Aug. 3, 1914.)

VIII

WASHINGTON'S POLICIES OF NEUTRALITY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT MORRISTOWN, N.J.,
FEBRUARY 22, 1916

VIII

WASHINGTON'S POLICIES OF NEUTRALITY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

SINCE the present century came in we have all become familiar with the agitation which has been carried on for the restoration of popular government in the United States. The radiance and energy of this movement have been a little dimmed lately through the absorption of the public interest in the Great War, but it was very conspicuous before the war began. Just where and when popular government in the United States was lost has never been clearly explained, but the method proposed for its restoration was to change — we might almost say destroy — the government which Washington founded and which Lincoln described as "of the people, for the people, and by the people." When the opinions of Washington and Lincoln on this point were quoted, we were told that Lincoln lived fifty years ago, and Washington in a period of great antiquity, and that although they were undoubtedly remarkable men in their day they could hardly be compared with the master minds engaged in undoing their work, and, moreover, that everything had altered since they flourished, and that what they thought was, therefore, not now important. This view involves a somewhat wide and far-reaching proposition which, briefly and broadly stated, amounts to saying that there is nothing to be learned from the past.

I have said frequently, and I will venture to say again, that while I am far from thinking that all wisdom died with our forefathers I am perfectly certain that all wisdom was not born yesterday. The propositions in geometry of a certain Greek named Euclid are still generally accepted, and the fact that they are two thousand years old does not appear to impair their validity. The atomic theory put forward by Lucretius in his great poem, and derived by him from the Greeks of a much earlier time, may or may not be sound, but modern science has not thought it unworthy of consideration. You will indeed find Lucretius quoted on the first page of that very remarkable book, the "Men of the Old Stone Age," just published, by Henry Fairfield Osborn, one of the most eminent and distinguished of the world's scientific men. If this can be said of ancient mathematics and of ancient science, branches of learning where the advances of modern times have been greatest and most rapid, it is much more true of theories of government and society. Any one who will take the trouble to read the "Politics" of Aristotle or the "Republic" of Plato will discover that there are very few phases of the relations of human beings associated in states and governments which those two great intellects had not considered. If we pursue this subject historically we shall be interested to find how very rare any new idea in government is, and this arises from the fact that the chief element in government is human nature, which, we may assert with reasonable confidence, is as old as humanity itself. Some of the excellent persons who are engaged just now in the admirable work of improving existing conditions are fond of declaring that those who are sceptical about their panaceas have closed their minds against new ideas. I think that in saying this they labor under a misapprehension. That there

are minds shut to new ideas and which information cannot penetrate is undoubtedly true, but minds of this description are found quite as often among those who wish to change and reform everything as among those who are incapable of movement.

Every thinking man of any age is disposed, if not eager, to welcome new ideas, but the condition of his doing so is that the idea should be really new as well as beneficial. I have read disquisitions by persons who think that every one who disagrees with them is a foe of new ideas, and I have been struck very much by the fact that the ideas which they themselves bring forward with a great blare of trumpets as something wholly novel and destined to regenerate the world are apt to be very old. They put new dresses on them, they trick them out with ribbons, smooth away the wrinkles and touch the pallid faces with red, but they are the same old ideas with a long history of experiments and usually of more or less complete failure behind them. Therefore, when we are dealing with questions which are not new in the history of man and in which human nature and the capacity of human beings for self-control and self-government are largely involved, the wisdom of the greatest men of the past, who were called upon to meet these same questions and to deal with identical conditions, is just as valuable to-day as when it was exercised in bygone centuries for the benefit of mankind. The fact that Washington had never seen an automobile or a flying machine or received a wireless message does not alter in the least the value of his judgment as to forms of government or as to the conduct of nations and their relations to each other. Washington was not only a great but a very wise man of large experience who had reflected much upon all these subjects. It fell to him to lead in the establishment

and organization of a new government and to determine some of its great policies when it started upon its career. He then laid down certain fundamental doctrines, from some of which we have never swerved. He was the greatest man of his time; he was immensely successful in the work which he was called upon to do, and I think that from his calm wisdom we all, yes, even the youngest and wisest among us, can learn much to-day. The country has never suffered hitherto from following Washington's leadership and counsel, whether in his own lifetime or since. In dealing with questions where the underlying conditions, like human nature and international relations, are in their essence constant, I do not think we shall gravely err if we consider his advice to-day, and I think that in many directions it is just as applicable now as when he was President of the United States.

I do not intend to say anything of Washington's great services in bringing about the adoption of the Constitution or as to his general views of government. My purpose is merely to discuss briefly, first, the policy he adopted in our foreign relations under circumstances which have much resemblance to those which confront us to-day, and, second, a certain general rule which he laid down as essential in its observance to our safety and existence as a nation. Washington's accession to the Presidency was coincident with the beginning of the French Revolution, and before his first term had ended that revolution had brought on a general war in Europe. It became necessary, therefore, to determine what the attitude of the United States should be in the perilous conditions thus created. The difficulties of the situation were much enhanced by the fact that with France, one of the chief belligerents, we had a treaty of alliance and we were also bound to her by a strong sense

of gratitude and a very real sympathy. Nevertheless, Washington, after careful consideration and full discussion with his Cabinet, determined upon a policy of strict neutrality and, on April 22, 1793, issued his famous neutrality proclamation. This action was by no means so easy or so obvious as it is to-day. We had just emerged from the colonial condition and for one hundred years our peace had been involved in the peace of Europe. War in Europe had hitherto always meant war for the American Colonies. As Macaulay says in his essay upon "Frederick the Great":—

> The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown; and in order that he might rob a neighbor whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.

Thus it came to pass inevitably that the people of the United States had not in 1793 grasped the idea, since habits of thought change very slowly, that there could be a general war in Europe from which they were to hold themselves entirely aloof.

The situation was further complicated, as I have just said, by the general, intense, and very natural sympathy with France. Not only had France been our ally and helped us to win our independence, but since then the French, following our example, had turned from a despotic monarchy to a democracy. The inevitable feeling among the masses of the people was that we ought to be fighting on the side of France and against Great Britain, with whom we had been so recently at war. The policy of neutrality, therefore, was far from popular, but Washington was determined, not only to keep the country at peace, but to separate it once for all from the old idea that wars

in Europe necessarily involved the American people. The policy he then laid down, and which he reiterated in his Farewell Address, has been the policy of the United States ever since. The Monroe Doctrine of thirty years later was a mere corollary and extension of Washington's proposition that our interests and our future were different from those of the nations of Europe and demanded our separation from them. It all seems very simple now, but it was anything but simple then, and the declaration of neutrality was only the first step upon a path beset with difficulties and dangers. Washington was not a phrase-maker. When, after deep and anxious consideration, he laid down the policy of neutrality, he did so with the complete determination to carry it out rigidly. When he declared the country to be neutral he meant that it really should be a neutral and in that capacity should not only insist on every neutral right, but should also perform all neutral duties. The policy was soon brought to a sharp test by the acts of Genêt, Minister of the French Republic, who endeavored in various ways to use the United States as a base of supplies for naval operations against England. Washington endured Genêt's performances, with the large patience so characteristic of him always, until a point was reached when forbearance ceased to be a virtue and inaction would have made the policy of neutrality seem at once false and absurd. He therefore demanded Genêt's recall.

In this action in regard to Genêt, Washington was fulfilling the duties of a neutral. Let us now see how he dealt with a vital question of neutral rights. The question arose as to the export of arms and munitions of war and their sale to belligerents. Washington himself made no specific utterance, but he spoke through his Admin-

istration. On the 15th of May, 1793, shortly after the proclamation of neutrality, Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State, wrote as follows to the British Minister: —

Our citizens have been always free to make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in practice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an internal disarrangement of their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President's proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as shall fall into the hands of any of the belligerent powers on their way to the ports of their enemies. To this penalty our citizens are warned that they will be abandoned, and that even private contraventions may work no inequality between the parties at war, the benefit of them will be left equally free and open to all.

On August 4 of the same year Hamilton, in a Treasury circular, stated the same proposition in his own concise and lucid way: —

The purchasing within and exporting from the United States, by way of merchandise, articles commonly called contraband, being generally warlike instruments and military stores, is free to all the parties at war, and is not to be interfered with.

Hamilton had a large part in framing the neutrality policy and, like Jefferson, he expressed the views of the President and of the Administration. At a later date, in 1796, Mr. Lee, the Attorney-General, again expressed the opinion of the Administration as to the purchase of arms and munitions of war from a neutral. He said: —

Belligerents may come into the territory of a neutral nation and there purchase and remove any article whatsoever, even munitions of war, unless the right be denied by express statute.

If, however, the object of such an act be to impede the operations of either belligerent power and to favor the other it is a violation of neutrality.

At about the same time, on the 25th of May, 1796, Timothy Pickering, then Secretary of State, in reply to Mr. Adet, who had protested against the sale of contraband of war to Great Britain, again stated the views of Washington's Administration in the following language: —

In both the sections cited (110 and 113, Vattel) the right of neutrals to trade in articles contraband of war is clearly established; in the first, by selling to the warring powers who come to the neutral country to buy them; in the second, by the neutral subjects or citizens carrying them to the countries of the powers at war and there selling them.

Nothing could be clearer, as these citations show, than the view of Washington's Administration and of Hamilton and Jefferson as to the undoubted right of the citizens or subjects of a neutral power to sell arms and other munitions of war at their own risk to belligerents. The doctrine and the policy thus laid down by Washington's Administration have been strictly adhered to by the United States from that day to this. Chancellor Kent, whose authority is the very highest, says in his Commentaries (1 Kent's Comm. 142): —

It was contended on the part of the French Nation, in 1796, that neutral Governments were bound to restrain their subjects from selling or exporting articles contraband of war to the belligerent powers. But it was successfully shown, on the part of the United States, that neutrals may lawfully sell, at home, to a belligerent purchaser, or carry, themselves, to the belligerent powers, contraband articles subject to the right of seizure *in transitu*. This right has since been explicitly declared by the judicial authorities of this country. The right of the neutral to transport,

and of the hostile power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.

The case referred to by Chancellor Kent was the Santissima Trinidad (7 Wheaton, 283). Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:—

But there is nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no nation is bound to prohibit; and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation.

Thus it will be seen that the position taken by the Washington Administration has been sustained by the Supreme Court and by the great authority of Chancellor Kent. It has been the unbroken policy of our Government ever since Washington declared it. It is the American doctrine, and this American doctrine as to the export of arms and munitions of war from a neutral country was embodied in Article VII of the Hague Convention, which says:—

A neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.

When Genêt was recalled and this position was taken as to the export of arms and munitions of war, our new Government had just been established; its success was uncertain. We were poor and still struggling with the burdens left by the Revolution. With a large portion of the American people any act unfavorable to France was extremely unpopular, but Washington did not hesitate. He had declared the country to be neutral and he meant it to be so. To Washington nothing was more repulsive than bluster or fine language or large phrases which sounded

well and meant nothing. His words were simple, but the deed was always behind the words. He had measured accurately all the responsibilities which the policy of neutrality carried with it. He knew what he meant to do, and when the time came to enforce neutrality, vindicate the honor of the country, and support its declarations, he did not hesitate. He undoubtedly regretted that the people of the United States did not all understand the question and feel about it as he did, but groups of dissatisfied voters had no terrors for him when he had made up his mind to the performance of a great duty, as he conceived it. He succeeded in steering the new-born nation of which he was the head through the raging seas of the wars succeeding the French Revolution. Under his successor it became necessary to face one of the belligerents in arms, going to the very verge of declared war, but the Government did not falter and peace was the result. I have not attempted to enter into the details of Washington's neutrality policy. They may be read in all our histories and may, I think, be studied with advantage at this moment. My sole purpose was to call attention to the policy which Washington then laid down of separating the United States from the policies of Europe and establishing in this respect a system of our own, and especially to emphasize the manner in which he enforced neutrality both in its rights and its duties. The other important point to be remembered is that when he announced that policy and founded that system, he did it with a full realization of its dangers and difficulties and with a complete intention of carrying it out. He was emphatically a man of action, and he never came to a momentous decision, either in peace or war, where he was not prepared to act as circumstances demanded. When we celebrate Washington's Birthday it is well that we should consider what

he did, and see whether from his grave wisdom and his perfect courage there are not lessons to be learned, and whether he does not offer an example to be followed, for wisdom, courage, and pure patriotism can never be out of fashion.

The other great policy of Washington which seems to have most immediate connection with our own times was set forth at the very beginning of his Administration, and was by him regarded as essential to the safety, the success, and the future of the United States. In his speech to the Congress on the 8th of January, 1790, he said: —

> Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention, that of providing for the common defence will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
>
> A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies.

In this message occurs the sentence, so often quoted, that to be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. It ought always to be read with the succeeding sentence, which is not constantly quoted, but which is of almost equal weight and value, now as then. We should never forget that Washington laid it down as a fundamental rule that "a free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined." He demanded a well-digested plan of defence and ample provision for the manufacture of munitions of war by "promoting such manufacture." He saw nothing incompatible with a love of peace in preparation for war. On the contrary, he knew that such love could never be gratified

except by intelligent and large preparation for war in defence of the country. The democracy of Washington was not to buy its way to safety by gold, still less by the surrender of its rights, but was to assure and make real its ideal of peace by "arms and discipline."

Again, on December 3, 1793, he said to Congress: —

> If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.

"If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it"; how strange that must sound in certain ears to-day. There is no nobler figure, no finer character in history than George Washington, and he believed that an independent nation ought to be ready to repel insult. Noisy voices of late years have scoffed and scorned "national honor." Washington was as sensitive about his nation's honor as about his own. He was right about many things. Perhaps he was right about this. Who knows? There are many views about the conduct of life. This was the view of Washington. Then he repeats that readiness for war is the security of peace. The thought indeed was often in his mind and in varying forms was expressed by him in his letters. It was not a new thought, of which Washington himself was no doubt quite aware.

Indeed, if you will turn to your "Familiar Quotations" you will see that Horace said: —

> "In pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello";

and when Horace wrote his terse line he simply expressed what was probably a commonplace in the days of Augustus. But the fact that the doctrine represented the general opinion of the wisest men of all times only adds

weight to Washington's advice. We have followed Washington's counsels in many directions, but never in this one, and we have paid heavily in the past for not doing so. In the War of 1812 we raised, first and last and in various ways, half a million of men, largely untrained and unprepared, and yet a small body of British regulars marched almost unopposed to the City of Washington and burned the Capitol. In the same war, although we had no sufficient navy, we won a series of remarkable frigate victories, as well as the actions on the Lakes, because our little force, such as it was, was of the very best, well officered, well manned, and thoroughly prepared. What the utter absence of preparation cost the United States at the time of the Civil War it is impossible even to guess, but if in 1861 we had possessed a well-equipped regular army of one hundred thousand men, there are good judges who think that the Civil War would have been checked at its very inception.

The vital, living interest in Washington's declaration is that it meets so exactly the opposition to proper national defence which we are encountering to-day. The chief argument of the extreme pacifists is that a well-prepared national defence is an incentive to war. This Washington regarded as false. He puts his demand for preparedness on the ground that it will preserve peace, and no man ever lived more anxious for the preservation of peace than George Washington. It was the cardinal policy of his Administration. He believed profoundly that the success of the new Government depended on the maintenance of peace. He felt that time must be given for the cement which held the fabric of the United States together to harden. He knew, no one better, how frail the bonds were when the great experiment of a Union of States

under one government was attempted. He knew our weaknesses; no one so well. He had led us through seven years of war to victory and independence, and he knew by the bitterest experience that one of the worst obstacles which he had to meet in that long and trying conflict was the utter inefficiency of the Congress in dealing with the war. He had suffered from their refusal to do what was necessary. He had not forgotten that on the very eve of Yorktown, when the final victory was just coming within his grasp, Congress had proposed to reduce the army. No man could have been more convinced than he of the need of peace for the United States after the adoption of the Constitution. To preserve that peace he sacrificed the French alliance in order to make a treaty with England which dispelled the danger of war and brought about the withdrawal of the British from the western posts, thus removing a constant menace and opening the gates to the westward movement of the American people. Yet this devoted friend and upholder of peace, who had made such sacrifices and incurred so much unpopularity in maintaining it, told his people with grave emphasis that preparation for war was the surest way of preserving peace. He knew that nothing was more shallow than the argument that the possession of an ample national defence was an incentive to war. He was certain that it was just the reverse. He knew that armaments in themselves did not mean peace or war, but that it was the purpose of the armament which determined its results.

No man understood more thoroughly than Washington that armaments designed for conquest were a means of conquest, and that armaments designed purely for national defence were the greatest assurance of peace. To his clear mind, free from all illusions and looking facts straight in

the face, it was plain beyond dispute that a weak and undefended nation offered a temptation to other nations fully armed and seeking the spoils of war. Therefore this great lover of peace wished to assure peace, so far as it could be assured, by thorough preparation for a national defence which would be notice to all the world that we could not be attacked with impunity. In those days we were weak and poor; now we are rich and powerful, with a great population, but our vast material prosperity makes us, when undefended, more tempting to attack than ever before in our history.

We celebrate annually the Birthday of Washington that we may do honor, not only to him for what he did, but for what he was. If we really honor his memory we must not disregard his counsels. That pure patriotism, that broad outlook upon life, that grave wisdom, should be just as powerful with us to-day as when he accepted the Presidency of the United States. From neglecting his advice as to national defence we have suffered sorely in the past. Never in our history was that advice more pertinent than at this moment. We shall do well to follow the counsels of Washington rather than the unthinking babble of those who dwell in a world of illusions, and, unlike Washington, have never in their lives looked facts in the face and never have wandered beyond the range of police protection.

The people who mistake the frail conventions of civilization for the realities of human existence, who wholly fail to realize that domestic peace and law and order rest on the organized force of the community are dangerous guides to trust or follow. They are like children playing on the glittering surface of a frozen river, unconscious of the waters beneath. They seem incapable of comprehending

that when the ice goes all that holds the stream then rising in flood are the bridges and embankments which the power of man has erected. They are blind to the fact that if the dikes, which represent the force of the community, betrayed and weakened by neglect, shall break, the dark and rushing waves of the fierce torrent of human passions, of lawlessness, violence, and crime will sweep over the fair fields reclaimed by the slow labors of civilization and leave desolation and ruin in their track. With them the wise words of Horace — wise despite the fact that he lived two thousand years ago — fall upon deaf ears. I will venture to quote them: —

> "Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est,
> Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi."

They would do well to come out from the mists of large language in which they wander and learn from history, as Horace had learned, that most rights are the creation and offspring of prevented wrongs, and then sit down and consider just what that fact means. It is a fact well worthy of thought, for it lies deep at the very roots of things. Whence came "rights," as we call them? They are not natural forces like the tides of the ocean or the mysterious electric currents which glide invisible about this pendent world. They are not born with us like the color of our eyes or the shape of our skulls. They are the work of man. Consider a moment. Each of us has the right to pass along the road unmolested. It was not always so. In distant days a man could only go up and down on the earth if physically able to protect himself. In the slow process of the years the community stepped in and declared that interference with an innocent traveller was a wrong and must be prevented. The wrong prevented, the right came. Let the advocates of peace at any price, let the pacifists,

consider this. Force, and force alone, gives to them, as to all of us, the right of free speech. Withdraw the force that prevents the wrong and the right would disappear. It rests on the prevention of wrong and nothing else. As it is with the rights of the individual, so it is with the rights of nations. Fail in preparing the force to prevent wrong, invasion, and outrage and the right of the nation to peace and security, to live its own life and work out its own destiny, would vanish like the mists of the morning before the rising sun.

It has apparently become a commendable fashion of late to quote from the Bible in this discussion of national defence. Let me imitate, in connection with the believers in an unprotected peace bought at any price, those who have called our attention to Ezekiel and ask you to recall the words of the prophet Jeremiah: —

> Then said I, Ah, Lord God! behold, the prophets say unto them, Ye shall not see the sword, neither shall ye have famine; but I will give you assured peace in this place.
>
> Then the Lord said unto me, The prophets prophesy lies in my name; I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, neither spake I unto them; they prophesy unto you a false vision and divination, and a thing of nought, and the deceit of their heart.
>
> Therefore thus saith the Lord concerning the prophets that prophesy in my name, and I sent them not, yet they say, Sword and famine shall not be in this land; by sword and famine shall those prophets be consumed.

There is, however, much more here than the concrete question of national defence, vital as that question is. The opposition of those who, like Washington, would have the nation's defence always ready and prepared, to those who directly or indirectly resist any such preparation, involves a complete and radical difference as to the true

conception of life and duty. When I was a boy we used to declaim at school a speech which ended in this way: —

> Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death.

I dare say that boys are no longer permitted to recite that speech or sundry others by the same orator; that they may be regarded in certain quarters as containing improper ideas for a child to acquire. They certainly would not harmonize with the lofty and inspiring aspirations of those who like the song, "I did not raise my boy to be a soldier." But in my day the thought and the sentiment which Patrick Henry expressed with stormy eloquence were accepted as truisms, as declarations of duty which no one questioned. We also used to recite a speech which ran in this way: —

> "How beautiful is death, when earned by virtue!
> Who would not be that youth? What pity is it
> That we can die but once to serve our country!
> Why sits this sadness on your brows, my friends?
> I should have blushed if Cato's house had stood
> Secure, and flourished in a civil war.
> Portius, behold thy brother, and remember
> Thy life is not thine own, when Rome demands it."

That was the eighteenth-century conception of life and duty, as expressed by Addison, and it was the conception of Washington. That same conception of life and duty came down unbroken to the time of the Civil War. That which the schoolboys declaimed the men who saved the Union put into action. This conception, held by Washington and Lincoln and by the men, both North and South, who died in battle, was a very simple one. It was merely that there was something more precious than life, com-

fort, safety, money-making, prosperity. It probably never dawned on the mind of Washington that any one but a coward could question that there were certain duties to the country, to right and to humanity, which made the brief life which is here our portion as dust in the balance. I have no doubt that, once awakened, this same conception would be dominant among the American people now as it always has been in the past, and as it is at this moment with the nations across the water who are fighting for national existence, for all that they hold dearer than life. But the other doctrine, that the short and uncertain life which is given to us on earth is to be preserved at all hazards, even if its preservation involves becoming a tributary and subject nation, and that there is nothing for which life and comfort ought to be sacrificed, is widely and loudly preached.

To the proclamation of this doctrine great millionaires, who think the accumulation of money is the chief end of man, have given uncounted sums. It is a doctrine which, if successful, would destroy the soul of any people and would turn them into helpless degenerates, the ready victims of stronger and more manly races. Every sensible man, every humane man and woman hates war and, alas, we know only too well what the horrors of war are. We all wish peace to be maintained. We earnestly desire to see international law restored and enforced, but that is a very different thing from the acceptance of the doctrine that there is nothing for which life should be sacrificed. Between the conception of life which puts money and personal, physical safety first, and the conception of life held by Washington and Lincoln and those whom they led, which put freedom, honor, and self-respect first, the choice must be made. The greatness of a people is to be found

not in the amount of money which can be accumulated, or in the ease and softness which can be wrapped about life, but in what a people stands for in morals and in character. On this day of all others it seems to me that we should remember the conception of life and duty held by Washington. The men of his day who were for peace at any price frankly because they were afraid and cared more for money than aught else are forgotten, but the name of Washington is enshrined and reverenced in the memory of all nations. Let us not depart from his teachings or from his high conception of man's duty and the conduct of life. Let us apply that conception now and put it into action without fear or favor.

IX

ADDRESS

DELIVERED AT THE OPENING AND DEDICATION OF THE NEW BUILDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE, JUNE 14, 1916

IX

ADDRESS

Delivered at the Opening and Dedication of the New Buildings of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

We open here to-day and dedicate to education these new buildings prepared for their purposes with all the perfection which the best skill and the highest intelligence can devise. But this is not all. These buildings and their equipments are the inanimate mechanism, as yet motionless and silent, which must be stirred into life and set in motion by those who use it, the teachers and the taught. To them is thus given a larger opportunity than ever before, and this means that this great institution which has risen so high in its chosen field that no one can attribute to parochial pride the declaration that it stands second to none other in the world, will now enter upon a yet broader field of usefulness, and contribute more generously even than in the past to the cause of learning and to the development of trained and educated men.

With this memorable expansion of opportunity it is the hope of all those who are the friends of the higher education that the addition of Harvard's great endowments for applied science to the resources of the Institute may go hand in hand. There have been too many instances in this country of the multiplication, often in close proximity, of separate institutions designed for the same purpose and all

alike insufficiently endowed. The result has been that in such cases we have had several second-rate colleges or academies, destined always to remain so, instead of one institution of the first rank which could raise the general standard of education, give an assured reputation to its graduates and thus be of benefit and possess a commanding influence throughout the country. How much better will it be to concentrate all the power and resources of Harvard and of the Institute in the domain of applied science under this one spacious roof than to have two rival schools struggling for supremacy, with separated endowments and both within the limits of one city. It is an old saying that in union there is strength, and this is peculiarly the case in this instance.

Both in its actual accomplishment and its yet larger possibilities the completion of the work we commemorate here to-day suggests many reflections to which he who tries rightly to consider its meanings would fain give utterance. But I hesitate at the threshold, for on occasions like this I am always haunted by the dread of being or of seeming to be didactic. The definition of a didactic poem, that it is so called because it is not a poem and teaches nothing, stares one in the face. And yet when one is summoned to speak, the risk must be met, the danger dared, and the step that costs taken.

In the ceremonial observance of an important event affecting the advancement of learning the first thought which rises in the mind is inevitably of the men who will go forth from these buildings to take into their keeping the days that are yet to be. To those whose morning hours lie far behind, shining in the golden haze of memory, the temptation to recall the teachings of their experience in the world's great school is irresistible, and when they yield

to it they must be gently forgiven by the young and happy just entering upon active life. I shall try earnestly to avoid anything didactic, and yet I am going to venture so far as to utter first a word of warning and then an appeal, perhaps an exhortation. Both are merely suggestive, but both are deeply and sincerely felt and intended.

The word of warning first. Beware of the closed mind. This sounds like a paradox when addressed to young men, yet it will, I think, bear examination. It is a truism to say that the danger of maturity, and especially of age, is the closing of the mind to new ideas. Habit, most powerful of influences, hard experience, the very passage of the years, all alike tend to stiffen the muscles and to harden the arteries of the mind as they do those of the body. It is a misfortune with which advancing age must struggle, and the effort is severe and too often either neglected or fruitless. But the same peril besets youth, although not for the same reason. The great mass of young men go forth from our universities, our institutes and schools, prepared to learn and eager for the knowledge which experience alone can bring. Yet the disease of the closed mind lurks all about them, and curiously enough is most likely to affect the cleverest, the ablest, and the most ambitious. This comes from their very talents, from the high confidence which youth ought always to have, and from the somewhat hasty conclusion that because they have thought for themselves, nobody else has ever performed that same feat before. I have met such cases, greatly to be regretted because the possibilities of usefulness are so much larger in youth than in age. From what I have observed, let me illustrate and enforce my meaning. In these cases the mind, as a rule, is exceptionally good, the cleverness undoubted, — very possibly there is much more than

cleverness, — and its possessor has enjoyed every advantage of the highest education, which ought to be liberalizing, and yet the mind is closed. In my experience the fortunate youth is very kind — almost oppressively so — to those with whom he converses, even when they are elderly persons. I have met many men of achieved distinction in widely various fields of thought and action; I have met some great men, but never have I had conscious greatness so imposed on me as in such cases as I am attempting to describe. The repose, the remoteness, the attitude, are truly Olympian. And yet, as I have looked and listened, it has seemed to me that I detected a lack of comprehension of the speaker's relation to the universe; have had an uneasy suspicion that my instructor had never fully grasped the fact that a realization of one's own ignorance is the beginning of knowledge, and I became sure that a sense of humor, sanest of all senses, was still to be acquired. The type of man of whom I speak has a contempt for the past and dismisses all who differ from him as stagnant and immobile intelligences, if they can be called intelligences at all. He has the best of educations, and, no doubt, fine abilities, but nevertheless his mind is closed — closed by his own energy and self-content. He is in danger of having it said of him, as Tennyson said of "A Character," that he

> " . . . trod on silk as if the winds
> Blew his own praises in his eyes,
> And stood aloof from other minds
> In impotence of fancied power."

For the sake of his country and on account of the good he might do, such a result would be much to be deplored. It is earnestly to be hoped that he will change by and by. Such minds, when they appear in youth, frequently open

as the relentless years pass on. But the malady nevertheless is as dangerous to youth as to age. Age must, if it can, keep its mind flexible and open to all that is new, while youth, if it is to win true success, must not scorn the past nor wholly condemn those who differ. It must not turn with contempt from the mature or even the old because they are sceptical about the genuine newness of alleged new ideas. Hood cried out against the "rarity of Christian charity," but outside the domain of science new ideas are even rarer. Even if the past can teach nothing to us, the all-wise heirs of the ages, it can, at least if rightly considered, show us our proper place in the general scheme of things. I confess when I study the art of the Cro-Magnon men, whose civilization endured in Europe twice as long as ours has yet done, I feel humbled as I contrast their achievement with their opportunities.

When I consider the imagination that gave us the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," the genius which produced the art and the architecture, the poetry and the drama of Greece; when I read the writings of Plato and Aristotle, I cannot but feel some doubt of the absolute superiority of the present moment in the field of pure intellect. It is well to remember that the very greatest men died learning, like Bacon and Pasteur. Socrates was entering old age when he drank the hemlock, but I do not think any one would say that his last words were, therefore, of no worth. The greatest benefactions to humanity, the greatest services to human thought, have not all been bestowed or rendered by men under twenty-five or even under forty years of age, a fact sometimes worthy of remembrance. Do not, then, fall victims to over-confidence and close your mind. The injunction is as important for youth as for age; easy of attainment for the former, difficult for the

latter; possible for both. The past and the present youth and age, new and old, all have their place in the sun; all are needed for the widest learning, for the highest achievement, for the best development of mankind.

From the word of warning, or suggestion, — for warning perhaps is too grave a word, — I come to the appeal, and an appeal every one has the right to make for the cause nearest his heart, for the truth as he understands it. The exact and high training of the men of applied science, the generous scholarship offered by our great university in every field of human thought and endeavor, are the noblest privileges and the finest opportunities which the wealth, the self-sacrifice, and the liberality of the past and of the present can offer to the generations which have the future in their keeping. But there are still other lessons to be learned here and at all our established seats of learning, more important, higher and nobler even than those which figure in our catalogues and earn our degrees. These lessons have no endowed professorships, they form no part of any curriculum yet devised; they are not generated in any laboratory or developed in any course of investigation or experiment. They are spiritual, not material. They must be drawn from the association and contact of the great body of students and teachers acting and reacting upon one another. They must come from the traditions which here, in the earliest years, are blent with the high ideals of the Civil War and which at Harvard stretch back to the days when the lamps of learning first flashed amid the dim shadows of the wilderness. They breathe from the walls of old buildings, they whisper to us from the pages of our records, they look out at us from the portraits of our founders and benefactors. These influences are as impalpable as air, but stronger than monu-

ments of brass or stone, and if we do not learn their lessons our spirit will fail for lack of breath and perish like the physical life, poisoned by foul gases or extinguished by a vacuum.

Rabelais said, "Science sans conscience est la perte de l'âme." The great French humorist used the word "science," I think, not with our modern and more restricted meaning, but with the older and broader sense of knowledge. Yet his meaning is clear. All the learning of the schools, he declared, if without conscience was the loss of the soul. There is a certain inevitable vagueness in the words "conscience" and "soul," for they are of the spirit which forbids man to accept contentedly the belief that the "be all and the end all" are here on the earth we know. It is this spirit which inspired the great Apostle to the Gentiles when he appealed from the terrestrial to the celestial. From beings who lack soul and conscience, no matter how highly educated they may be, come the sordid and the selfish, those who are insensible to the sorrows and deaf to the appeal of their fellow men, those who see in money-making, in comfort, in amusement, in shelter, the highest object of life; and, worst of all, the conscienceless and soulless supply the slavish and the criminal. It is the function of the moralist and the preacher to deal with this theme as it touches the individual man. I shall not invade their province and I have no sermon to deliver. The first lesson which, to my thinking, should be learned here is that education and knowledge are not ends in themselves but means to an end, and that one great purpose to be here achieved is to go forth with the understanding that all who have these privileges are units in the making of a nation. Our learning is vain if it fails to teach us that nations, like men, must have a conscience

and a soul. If those have vanished it may be said of a people, even as of a single one of their number: —

> "All else is gone; from those great eyes
> The soul has fled;
> When faith is lost, when honor dies,
> The man is dead."

So is a nation dead when its conscience has departed, when its ideals are forgotten, its faith unkept; when its soul has fled, and base desires alone survive. What were the ideals of this nation? Freedom, democracy, liberty of conscience, personal liberty, equality before the law — these were the guerdon of the Revolution. Later came the mighty conflict for the preservation of all these things, maintained by the ideal of a Union broad enough and strong enough to cover this vast land. For these ideals men gave their lives and spent their treasure and so kept their faith. The last enemy they encountered in arms was the spirit of separation, and union triumphed. But that spirit is not confined to setting the States above the Nation. More insidious, but quite as dangerous, is the separatist spirit which in its greed for votes and power puts local above national interests; or that still darker spirit which would divide us into classes, or into groups, based on race, or religion, or allegiance to some country other than our own. We draw our blood and traditions from many people and many lands, but we labor in vain if here on this soil we are aught but Americans with one country, one loyalty, and one tradition common to us all. All Americans, and especially all Americans who have been fortunate in securing the highest education, should fight everywhere against the spirit which would divide and be apostles of the spirit which will unite and of the tradition which should inspire all Americans. That tradition, in its

dominant meaning, tells us that the American people put liberty and independence and union, in the war with England and in the Civil War, above comfort and safety, above riches and life. Many voices are now heard proclaiming that there is nothing for which life and physical well-being should be sacrificed, and great millionaires are using lavishly their suddenly acquired wealth to instil the doctrine that the undisturbed accumulation of money is the chief end of man. I have seen in the newspapers that the Anti-Enlistment League is preparing to circulate a pledge in our colleges and universities, which runs in this wise: —

> I, being over eighteen years of age, hereby pledge myself against enlistment as a volunteer for any military or naval service in international war, offensive or defensive, and against giving my approval to such enlistment on the part of others.

In the early days when our independence was won, in the later days when our Union was saved, such a pledge would have been described by the ugly word "treason." That any one should now think such a pledge possible is an evil sign. A people who will not make ready to defend their own peace, their own security, and their own honor, are well on the way to helpless, hopeless war, or to supine submission. A people who are not ready, if the need come, to give their lives for their country will soon have no country. A nation that will not protect its citizens will soon have no citizens to guard and defend the national life. If a government deserts those who support and sustain it, alike in the calm of peace and in the hour of danger, that government itself will be deserted when the menaced peril comes. There are two doctrines presented to us to-day. One is that the brief life of the individual man must be preserved at all hazards and at any cost to

the nation. The other is that the life of the individual man must always, when the dread call is sounded, be ready for sacrifice in order that the life of the nation may be preserved. Between these two doctrines we must choose. In these days of world-wide war we must face the facts with steady gaze and make our decision. What that choice will be I cannot doubt, but it must be made. Emerson said: —

> "'T is man's perdition to be safe
> When for the truth he ought to die."

That was the belief of the great mass of the American people, North and South, in 1861. That must be, that, I am sure, deep down in the hearts of the people, is our belief to-day, and while it is, all will be well. To those who go forth trained and educated from our great universities and institutions of learning comes an especial duty in these perilous days, to preach this doctrine and carry this belief in devotion to the country, like a flaming torch, throughout the land.

In every corner of the United States, with each recurrent year, we celebrate the deeds and honor the memories of those who fought the Revolution and died in the Civil War. If we do not mean what we say, if we are not instantly ready to translate our words into action, it would be far better to stand silent and bow our heads in shame that we are not as our forefathers, as the makers of the country were. No one must ever be permitted to say of us, as was once written of a country long since freed and redeemed: —

> ". . . The voices of the dead
> Sound like a distant torrent's fall,
> And answer: 'Let one living head,
> But one arise — we come, we come!'
> 'T is but the living who are dumb."

With the young men, especially with those highly trained and educated, rest not only the defence of the country, if war comes, but the cause of preparation and readiness which will alone be able to prevent the coming of war. In their keeping are the ideals of the country, and it is to them we must look to make it known to all men that, like knowledge, a nation without conscience has lost its soul.

X

ADDRESS

DELIVERED AT THE UNVEILING OF THE LAFAYETTE STATUE, FALL RIVER, SEPTEMBER 4, 1916

X

DISCOURS

Prononcé aux Fêtes du Dévoilement de la Statue de Lafayette, à Fall River, le 4 Septembre, 1916

Dans le caractère des peuples parlant le français et l'anglais, il existe un trait si rare que chacun de ces deux peuples voudrait se l'approprier. Il est certain que, lorsque nous en cherchons des exemples, nous nous tournons instinctivement vers les peuples français et vers ceux qui parlent l'anglais. Le trait dont je veux parler se révèle lumineux sur le fond obscur du passé. Les qualités, qui le font ressortir, sont le désintéressement, l'oubli de soi et le fait qu'il se tient toujours prêt à tout sacrifier du côté temporel. L'exemple le plus frappant de ce genre nous est offert par cette jeune paysanne, ignorante, qui se nomme Jeanne d'Arc. Ses ennemis l'ont envoyée au bûcher. La postérité l'a élevée sur ses pavois ; l'Église la réclame au nombre de ses saintes.

Mais je me bornerai aujourd'hui à rappeler quelques hommes qui se sont illustrés avant d'avoir atteint l'âge mûr et dont les noms sont connus partout où le français et l'anglais se parlent. Nous songeons à eux lorsque nous voulons décrire le gentilhomme dans le sens le plus noble de ce mot. Ils furent, alors qu'ils débutaient dans la vie, instruits, rompus aux arts d'agrément, avec tout ce que donnent et la naissance et la fortune. On les vit s'avancer l'âme haute, sans peur, sans hésitation, insouciants

des dangers dont l'existence est parsemée. Il est possible qu'ils n'aient pas atteint l'apogée du succès matériel, qu'ils n'aient pas été appelés aux plus hautes responsabilités, et pourtant ils sont rayonnants de gloire. Toutes les générations les aiment et les admirent, parce qu'ils ont su montrer jusqu'à quelles hauteurs la nature humaine a pu s'élever par le sacrifice et le courage. Celui d'entre eux qu'on appelle le "Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche" les personnifie tous. Notre imagination les évoque sans peine. Bayard agonisant sur le champ de bataille; Sir Philip Sidney qui, mourant à Zutphen, donnait son dernier gobelet d'eau à un soldat blessé; John Hampden à Chalgrove Field; Robert Emmet s'acheminant intrépidement vers le lieu de son exécution; Charles Russell Lowell chargeant avec son étonnant stoïcisme à Cedar Creek; Craven se dévouant à la mort avec son "après vous, pilote"; Gaston de Foix tombant victorieux à Ravenne; Dunois repoussant les envahisseurs anglais, premier pas vers la délivrance de la patrie! Quel groupe glorieux! Croyez-vous qu'il puisse se trouver un nom au dix-huitième siècle plus digne de leur être associé que celui de Lafayette? Lafayette, comme Dunois, est devenu vieux; il a été comblé d'honneurs en France et à l'étranger, il est arrivé aux positions les plus distinguées. Il a beaucoup souffert et sa vie s'est terminée triomphalement. Mais j'aime mieux me le figurer à l'aube de sa carrière lorsque jeune, noble, admiré, entouré de tout ce qui peut ensoleiller l'existence, il a tout quitté pour traverser l'océan et offrir son épée, peut-être sa vie, à la cause de la liberté. Héroïque et modeste, on le voit se joindre à l'armée en guenilles de Washington. L'atmosphère qui l'entoure, grand seigneur qu'il était, est tout imprégnée de chevalerie, éclairée d'une lumière romanesque; il s'est inspiré à la

même source que les grands Français des Croisades, ces grands Français dont il descendait.

Nous sommes à jamais endettés envers la France à cause du concours que son gouvernement et ses armées nous ont donné pour nous aider à gagner l'indépendance. Mais que de reconnaissance ne devons-nous pas à Lafayette, non seulement pour sa co-opération, mais pour son illustre exemple. Il s'est sacrifié à un sentiment, à une grande cause, et en se sacrifiant il a montré que la vie d'un individu n'est rien comparée à celle d'une nation ou à la défense d'un grand principe. Aujourd'hui beaucoup de jeunes Américains se sont enrôlés dans l'armée française avec l'espoir d'acquitter, en partie au moins, notre dette envers Lafayette et envers la France. Ils conduisent des ambulances, ils se battent dans les tranchées, ils se font couvrir de blessures et d'honneurs et il y en a, tels que Victor Chapman, qui sont tombés dans la lutte glorieuse pour la cause qu'ils croient fermement être celle de la démocratie et de la liberté.

A cette heure où on entend dire de tous côtés qu'on doit tout sacrifier à la préservation de l'individu, pour le confort, la sécurité, la jouissance, nous ferions bien de nous souvenir de ces hommes, de ces chevaliers Bayard, de ces Lafayette, ainsi que de leurs pareils, Charles Russell Lowell, Craven, Robert Emmet, John Hampden et Sir Philip Sidney.

Ne ferions-nous pas bien de nous demander comment il se fait que ceux qui se sont cramponnés à l'argent, à la vie et au confort soient oubliés, tandis que les noms de Bayard et de Sidney brillent et résonnent à travers les siècles? On les admirera toujours et voici pourquoi: Nous nous tournons instinctivement et avec vénération vers ce qu'il y a de meilleur et de plus élevé; or, ces hommes et

ces femmes de grand courage, prêts à tout sacrifier, fût-ce la vie, pour leur pays et pour la bonne et juste cause, ceux-là représentent ce qu'il y a de meilleur et de plus élevé. Les accapareurs d'argent peuvent avoir leurs pique-assiettes ; les égoïstes, les lâches et ceux qui réclament à tout prix la paix peuvent se faire valoir devant leurs contemporains ; il est possible que l'air retentisse de leurs cris. Mais plus tard dans l'histoire on les perdra de vue. Ils disparaîtront, comme des brouillards, comme s'ils n'avaient jamais existé, à moins que l'on se souvienne qu'ils furent des obstacles sur le chemin du devoir ; et qu'ils retardèrent le progrès de ceux qui travaillent pour l'humanité.

Que vos regards se portent au-delà des mers. Pourquoi le monde entier, ami et ennemi, admire-t-il la France ? S 'est-elle soustraite aux dangers, aux souffrances, aux exigences de l'honneur ? Dans ce cas pourquoi ces ruines dont son sol est comblé ? Non, ce qui fait la force de la France moderne se trouve être précisément ce feu sacré qui animait Jeanne d'Arc et Dunois. C'est à ce même état d'âme que nous devons la grande victoire de la Marne, les tranchées ensanglantées mais jamais rendues et enfin la défense resplendissante de Verdun, défense qui émerveille le monde entier. Mes amis, vous êtes Américains, Américains pour la plupart depuis plusieurs générations ; vous êtes citoyens des États-Unis, fidèles à votre pays et à votre drapeau. On ne peut avoir deux patries et je sais que vous êtes d'abord et partout des Américains. Mais vous ne seriez pas dignes de vos nobles aïeux si vous ne vouliez suivre par la pensée la marche triomphale des Français. Ils combattent pour la patrie, pour la liberté. Ils repousseront l 'envahisseur. Comme Jeanne d'Arc et Dunois, il y a cinq cents ans, ils sauveront la France.

XI

THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE REPUBLICAN STATE CONVENTION AT BOSTON, OCTOBER 7, 1916

XI

THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

THE Republican Party of Massachusetts — strong, reunited, confident, with the light of coming victory shining upon it — is represented here to-day by you to whom I speak. It is your duty to lead forward those who have sent you here, and never has there been a time when that duty was clearer or more imperative, for the contest before us is not for mere party supremacy, but to free the country from an Administration which has been injurious at home and has humiliated us abroad; which has left our prosperity and security to be the sport of chance in a world torn with war and which has deprived us of the place and the influence which we held but a few years ago among the nations of the earth. You make your appeal, not merely to those who bear your party name, but to all who set country above party, whose Americanism is not content with the lip service of fine and empty phrases, but lies deep in their hearts, entwined with all the traditions, beliefs, and aspirations that have created the great Republic which we have always loved and honored. Strain every nerve, make every effort, for you are contending for a victory second only to that which your fathers achieved when in 1864 they declared that the War for the Union was "not" a failure and returned Abraham Lincoln to the White House.

You have candidates, both in State and Nation, both for Governor and President, who are an honor to the party, who will be an honor to State and country and whom you can follow and support without reservation and with all the strength that is in you. To you I need make no argument framed to win your agreement, for your convictions are already settled and made up. We have a score of issues, any one of which should in itself be enough to drive from power the present Administration and its followers.

In full control of the Government, the present President and a Congress of like faith swept away the protective policy and enacted a tariff which opened our markets to the almost unrestricted competition of the world, with the usual unhappy results. The war which came in Europe has acted as a protective tariff, almost prohibitory indeed in most directions, but when peace returns we shall be left open to the fiercest competition which the world has ever seen; and yet those in power have made no effort to provide for this peril which is drawing constantly nearer, except to place upon the statute books what they call an anti-dumping provision, which will give us no real protection, but will surely involve us in tariff wars and commercial retaliations. They have deliberately flung away import duties in order to impose upon the country direct taxes, so arranged that they are collected almost entirely in the North and East and which in their earlier and more moderate form have already imposed a burden upon the total wealth of Massachusetts six times as great as that imposed on the wealth of the State of Alabama. Our fathers went to war because they would not submit to taxation, no matter how light, without representation. We are now asked to endure a system of taxation which is both unequal and unjust. It

has never been characteristic of New England to submit tamely to such oppression. We shall not submit now. The money thus drawn from one section of the country is chiefly spent among those who pay the smallest share of the taxes. We are weary of a Government which in its taxation and in its expenditure alike is under sectional control. The time has come to restore to power the national party which saved the nation and which has always governed in a national spirit.

The Administration and its party in Congress have shown themselves enemies of American business, for they have treated business success, no matter how honestly won, as *prima facie* evidence of wrong-doing. Their attitude toward the business men of the United States has been that usually adopted toward the criminal class.

They have sought in every way to promote government ownership, thus making the Government a competitor with its own people, a policy capable of no result except an increased burden upon the taxpayers and grave injury to individual enterprise.

They have failed to take any steps towards that industrial organization which is an important part of national defence. They have equally neglected to take any effective steps toward the military and naval defence of the country by land and sea. With the anarchy of Mexico close beside them and the greatest war that the world has ever known raging in Europe, they made no move toward the defence of the country until an aroused public opinion compelled this summer the passage of a naval bill which will be a long step toward bringing us back to the position which we once occupied and under their rule have lost. But do not forget that three years must pass before we reap its benefits. The result of their failure to increase the

army as they ought to have increased it is painfully shown by their sending the National Guard to the border and keeping them there to perform police and patrol duty which should have been performed by regular troops.

They have created new offices for the reward of political adherents until the added expense to the people has risen into the millions.

While they have neglected, until a few short months ago, any adequate expenditures for the army and navy, they have rapidly pushed through extravagant appropriations for objects of which few were necessary and none immediate.

Their incapacity in administration, their inability to rule and govern, which have been patent to the world for half a century, have been painfully and conspicuously shown in the conduct of the navy, the post-office, and other departments. The present administration of the navy has caused injury to the service which it will take years to repair. If we continue this administration for another four years this injury to the navy of the United States will be converted into disaster. At the last session of Congress large appropriations were made for building up the navy. If you entrust this great and important work to the present head of the Navy Department many years will elapse before you get any result, and the purposes of Congress for the construction of a navy adequate for the defence of the country will be frustrated.

I might extend this dreary catalogue of shortcomings, I might enlarge the indictment with many other charges, but my time to-day does not permit me to continue the ungrateful task. I wish to come to the one great underlying issue, compared to which all questions of appropriations and expenditures, of rates of duty and of the reckless

increase of offices, sink almost into insignificance. Before doing this, however, there are two points which I desire to make clear. With singular lack of humor, and a curious absence of intelligence, the Democratic leaders keep asking in a fatuous way, "What would you have done if you had been in power when these various crises arose in our foreign relations?" Nothing is more utterly vain than the hypotheses of history. Nothing is more futile than to speculate as to what might have been if everything had been totally different from what it was. The question as to the events of the last three years is not what we would have done if we had been in power. The question is, and the only question is, what they did. On that issue we bring them to the bar of public opinion and ask the verdict of the people of the United States.

The only demand that can justly be made upon us is to know what we intend to do. In the present condition of the world no one can say what conditions may exist or what complications may arise after the fourth of next March. But this we can declare. We will either hold absolutely aloof from Mexico or we will deal with the Mexican question effectively. We will not halt between intervention and non-intervention, like a donkey between two bundles of hay, and indulge in a little of each in such fashion as to produce the most harmful result conceivable. The Democratic Party declared in 1912 as strongly and clearly as possible, that they would protect Americans in their lives and their property, on the border of the country and everywhere else. This promise they have utterly failed to keep. We renew the promise they broke and when we come into power next March we will redeem it. What our relations may then be with the warring nations in Europe no man can predict, but this much can be said: we will

take a position worthy of the greatest neutral in the world: we will restore the country to the position of influence and respect which it held under McKinley and Roosevelt. We will if possible keep the peace and maintain neutrality, but it shall be the peace of right and justice and an honest and rigid neutrality and both the neutrality and the peace shall be as undisfigured by unmeant words and empty bluster as they will be unclouded by humiliation and regret.

The President of the United States has recently said that the Republican Party means to engage the country in war. This statement comes from a man who is responsible for acts of war in Mexico and who, by his vacillation and hesitation, has brought the country on several occasions nearer to war than ever would be done by the Republican Party, because the Republican Party would be strong and determined and would uphold a policy which would insure national defence and command the respect of other nations. The Republican Party, of course, has no such purpose as that charged by the President. The Republican Party means to keep the peace if it can be honorably and rightly kept, but it does not mean to keep it by humiliation and by the cowardly abandonment of American rights. The Republican Party intends if possible to have peace, but such a peace as George Washington commended to his countrymen, the peace that Lowell described when he wrote: —

> "God, give us peace! Not such as lulls to sleep,
> But sword on thigh, and brow with purpose knit!
> And let our ship of state to harbor sweep,
> Her ports all up, her battle lanterns lit,
> And her leashed thunders gathering for their leap!"

The other point which I desire to make concerns my own attitude. In what I am about to say concerning foreign

relations I do not criticize the President because he is a Democrat and I am a Republican, for in dealing with foreign relations I have at no time since I have been in public life approached them in a party spirit, and so long as I continue to hold the commission of Massachusetts I shall never do so. In the many shifts and changes made by this Administration in international relations it would have been impossible that at some point in their movements they should not have occupied the right ground. The President, like Mrs. Wititterly, "forms and expresses an immense variety of opinions on an immense variety of subjects." He can hardly fail, under the circumstances, to be right occasionally, and when he has been right he has had my support. I gave my best aid, and I think I gave substantial help, to the ratification of the treaties with Nicaragua, with Haiti, and with Denmark for the purchase of the Danish Islands. The Nicaragua treaty was in substance the same as the one sent in by Mr. Taft and defeated by the Democrats as a party. The treaty with Haiti was a continuance of the policy embodied in the treaties with Nicaragua and San Domingo, which was the policy of Roosevelt. The treaty for the purchase of the Danish Islands was carrying out the policy of Seward in 1868 and of Roosevelt and Hay in 1902. The fact that these treaties, which embodied Republican policies, were brought forward by a Democratic Administration in no respect altered my support of every one of them. The President, again, took the right ground at the beginning of the war in Europe as to armed merchantmen, a position consistent with international law and the unbroken American practice. He had my support. On the 18th of January, 1916, he sent a note to the powers which involved a change of this position, and he encountered my opposition in the

Senate and that of many others there and elsewhere. Owing to this opposition, and perhaps to other reasons, he reverted to his original and correct attitude and he regained my support, which I cordially gave him upon the questions raised by the McLemore and Gore resolutions. In the spring and summer of 1915 he took what I considered the right position in the very vital question of the proposed embargo upon the export of munitions of war. I gave him my strong and outspoken support and I gave it when his adherents in this State who, with the earnestness which arises from a lively sense of favors to come, were bawling shopworn eulogies of the Chief Executive from every platform, preserved a dismal silence on this important question for reasons best known to themselves. I shall continue to give him support on this question until he changes his position, and of course no one can tell when that will happen. I therefore may say with justice that I criticize him now, not as a Republican opposed to a Democrat, but as an American resisting policies which he believes in the highest degree humiliating and discreditable to his country. Now let us look at those international questions just for a moment, for I have no time to discuss them in detail.

On our Southern border is a ruined country, the prey of predatory bands, in a condition of well-nigh complete anarchy. In large measure that anarchy and that ruin lie at our doors. To gratify a personal animosity the only Government which had any apparent hope of success in Mexico was overthrown. The Administration neither intervened effectively nor abstained from intervention. The man whose adherents proclaim him to have kept the peace has had a peace with Mexico marked by recurrent bloodshed and by intermittent acts of war. The killing of sev-

eral hundred Americans in Mexico and on the border has gone on without redress, reparation, or effort to protect the survivors, while the miseries of the Mexican people, the outrages upon harmless women and the slaying of unarmed men, have left cold and unmoved a Government which in former days and in other hands declared that the cruel wrongs inflicted upon the people of Cuba must cease.

In the grave and critical situation produced by war in Europe we have utterly failed to exert any influence and we have vacillated and oscillated and paltered in dealing with every issue and every wrong until we have incurred the scarcely veiled contempt of all the nations of the earth. We are the great neutral in the greatest of conflicts and we are less regarded than the weakest and most helpless of the small States still at peace. We have utterly failed to protect American lives by land or sea, on the plains of Mexico or on the waters of the Atlantic. Why is it that in this greatest crisis in the history of civilized mankind we, the great Republic of a hundred millions, present such a sorry sight? I will tell you why, and the causes go deep down to the very foundations of government and of national character.

The relation of this nation with other nations should always be carried on by the Executive in accord with the principles of international law and of morality, and in conformity with the well-established traditions of American foreign policy. When a President is confronted by a grave foreign question he ought to look only to those principles and to those traditions to determine what is right and just and he ought never to undertake to shape the foreign policy of the country by what he believes to be the course at the moment most likely to bring him votes at the next election. A foreign policy ever shifting

because it is based on the desire to secure bodies of voters here and there, is disastrous. It can result in nothing but harm and humiliation to the United States. The foreign policy of this country since 1912, beginning with Mexico and continuing through the complications caused by the war in Europe, has followed no principle, has been true to no tradition, has cast aside all the lessons of the past and has been determined from day to day by the effort to conciliate one group of voters or to secure the approbation of some other group. A policy so guided swings like a pendulum from one side to the other but without even that regularity of motion which is the pendulum's characteristic.

A foolish consistency, as Emerson says, may well be the hobgoblin of little minds, but to be consistent only in inconsistency is something far worse. To have held in little more than three years sixty to eighty opposed opinions on thirty to forty subjects is enough to destroy confidence in any government. This Administration seems to have adopted the immortal principle laid down by Mr. Pickwick, who said: —

> "Hush. Don't ask any questions. It is always best on these occasions to do what the mob do."
>
> "But suppose there are two mobs," suggested Mr. Snodgrass.
>
> "Shout with the largest," replied Mr. Pickwick.
>
> Volumes could not have said more.

This rule has its risks, for a mistake may be easily made even by attentive persons with both ears to the ground as to the comparative size of the different crowds. The Pickwick doctrine, moreover, applied to public questions is perilous, and when followed by an Administration in dealing with international relations it is fatal.

But something much worse than this has been done. The Administration, which was without firmness or courage in dealing with foreign affairs, has shown an immense bravery in compelling obedience from the Congressmen and Senators who supported it. Appealing to those "who crook the pregnant hinges of the knee where thrift may follow fawning," by holding up official patronage, coercing others by threats of hostility at coming elections, they have brought a once great and powerful party into a state of absolutely helpless subserviency. With few exceptions they have been reduced to the condition of frightened schoolboys shivering at the sight of the master's rod. We have in this country government by parties — the party of the Administration and the party of the Opposition. It is an evil thing for the Republic when in one of those parties independence is destroyed, and the men who are sent to the Senate and House, not only to carry out party policies, but to represent the people of the United States, smother their convictions and become the meek recorders of the wishes of the President, as was the custom in Mexico in the days of Diaz. In the determination to get votes at all hazards not only has the Democratic Party been sacrificed and degraded, but to secure the support, as it was hoped, of four powerful organizations, the Executive did not hesitate to divest himself of the great attributes of his office in order to compel his followers in the two Houses of Congress to pass through the Caudine Forks and beneath the yoke so that those with whom the President had made political agreements might carry their legislation, without investigation or deliberation, under the threat of injury to the entire people of the United States. It was a miserable spectacle and a sorry bargain for a President to make,

and it was made, in my judgment, long before the contending parties appeared in Washington.

But the evil goes deeper still. The appeal of the Administration has been made, not to the highest ideals or to the best aspirations of the American people, but to the material desires of our nature. There was a time when foreign countries reproached us with being the slaves of the "almighty dollar." That reproach vanished in the smoke and sacrifices of the Civil War. But the vast prosperity of the last quarter of a century has made the material side of life very conspicuous in the United States. It has brought in its train a widely diffused increase of comfort in living and also a luxury much less to be desired in our Republic. No one is more anxious for the prosperity and business success of the country than I. No one has resented more keenly than I the assaults of the Democratic Party upon American success in business and upon American enterprise. Prosperity and wealth, if rightly used, advance civilization and lead to much that is best in the intellectual and scientific development of the country. But it must never be forgotten that money, which is the outward sign of wealth, is measured only by quantity. Quality does not enter into the estimate. But neither a man nor a nation can be measured in that way. The true value of a nation to humanity and civilization is determined, not by its quantity, but by its quality. Every appeal of this Administration has been to the material side, and that side they have sought to organize and make dominant. We have had an overabundance of mouth-filling phrases about humanity and about our place in the world. But the actual appeal has always been addressed to the material impulses. It has not been the appeal of Washington or of Lincoln to the men of the Revolution

or to the men of the Civil War. It has been an appeal to the desire for safety, for comfort, for shelter, for amusement, for money; for the preservation of the individual life at the expense of the country's security and the country's honor. These thoughts have come to me often during the last three years: —

> "When I have borne in memory what has tamed
> Great Nations, how ennobling thoughts depart
> When men change swords for ledgers, and desert
> The student's bower for gold."

These lines of a great poet have rung in my ears as I have watched the course of the present Executive and as I have seen the steady effort to substitute words for things, language for action, phrases for deeds. They have insistently recurred when I have heard the country told that it should be "too proud to fight," and the cry go forth that the President should be returned to power because "he has kept the peace," — without regard to whether it is the blood-stained thing that is called peace in Mexico or the peace of honor and righteousness, the only peace worth having, which this country has a right to demand. They have come to my memory as I have listened to the clamorous shout that "he has kept us out of war," — when nobody wanted to go to war with us, — and I have watched with bitter regret the shuffling methods of dealing with other nations which have made us hang our heads in shame when the noisy boast of "keeping out of war" has filled the air. The whole course of this Administration, in dealing with the grave questions which Mexico on the one side and the war in Europe on the other have brought to us, has tended to loosen the fibres of the American conscience.

That is the great danger, beside which all others look

pale and fade away, which this Administration has brought upon the country. That is the danger which will grow until it may well become deadly if we are to have four years more of the present Executive. It is this attitude which is slowly but surely impairing the best qualities of the nation — this evil, this un-American readiness to set race against race and class against class in the hunt for votes; this utter disregard for everything but the most material success; this reliance upon empty words and sounding phrases, which are bringing us to a point where every American should rise and say, "Whatever happens, whatever my party feelings and prejudices may be, I will have no more of this. Anything is better than this lowering of the American spirit, this dulling of the American conscience, which have been the work of this Administration."

By our conduct we so excited the contempt of the Mexicans that they did not hesitate to invade our country. Let us beware how we excite the contempt of other and greater nations, for they may, unless the old American spirit is restored to power, treat us in such a way that finally a point will be reached where the exactions of foreign governments will go so far that we shall find ourselves plunged into war, defenceless, unprepared; a war in which our bravest and our best, unarmed and untrained, will be sent to useless slaughter because we had failed to insist that we must have the only peace worth having, the peace which comes from firmness and from courage and which is guarded by the physical defence which Washington never ceased to urge. Let us see to it that this attitude which would sacrifice all that is best in the past, in the present and in our very nature, for the sake of physical comfort and in the hope of securing votes, be brought to an end. There is no American who would wish to be —

> "One of a Nation, who henceforth, must wear
> Their fetters in their souls."

The present Administration has been leading us along this path, but it has not yet killed the soul of the American people or changed the American spirit. The overwhelming mass of the American people are deeply patriotic and ready to make any sacrifice for their country. Let them open their eyes and arouse themselves to the dangers which this Administration has brought upon us; dangers to the very quality of the nation; dangers which threaten to dim the glories of the past and destroy the hopes of the future. In my heart of hearts I believe that the American people, who recognize but one allegiance and reverence but one tradition, are awakened now, and if they are I know what, with the coming of November, the end will be. The false leaders will be put aside and the country will return to the great traditions which have come down to us from the Revolution, which were made greater than ever in the Civil War, and will once more march along the path which was marked out for us by those who made and those who saved the United States.

XII

SPEECH BEFORE THE HARVARD REPUBLICAN CLUB

CAMBRIDGE, OCTOBER 23, 1916

XII

SPEECH BEFORE THE HARVARD REPUBLICAN CLUB

I AM going to speak to you first about the Presidential election in this country which occurred more than fifty years ago. To me it is a remote memory of boyhood. To him[1] who presides over your meeting to-night it is the vivid recollection of a gallant man in the flush of youth who had offered his life to his country on the field of battle and who bears the scars of honorable wounds received in her service. To you that election of 1864 is history, but it is history which it is well to bear in mind. For three years the Government of the United States, with Abraham Lincoln at its head, had fought for the preservation of the Union and the freedom of the slaves. The people of the United States had poured out their blood and treasure like water. We were on the eve of great and final victories. Yet a political party was found even then which declared that the war was a failure. The appeal made by that party was to the desire for peace, to the lower interest which wished to return to the quiet work of business and money-making, which was ready to sacrifice all that was at stake in the war to the preservation of the individual life, which was prepared to throw away all the sacrifices that had been offered up, for the sake of quiet and safety and shelter. It was an appeal to the lower impulses against

[1] Major Henry Lee Higginson.

the higher. It seems wholly incredible now, as we look back through the vista of the years, that such an appeal should have been made, still more that there should have been any chance of its success. We know now that there was no real possibility of its success, and yet men doubted and thought that those who declared the war a failure were likely to win. Even Abraham Lincoln, who knew the American people better than any man who has ever lived, who understood them, and served them, and died for them, believed he was going down to defeat. On August 26, 1864, he wrote: —

> This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reëlected. Then it will be my duty to so coöperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterwards.

This memorandum he sealed up, after having his Cabinet officers sign their names upon it, and it was not to be opened until after the election. No nobler expression of a great patriotism was ever written down, but I refer to it here merely to show you the doubt in the mind of the wisest and greatest man at that time as to the result of an election which we, looking back over half a century, know was certain to result as it did, certain because the appeal of Lincoln was the lofty appeal to the finest impulses of our nature, and a majority of the American people were certain in that hour of trial to respond to it.

The integrity of the country is not at stake to-day; the Union sustained in the election of 1864 is not in danger; we are not in the midst of a Civil War; and yet the respect and influence in which we are to be held abroad and our own self-respect are as much at stake now as then.

Now, as then, the question is between the appeal to the material desires of our nature and that other addressed to the nobler impulses which in the past has made and saved the country.

We have in power an Administration which has conducted our international relations purely on a basis of securing votes, something which should never be done and never has been done in our history until the past three years. Our foreign relations have hitherto been dealt with as the foreign relations of every great nation should be dealt with, in accordance with the principles of international law and the well-settled traditions and practice of the Republic. In no other way can the foreign relations of a great nation be properly conducted. If the Executive writes a note to satisfy a popular sentiment at the moment; if he writes another note in the hope of conciliating some group of voters marked out by racial lines, and then writes still another note in a different sense to conciliate another group marked out by other racial lines, our foreign policy becomes a thing of shreds and patches, such as we have beheld with a deep sense of humiliation during the past three years.

As an illustration of what I mean by this fluctuation, let me give you a single example from my own immediate experience. At the outset of the war the Administration issued a circular note to the powers stating our position as to armed merchantmen. Nothing is better settled in international law than that a merchantman armed solely for defence does not lose her character as a privately owned ship, and that character entitles her to warning from a hostile belligerent, entitles the neutrals rightfully on board to be landed in safety at the nearest port and the crew to proper treatment as prisoners of war. These

principles have been established in the interest of humanity; they have been adopted and accepted by all civilized nations for more than two hundred years. The circular of September 19, 1914, took this correct ground and it had my support, as it had that of all men who believed in the maintenance of an honest neutrality, for it observed all the principles of international law. On January 18, 1916, the Administration sent a note to the powers, signed by Mr. Lansing, in which it was proposed to modify these well-established principles and to have an armed merchantman owned by a belligerent lose her private character and be subject to the treatment of an auxiliary cruiser; that is, of a vessel of war, liable to be destroyed, without regard to the passengers or crew, by an enemy vessel. This was done with a view to conciliating one of the belligerent powers and securing some language in a note which could be used by the Administration for political purposes and be called "a diplomatic victory." The avowed purpose was to facilitate the operation of the submarine, because the submarine was vulnerable and therefore ought not to be exposed to resistance and possible destruction by an armed merchantman. It was proposed to set aside all that humanity and law had built up in the course of centuries, in order to make the submarine more deadly in its operation. I could see no ground for making the submarine, which is an instrument of death, any more effective than it was. I thought the law ought to be retained and the submarine, like other vessels of war, subjected to it. I and others attacked this proposition in the Senate. Then the President changed his mind again and returned to the original and correct position. He lost my support when he wrote the note of January 18. He regained it when he changed his mind for the second time

and returned, however temporarily, to the only correct attitude. Do you think that a foreign policy conducted by methods like this secures to us the respect of foreign nations or tends to maintain the influence which we once had not so many years ago when Roosevelt was President and Root was Secretary of State? This one case is typical of the whole foreign policy of the Administration and you will see in it just what I have described — the attempt to use our foreign relations for the purpose of conciliating groups of voters separated by lines of racial descent. There is no more evil thing than the effort to divide our people along the lines of race. We come from many races, and the only salvation of the country is that all men, native-born and naturalized, should act in their public affairs simply as Americans, knowing only one allegiance and reverencing only one tradition, the tradition of the United States.

We have had recently a much worse example of this appeal. I quote to you from a statement made by Mr. Victor Ridder, who is the proprietor and editor of the "Staats-Zeitung" in New York. His father, Mr. Herman Ridder, was a lifelong Democrat and the newspaper has always been Democratic. He describes a dinner which was held at Terrace Garden, in New York, on September 16th last. I will now quote his own words: —

There were present at this conference Mr. Otto Van Schenck, Mr. Henry Abeles, Mr. Joseph Frey, President of the German-American Catholic Societies, President Collmeyer, of the United German Turners, and one or two other friends whose names I do not remember, George Sylvester Viereck, the editor of the "Fatherland," and Senator Stone.

This conference lasted from eight o'clock at night till three on Sunday morning. Senator Stone used all his well-known powers of persuasion — and I am ready to concede him the

palm as an able advocate of the Administration — to convince us that the apparent anti-German-American policies of the Wilson Administration were only for public consumption and that privately they were ready to work hand in glove with the German-American leaders.

The whole object of this conference, so far as Senator Stone was concerned, was to find out what action was necessary on the part of the Administration in order to secure the support of German-Americans at the coming election.

Can anything be more humiliating than the spectacle of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate gumshoeing in a small room of a Third Avenue beer garden and bartering for the votes which the President from the platform of Shadow Lawn and in his speech of acceptance had repudiated?

The conference broke up at three o'clock in the morning and matters were left in a state of watchful waiting.

Hardly ten days passed by when the second emissary of President Wilson appeared in New York City to accomplish what Senator Stone had failed to accomplish. This time the messenger appeared in the person of a Cabinet Minister — no less a personage than Albert Burleson, Postmaster-General, who divides the honors with Senator Stone and Colonel House in the intimate advisorship of the President.

Mr. Burleson arranged through Mr. Viereck, the editor of the "Fatherland," for a conference at the offices of the Democratic National Headquarters in the 42d Street Building, for the hour of twelve o'clock on Tuesday, September 26. Invitations were extended to the following: Mr. Bernard H. Ridder, Mr. Oscar Seitz, the editor of the Hearst German paper, Mr. Rudolph Pagenstecher, and many others. The committee was to meet in Mr. Pagenstecher's office which was conveniently located in the same building as the Democratic National Headquarters. Be it said to the credit of the gentlemen invited, that they declined to have any dealings in the subterranean political diplomacy which was being engineered by the Wilson group.

Mr. Viereck was the only one to welcome Mr. Burleson. What transpired between Mr. Burleson and Mr. Viereck may safely be left to the imagination until such time as either one of the gentlemen is willing to take the public into their confidence.

So much for the campaign of Keller, Stone, Burleson, and Wilson. What they have done in New York they have done in the West. They have been hypocritical to the limit and we have been in the best position to observe their hypocrisy.

That statement by Mr. Ridder needs no comment. There have been denials of details but no denial of the meeting or of its purposes as described by Mr. Ridder. There were the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, — the representative of the President in the Senate, — and a member of the Cabinet engaged in an effort to secure votes for the President by making our politics turn on the sympathies, which we are all entitled to feel, in regard to the conflict in Europe and by dividing Americans into parties based on racial descent. I do not think that there could be anything worse than this. It is for the President of the United States to say whether he was cognizant of these negotiations. Mr. Hughes, on the other hand, is an American pure and simple. He has made no racial appeal. He has not attempted to carry on American politics along the lines of foreign wars or foreign politics. When he is President he will stand simply for American rights by land and sea, without fear and without favor.

But behind all this — behind this ever-shifting policy, behind this effort to divide us on racial lines — lies what to my mind is far worse, the constant appeal to the material rather than to the nobler impulses of the American people. This is the steady and reiterated appeal of the President, coupled with the declaration that he has "kept the peace," — when he has involved us in miserable fighting in Mexico, where he has shed the blood of American citizens and American soldiers, — it is heard in the unceasing clamor that he has "kept us out of war," when nobody wanted to fight with us; when for the sake of per-

sonal political advantage he has sacrificed our position among other nations of the earth. All through he is seeking to rally to his support those who would sacrifice anything for the opportunity to remain in safety, to make money, and to live in comfort, as against those finer and better feelings to which Lincoln appealed in 1864.

Behind all the issues which are clashing together in the discussion of a great Presidential campaign lies this underlying question, greater than all the rest, — shall we be true to our traditions, to the highest and best aspirations of the country, to the spirit of the Revolution and the spirit of the Civil War? That spirit, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the devotion to the higher beliefs as against the lower desires of our nature, forms not only the tradition of the country, but is peculiarly that of Harvard. We open the doors of active life here in this great University and try to fit men for every form of work in the world, but that which has made Harvard great and which we really in our hearts love best is the spirit which she has shown in all the vital crises of the national life. It was the president of Harvard who in the twilight of a June evening prayed for the soldiers who stood bareheaded before him on Cambridge Common on their way to Bunker Hill, believing, plain New England farmers as they were, that the individual life was as nothing compared to the life of the country or to the principles which they held dear. In Memorial Hall and on Soldier's Field you have the monuments of those who went to their death in the same spirit as the farmers of Concord and Lexington in order that the country might be saved. To-day, even now as I speak, Harvard men are giving their services and their lives to a cause in which they believe, although their own country is not engaged in the conflict. Eighty-nine

Harvard men have been enrolled in the American Ambulance Service, which, in France and Flanders, has been bringing the wounded and the dying from the battle-front to the hospitals. They have performed this duty beneath the fire of the enemy, in rain and snow, in darkness, in danger, over mountain roads and fields torn with shells. Some in this way have given their lives to help their fellow-men. Others have served in the army. I have here a list of sixteen who have lost their lives in this service. The brilliant gallantry of Norman Prince and Victor Chapman is familiar to all, but the sacrifice of the rest was just as fine and differs in no respect in principle. Those who loved them suffer and sorrow for them, but they cannot but feel the "solemn pride" of which Lincoln spoke in his letter to the mother who had lost five sons in our Civil War. They gave up comfort, ease, and the pleasant paths of peace to help their fellow-men and to serve a cause in which they believed. Although they have died in their youth they have won the great prize of death in battle. They are safe. Failure is impossible to them, for

> "They never fail who die
> In a great cause. . . .
> But still their spirit walks abroad. Though years
> Elapse, and others share as dark a doom,
> They but augment the deep and sweeping thoughts
> Which o'erpower all others, and conduct
> The world at last to freedom."

It seems to me that all those men who fought in the Revolution, those who died in the Civil War, those who have been ready to give their lives for France, represent the shining spirit of self-sacrifice which is what makes nations great as well as men. That the first duty of man is to preserve his own life and secure an opportunity for the

undisturbed accumulation of money, for ease, for amusement, for safety, has never been the Harvard doctrine when the crucial moments came. The Harvard gospel has been that of Emerson: —

> "So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
> So near is God to man,
> When duty whispers low, thou must,
> The youth replies, I can."

That is the spirit of Harvard, the spirit which in the last resort and in the ultimate analysis has made the University great in the eyes of the world and beloved of all her offspring. What is true of a university is true of a nation, and that which to me outweighs all else in this campaign is that the present Administration has lowered the standard of political conduct; has taken as its motto that all that is best, that every tradition, that every higher aspiration, may be cast into the dust heaps in the pursuit of votes. They have lowered the American spirit; they have blunted the American conscience. They have tried — as I believe, tried in vain — to deaden the very soul of the American people. The Republican Party in this campaign is but an instrument, the only instrument we have, to put the United States back in the place which they have always occupied. The first duty, as it seems to me, is to restore the American spirit to power in this nation, to bring back the fidelity to the old traditions, to make it clear to all the nations of the earth that what we would proclaim above all other things is not that we "have kept the peace" but that "we have kept the faith."

XIII

THE PEACE NOTE OF THE PRESIDENT

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, JANUARY 3, 1917

XIII

THE PEACE NOTE OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I said yesterday, in expressing the hope that we might consider this resolution with some care, that it was a resolution of extreme importance. I do not, indeed, think its importance can be exaggerated. It projects Congress, — for the resolution is not confined to this body, — in the first place, into the field of foreign negotiations, which, under our Constitution and form of government, is reserved to the Executive. It does far more than that. It also projects Congress into the field of European politics, and involves us in the affairs of Europe.

Hitherto, Congress has avoided, in accordance with our traditional policy, any steps which would directly involve us in European affairs. Such resolutions as have been passed in regard to events in Europe have been of a general character, usually an expression of sympathy for peoples struggling for their liberties or their independence. This resolution is not of that character; it is not a general resolution in regard to peace. It does not simply say that in the interests of humanity the United States hopes that peace will soon be reached among the belligerents, and that this desolating war will be brought to an early end. Whether or not such a declaration of opinion on the part of Congress would have any effect it is not necessary to discuss; but it would certainly express a

sentiment which must be shared by everybody who has any feeling of humanity or any capacity for connected thought.

This resolution goes very much further than that. It commits the Senate, and similar resolutions introduced in the other body commit the House, to the most absolute approval and endorsement of the entire note of the President. Therefore it is desirable to consider to just what propositions approval of that note would commit Congress and the country. This resolution not only commits us to approval of the President's note, but also specifically to demanding of the nations engaged in war on what terms they will make peace. With those terms of peace, as the war is to-day, we have no national or legal concern. The terms of peace, as the war now stands, are wholly beyond and outside our national interests. The ostensible causes of the war — Servia, for example — did not touch the interests of the United States. Such interest as we may have in the terms of peace can only be that of sentiment or of humanity; but legally and nationally we have nothing to do with them. Those who fight the war must make the peace and settle the terms.

It is also to be remembered, Mr. President, that Congress, in acting on a matter of this great seriousness, cannot be content with a mere clamor for peace on any terms. A peace which meant merely a breathing space until the belligerent nations could gather strength for a fresh struggle, which in all probability when renewed would involve this country, is not one which would be worth having. The peace which we desire and must desire, not only for our own selfish interests, but in the interests of humanity, must be a just and righteous peace which offers some promise of permanence, and some guaranty that the

horrors of the last two years shall not be again poured out upon the world.

Mr. President, before coming to a detailed consideration of the note, I wish briefly to trace the policy heretofore pursued by our Government under similar conditions.

The right of a neutral country to offer either its good offices or mediation is undoubted. It is discussed and recognized by every writer on international law, from Vattel to the present day. We have a right through the organ of our Government entrusted with that duty — and that is the President — to offer our good offices to bring about peace between warring nations with which we are on friendly terms. This right was explicitly recognized in the Hague conventions, and it was provided there that the offer of good offices by a neutral should not be considered cause of offence by a belligerent. I do not think the Hague provision in any way strengthens the general practice of nations or the law as it now exists, for the Hague conventions have been trampled under foot and utterly disregarded since this war began, and their destruction has been watched with painful indifference by ourselves and all other neutrals. But the general practice of nations, as I have said, and the recognition of international law, make the right to offer good offices and mediation by a neutral undoubted, and under our form of government the President is the proper authority to make that offer. It must, however, be remembered that, except where mediation is imposed upon belligerents by a more powerful neutral, or by several neutrals, offers of good offices have always followed certain well-recognized lines.

In the first place, it is not to be forgotten that belligerents engaged in active war may, without any breach of friendship or good-will, absolutely decline and even resent

interference from outside. I wish to call the attention of the Senate to the attitude of our Government in regard to mediation during the Civil War: —

June 15, 1861, Lord Lyons, British Minister, and M. Mercier, French Minister at Washington, called on Mr. Seward and proposed each to read an instruction which he had received from his Government and to leave a copy of it if desired. Mr. Seward, before consenting that the papers should be officially communicated to him, inquired as to their contents; and, after inspecting them, he "declined to hear them read, or to receive official notice of them."

He wrote subsequently to Mr. Adams: —

The British Government, while declining, out of regard to our natural sensibility, to propose mediation for the settlement of the differences which now unhappily divide the American people, have nevertheless expressed, in a very proper manner, their willingness to undertake the kindly duty of mediation if we should desire it. The President expects you to say on this point to the British Government that we appreciate this generous and friendly demonstration, but that we cannot solicit or accept mediation from any, even the most friendly, quarter.

I quote that paragraph from Moore's "International Law Digest," but those who are interested will find a much fuller account of the incident in the recently published "Life of Lord Lyons," and of the interview which he and the French Minister had with Mr. Seward.

At a later time Mr. Seward said, in 1862, more than a year later — and this is published in the "Life of Charles Francis Adams," by his son of the same name: —

If the British Government shall in any way approach you, directly or indirectly, with propositions which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seems to imply a purpose to dictate or to mediate or to advise, or even to solicit or persuade, you will

answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. You will make the same answer, whether the proposition comes from the British Government alone or from that Government in combination with any other. If you are asked for an opinion of what reception the President would give to such a proposition if made here, you will reply that you are not instructed, but that you have no reason for supposing it would be entertained.

MR. HITCHCOCK. Will the Senator yield?

MR. LODGE. Yes.

MR. HITCHCOCK. I wish to draw the Senator's attention to the great distinction which all writers make between a civil war and a war between independent powers.

MR. LODGE. Mr. President —

MR. HITCHCOCK. If the Senator will permit me —

MR. LODGE. I am permitting.

MR. HITCHCOCK. I think the Senator will not find a precedent or an authority for the position that the attempt of a neutral to bring about peace between belligerent powers can be resented or regarded as an unfriendly act, and if he will observe the precedents he will see that the exercise of this right — that is, the right of a neutral to intervene —

MR. LODGE. Mr. President, I yielded for a question; I did not yield for a speech.

MR. HITCHCOCK. Is it not a fact, then, that the exercise of this right can never be regarded by either of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act, and can the Senator point to a case, except a case of civil war or a case of admitted war of conquest, where interference has been or can be resented?

MR. LODGE. Mr. President, I explicitly said when I began that it was not an unfriendly act. Without pretend-

ing to any very profound knowledge, I was aware that the war in this country was what is ordinarily called a civil war. That it was a war between the States, I knew. I also am aware that the present war is not a civil war. But the belligerency of the Confederate States had been recognized; it was recognized at the very beginning by England, and our belligerency, of course, was recognized. I only quoted what Mr. Seward said to show that every nation had the right to decline good offices or mediation, and that we had illustrated that fact ourselves.

I now come to the Franco-German War. On September 9, 1870, this dispatch went from Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft, our Minister at Berlin: —

Washburne telegraphs —

Mr. Washburne was our Minister to France —

Washburne telegraphs that France requests United States to join other powers in effort for peace. Uniform policy and true interest of United States not to join European powers in interference in European questions. President strongly desires to see war arrested and blessings of peace restored. If Germany also desires to have good offices of United States interposed, President will be glad to contribute all aid in his power to secure restoration of peace between the two great powers now at war, and with whom United States has so many traditions of friendship. Ascertain if North Germany desires such offices, but without making the tender thereof unless assured they will be accepted.

FISH.

On September 30 Mr. Fish wrote to Mr. Bancroft: —

WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1870.*

SIR: Your dispatch No. 133, of the 12th instant, has been received.

The reasons which you present against an American intervention between France and Germany are substantially among the

considerations which determined the President in the course and policy indicated to you in the cable dispatches from this office on the 9th instant and in rejecting all idea of mediation unless upon the joint request of both the warring powers.

It continues to be the hope of the President, as it is the interest of the people of this country, that the unhappy war in which France and North Germany are engaged shall find an early end.

This Government will not express any opinion as to the terms or conditions upon which a peace may or should be established between two Governments equally sharing its friendship, but it is hoped that the prolongation of the war may not find its cause either in extreme demands on the one side or extreme sensitiveness on the other.

HAMILTON FISH.

The Administration of President Grant followed the well-established method of offering good offices or mediation; that is, the first step, and one without which our Government declined to move, was to ask belligerents, those on both sides of the war, whether it would be acceptable. That not being the case, no offer was made; and our Government was careful to point out that they were not concerned in the terms, that their only desire was peace, but that they would not offer their good offices unless both sides desired them to do so.

This was the course pursued by President Roosevelt when he brought the representatives of Japan and Russia together. He did not send his note to Japan and Russia until he had found that it would be agreeable to both. In his "Autobiography," on page 583, he says: —

I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that, naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the other should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative. I then sent an identical note to the two powers proposing that they should meet, through their representatives, to see if peace could not be made directly between them, and

offered to act as an intermediary in bringing about such a meeting, but not for any other purpose. Each assented to my proposal in principle. There was difficulty in getting them to agree on a common meeting place; but each finally abandoned its original contention in the matter, and the representatives of the two nations finally met at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire.

It will be observed that President Roosevelt, following the precedents of our own country and of others, first sounded both sides to the conflict to discover whether his good offices would be acceptable. Having discovered that they would be, he then wrote to Russia and to Japan an identical note proposing that they should meet, not suggesting that we, a neutral power, should take part in the conference, but that they should meet, and, as he said, confining himself to that and to no other purpose. The rest is known.

MR. WATSON. May I ask the Senator a question?

MR. LODGE. Certainly.

MR. WATSON. I ask the Senator if, in the case of President Roosevelt's note, any resolution was introduced into the Senate for a confirmation of his proposal?

MR. LODGE. I do not remember that any resolution was passed by either House of Congress endorsing and approving the action of the President. The President then was acting wholly within his right as Chief Executive, as the present Executive is acting, and it was not sought by him certainly to project the Congress of the United States into the negotiations, if you choose to call them so, or to mix Congress up with the good offices he had offered in hopes of bringing the belligerents together.

Now, Mr. President, we are asked to give our full approval to the President's note, which, as I shall proceed to show, goes far beyond any proposition of merely bringing

the belligerents together. The President had a perfect right to send that note and to make that experiment. The experiment, as I shall show later, so far as one of the belligerents is concerned, has failed. We have no reason to suppose from reports which come to us that it will have any better success with the other side.

This is the note: —

The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to His Majesty's Government a course of action with regard to the present war which he hopes that the British Government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has in fact been in no way suggested by them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them.

Now, apart from what is said about our own interests, which lies outside of bringing the nations together, the first proposition of the President is to obtain a statement of the terms of peace from all the belligerents: —

He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war.

This, again, seems to be going rather far in stating the views, the objects, and the intention of the people to whom he is offering his good offices: —

Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

Now, we come to the second request, and that is the measure to be taken for the preservation of the future peace of the world after this war has been concluded: —

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command.

I am not going to discuss now the merits of our engaging and associating ourselves with the powers of Europe. I merely point out that it is a departure from the hitherto unbroken policy of this country, a departure so important that it does not seem to me that it ought to be hastily taken. This part of the note does not concern peace; it concerns the future policy of the United States. If carried out, it means an abandonment of the policy we have hitherto pursued of confining ourselves to our own hemisphere, and makes us a part of the political system of another hemisphere, with the inevitable corollary that the nations of that other hemisphere will become a part of our system.

But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full

responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed toward undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitively stated.

It has not been usual to criticize the people to whom you are offering your good offices, but I dare say that may be perfectly suitable under the new dispensation, although it has not been the habit to do it.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides.

I doubt very much if this assertion would be accepted by the belligerents. I think their objects seem to them, however erroneously, to be different.

Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as

some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

LANSING.

Putting aside the general statement about conditions, we come down to the essential points that are made in the note which we are asked to endorse by this resolution and to commit the country to, so far as we can commit it, from the first word to the last.

It will be observed that the President found it necessary to say that in making his offer at this particular time he was embarrassed in making it, because it might seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers; and he assures us that, of course, it had nothing to do with them. Coming at the time it did, however, it was unfortunate in producing a widespread impression to the contrary. Of course, I accept the President's statement absolutely. I mean never to impute motives to anybody, and I have no power to divine intentions. The President says that it was in no way associated with the note of Germany to the other powers, which had just preceded it; but, unfortunately, I repeat, a different interpretation was placed upon it abroad very generally and also here at home. Those who sympathized most warmly with Germany regarded it as friendly and as issued

at a time when it would help Germany to make peace at the moment and on the terms she desired; and it was regarded in the same way by those whose sympathies were adverse to Germany and in favor of the allies. It could hardly be otherwise, coming at the moment it did.

But, Mr. President, we are not left wholly to conjecture as to what the attitude and feeling of Germany really were as to the President's note. It is an unwritten rule in both Houses — from which I should be the last to deviate without good cause and which I have never seen set aside but once — not to refer in debate to the representatives of foreign Governments in the United States. The only occasion on which I remember to have seen that rule set aside, and properly set aside, was when a letter written by Mr. Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister, came to light, in which he attacked the President and Congress, and which led to his voluntary recall by the Spanish Government. That letter was discussed and criticized as it deserved to be.

I know that in referring now to an ambassador I am doing an unusual thing, although I refer with all respect; but it is an unusual circumstance which warrants and fully justifies my doing so, and this circumstance explains, perhaps, why the President's note was so widely misinterpreted as being put forth in the German interest.

On December 24, in the "New York Staats Zeitung" — I have the original here — was a message from the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, from which I quote the two essential paragraphs, which I have translated into English. He says: —

Just as once the Star of Bethlehem led the kings from the East on their long journey through the night in the fulfilment of their hopes, so there now gleams into the darkness of this

useless slaughter in Europe out of the words of President Wilson the light of a new message of peace on earth. Germany stands ready to follow it. Confident of her strength, but not boastful, conscious that she drew the sword not through lust of conquest but only in defence of her national existence, she asks no foreign territory, but only assurance against future attack and against alliances which threaten the peace of the world.

It is hardly to be wondered at that after such a statement as this from the German Ambassador there should be a general impression or general misinterpretation of the President's note, that there should be a general belief that it was designed and timed so as to help Germany in obtaining peace at the moment she desired it and on the terms she wished to impose.

It is most unusual, I think, for an ambassador, so far as my experience goes, to approve or to oppose the utterances and declarations of the President of the United States. Washington demanded the recall of Genêt because of his public statements in opposition to the policies of Washington's Administration. President Cleveland demanded the recall of a British Minister because a private letter of the Minister had been published in which he had advocated Mr. Cleveland's election, and the demand was made within forty-eight hours, I think, after the note had been printed.

Mr. Stone. Did the Senator from Massachusetts say that the British Minister had advocated Mr. Cleveland's election?

Mr. Lodge. He spoke favorably of Mr. Cleveland's election in his note to his correspondent in California. I think if the Senator from Missouri will look the matter up he will find I am not mistaken in saying that the letter was favorable to Mr. Cleveland. In the one case, that of

President Washington, the Minister had spoken in opposition; in the case of Mr. Cleveland he had spoken in favor. Of course, I do not cite these as precedents. The traditions and practices of President Cleveland and Mr. Bayard, I know, are no longer in force, but I think they justify me in saying that this utterance of the German Ambassador at this time was very unusual, and that I am further justified in citing it as showing why President Wilson's note has been so misinterpreted on the precise point which he disclaims. I regard that misinterpretation, which has gone widely over the world, as presenting a very serious objection to our endorsing and approving without a word of explanation the President's note.

We have been a neutral in this great war. I think we have all tried — I know I have tried in my official capacity, whatever my sympathies might be, and they are very strong — to preserve both in speech and in action a neutral attitude. Now, it is quite as possible to be unneutral in entering upon negotiations for peace as to be unneutral during the operations of war. If that misinterpretation of the President's note, owing to the time at which it appeared, and which he thought it necessary to try to forestall, is so general throughout the world, as I believe it to be, then we are in danger when, without any abatement or any modification, we adopt that note, of saying to the whole world that the Senate of the United States, and, if the House acts, the Congress of the United States, are ranging themselves on the side of one belligerent in seeking to bring about peace favorable to that belligerent.

I do not wish, if war can be honorably avoided, to see this country officially ranged on the side of either belligerent either in war or in peace; but certainly I should not wish through any vote of mine to have my action misin-

terpreted. I am willing and glad to do anything to promote righteous peace, if neutrality is preserved in seeking it; but I am not willing by interpretation or misinterpretation to have myself placed by my vote in the attitude of trying to help one side in the negotiations of peace against the other; and particularly I do not want to be ranged against the side which I personally believe is fighting the battle of freedom and democracy as against military autocracy. I do not wish to be put in that false position. I do not ask now to have the country ranged on the side of the Allies; I certainly do not want it to be ranged on the side of Germany; and with this widespread misinterpretation, which has gone all over the world as to the note, a misinterpretation so general and probable that the President thought it necessary to anticipate it, I think we should be very slow before we approve and endorse that note without modification or subtraction of any kind.

Mr. President, the next point is the demand for terms. My own belief is that, according to all good practice, the terms must be the work of the belligerent nations, especially when the nation offering its good offices has no national or local interest in the questions involved.

The third point is the suggestion of the President as to what we are to do after the war is over with a view of preventing future wars. That I do not myself misinterpret his purposes there or give them too great extension, I shall ask the privilege of reading to the Senate an article clipped from one of the great Democratic papers of the country, the "Louisville Courier-Journal." The article referred to quotes the passage which I have read in the President's note, beginning with the words: —

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world, the people and the Government of the United States are

as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. . . . They stand ready and even eager to coöperate —

And so forth; and then says: —

That is plain speaking, whose plain meaning is that if the speaker is to shape the future foreign policy of this country we are to assume a full share of responsibility for the future peace of mankind. It means that we are a world power; that the world's affairs are our affairs; that never again in any great war convulsion shall we be a neutral; that with the coming of peace in Europe will begin our new responsibilities as a guarantor of peace, backed, of course, by our resources in men, money, and arms. It means, indeed, that the President of the United States, in view of the assumption of those responsibilities, would not be averse to having a voice in shaping that peace, if not actually sitting at the council board which shall draw up its terms.

It goes on at some length and then says at the end: —

There are resolutions before Congress for the indorsement by that body of this note of the President's. It might be well for Congress before taking that action to go slow enough to be sure of just what it is endorsing.

Let me say also, as I have already pointed out, that it has been the practice to sound belligerents before sending an offer of good offices. That course has been always pursued, and I think it is the general practice of nations. According to the published statement of the representatives of the Allies the note came to them as a complete surprise. They were not sounded in any way in regard to it, and I do not know that Germany was; but one side was certainly not sounded. Mr. Lansing says no one was sounded, and this was, of course, a radical departure from the accepted practice in offering either mediation or good offices.

Mr. President, there is a good deal of subsequent his-

tory attached to the President's note. When we endorse that note in this general and sweeping way and approve it without any reservation whatever, it is well to know just what it means and what official glosses have been put upon it. It appeared on December 21, and early on that same day it received its first explanation by the Secretary of State, which was as follows: —

> The reasons for the sending of the note were as follows: —
>
> It is n't our material interest we had in mind when the note was sent, but more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical.
>
> I mean by that, that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and, therefore, we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future.
>
> No nation has been sounded. No consideration of the German overtures or of the speech of Lloyd George was taken into account in the formulation of the document. The only thing the overtures did was to delay it a few days. It was not decided to send it until Monday. Of course, the difficulties that faced the President were that it might be construed as a movement toward peace and in aid of the German overtures. He specifically denies that that was the fact in the document itself.
>
> The sending of this note will indicate the possibility of our being forced into the war. That possibility ought to serve as a restraining and sobering force, safeguarding American rights. It may also serve to force an earlier conclusion of the war. Neither the President nor myself regards this note as a peace note. It is merely an effort to get the belligerents to define the end for which they are fighting.

This appeared almost immediately after the President's note. If it had any purpose — and I believe it had, for Mr. Lansing is a most accomplished international lawyer; he is a man of discretion; he certainly would not have made this statement without purpose and without full

approbation from the Executive — if that statement is correct, and interprets the note aright, then the whole transaction becomes perfectly simple. By putting it on the ground that our own interests are involved, that we are on the verge of war, we are at once justified in sending that note to the belligerents without notice beforehand, without sounding them. I do not know, but I assume, that this statement before it appeared in the newspapers was made in those precise terms to every one of the foreign nations, belligerent and neutral, in order to explain to them why the so-called peace note was sent. If it was a note of mediation and of good offices, the belligerents should have been notified, and we should have kept ourselves within the well-defined lines which offers of good offices always observe. But if the purpose of the note was to say to the world, "We have a direct national interest in this question, because we foresee that in the continuance of war we shall be brought to the verge of hostilities, if not engaged in them," then that note is justified in form and substance from beginning to end, except, of course, the portion which relates to our conduct after the war.

That was the first statement.

Almost immediately, the same evening, in fact, the second explanation appeared, also from Secretary Lansing: —

> I have learned from several quarters that a wrong impression was made by the statement which I made this morning, and I wish to correct that impression.
>
> My intention was to suggest the very direct and necessary interest which this country as one of the neutral nations has in the possible terms which the belligerents may have in mind, and I did not intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality, which it has consistently pursued in the face of constantly increasing difficulties.

I regret that my words were open to any other construction, as I now realize that they were. I think that the whole tone and language of the note to the belligerents shows the purpose without further comment on my part. It is needless to say that I am unreservedly in support of that purpose and hope to see it accomplished.

How far that changes the character or meaning of the first explanation I leave it to others more ingenious than I am to determine.

On the 24th of December there was given out the following official statement: —

This outline, and what follows, was stated officially yesterday for the Administration.

It is the third explanation of the note. Mr. Lansing's name is not attached to it; but the Associated Press, and all the press so far as I saw, said that it was an official utterance, and it certainly reads as if it were a carefully prepared statement: —

This Government does not know, and feels that it has had no real means of knowing, what terms would be required by each of the belligerents to make peace. It regards the recent speeches of the leading statesmen in all countries as vague and undefined and sees nothing in them that would enable a conference to draw up a treaty.

All speak of the rights of small nations, the repugnance of conquest, and the guaranties of a permanent peace, but no one nation has yet gone into what it means by those phrases in a way that the Government of the United States can understand.

Recent press comment has been taken to enhance that vagueness. France, for instance, has not disclosed if what she considers a just peace means the evacuation of her northern Provinces; or, in addition to that, the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine; or if in addition to both those claims she expects a money indemnity for the damage of invasion; or, beyond that, if she has an actual programme for doing away with

so-called German militarism. In short, the United States asks what would she accept to-day as the basis of peace.

Similar issues apply to all the belligerent countries in merely a varying form. What President Wilson wants is the details. As the largest neutral facing grave problems and as the friend of all parties concerned, the United States feels most earnestly that it is entitled to know those facts. Unless some one of the groups lays down its actual terms there will be no basis for negotiation and no possibility of peace till the world is bled white, officials declare.

There is not the slightest expectation here that the terms laid down will be reconcilable at first. It is known that some of the nations will demand what in actuality is impossible. Nevertheless, the naming of those terms will afford a basis of negotiation, a starting place from which the conflicting interests can begin to converge.

Nor is any embarrassment seen to any of the nations in naming such terms. It is understood in advance that they are apt to fluctuate with the military changes and are not permanently binding under new conditions. Whatever any nation feels must be included in its terms, for moral reasons can also be added to the terms without embarrassment it is said.

As to permanent guaranties, it was officially declared that the United States stands ready to enter any kind of international agreement that may seem most desirable to the nations, whether permanent peace is to be secured by force, if necessary, or by law. The country is not committed to any one plan, and President Wilson is entirely open to suggestions. It is the Administration view that the country can be committed to an abandonment of the policy of isolation, much as President Monroe committed it to the Monroe Doctrine, without Senate action. In the plans so far contemplated, however, it is probable the nations would be bound by treaty agreements which would necessarily have to be ratified by the Senate, so far as the United States is concerned.

A fuller understanding of the embarrassment caused to the Administration by the coincidence of its note with the German proposals was given yesterday, when it was said that, despite the early unfavorable effect which the note was expected to have in the Allied countries through that fact, it was decided to risk

it in view of the greater interests involved. It is expected it may be some time before the American viewpoint will be accepted abroad, but it is felt that in the end it certainly will prevail.

NOT AIMED AT LLOYD GEORGE

It also stated most emphatically that the note was not rushed off Monday in order to get it to Premier Lloyd George before he had irrevocably committed the Allies against peace in his speech to Parliament Tuesday. That assumption was foreseen, but officials expect it to lose weight and importance as the first impressions wear off.

The early resentment in London and Paris on the assumption that the President's note declared both belligerents were fighting for the same object is regarded as unwarranted at the State Department, where it was said great pains had been taken to avoid that very inference.

Stress was laid on the President's words to show that he had not expressed any conviction that both sets of belligerents were fighting for the same objects. On the other hand, the language of the note, it was pointed out, specifically said the statesmen of both groups of belligerents had so stated their objects in general terms to the people of their own countries. Officials were gratified to see this view being pointed out in some of the later foreign comment received.

VAGUENESS HAS INCREASED

The phrase was written, it was said, after study of the more recent statements of the belligerents rather than the statements at the time they entered the war. Then the avowed objects of all the nations were more specific, Italy, for instance, coming into the war with an official statement of what she felt necessary for her future. Since then, however, on all sides, it is felt a constantly increasing vagueness has been growing up, which now is expanding into the most nebulous terms.

General hostility to the note, at first, both in Allied and Teutonic countries, as conveyed in news dispatches, was regarded by officials as one of the most hopeful signs, as it indicated that the note was neutral. Especially was the hostility in some of the German papers pleasing, as it was thought that when the

Allies realized that the plan was not so welcome to their enemies they would give to it more earnest and more impartial consideration.

EARLY REPLY NOT EXPECTED

The possibility of an early reply is discounted here. The Central Powers have indicated that they will not risk laying down their peace terms until they have had a reply to their own proposals from the Entente. While the reply now is finished, it will take a week to distribute it to the various powers.

The Entente having both that reply and the President's note to consider, and consisting of ten different nations, all with different interests, is expected to require considerable time to get its views into shape for transmission.

The Allies' reply to the Central Powers will not be made public here.

Mr. Lodge. I merely wish to call attention to the fact that this is the third explanation of the note issuing from official headquarters. They have reviewed it and explained it, and they have particularly laid stress on the United States entering into some kind of international agreement, to which I have already called attention, and they bring up the Monroe Doctrine. It is stated here: —

It is the Administration view that the country can be committed to an abandonment of the policy of isolation, much as President Monroe committed it to the Monroe Doctrine, without Senate action.

President Monroe committed his Administration to that doctrine when he sent in his famous message. He committed nobody else.

Mr. Smith of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The President *pro tempore*. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. Lodge. Yes.

MR. SMITH of Georgia. I wish to say to the Senator from Massachusetts I feel absolutely sure that the President does not agree to the view that the Government or the Nation could be committed to the policy indicated without Senate action.

MR. LODGE. Then he should not allow the Associated Press and all the press of the country to come out with an uncontradicted official statement, repeated over and over again.

MR. SMITH of Georgia. I am sure that the President approves no such publication, had nothing to do with it, and approves no such view.

MR. LODGE. I am delighted to hear it.

MR. SMITH of Georgia. I state that in my place with absolute knowledge of what I say.

MR. LODGE. I am delighted to know that the Senator makes that statement on his own authority.

MR. SMITH of Georgia. I do.

MR. LODGE. I am glad to know that the President — who is certainly as familiar as any living man with the history of his country — knows that President Monroe could not commit anybody but himself and his Administration. The Monroe Doctrine has become part of the policy of the United States because it has received the repeated if informal approval of Congress and of the people of the United States. It is not a treaty. It is not binding. It is a policy to which this country is deeply committed in every way in which a country can be committed; but the country committed itself to the doctrine laid down by President Monroe, and I hope it will be a long day before that doctrine is impaired or abandoned.

Mr. President, the interpretation of the note in the

third explanation may be mistaken, but there can be no mistake about the note itself: —

> In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command.

I am not now attacking the merits of that policy. I am only saying at this time that it is a question of very great moment. The world is aware — those who have given any attention to the subject and those who are anxious, as we all are, to promote and maintain peace — that the limit of voluntary arbitration has been reached. Elsewhere, on other occasions, I have said that, and have gone into the question at some length. The only way in which the settlement of disputed questions between nations can be carried further, the limit of voluntary arbitration having been reached, is by putting behind the decision of the international tribunals force to compel the acceptance of the decisions of those tribunals as the force of the United States stands behind the courts of the United States and compels the acceptance of their decisions.

That next step is charged with difficulties, as I have pointed out. Great obstacles arise. It may be possible that something can be done in that direction to remove causes of war, to promote the cause of peace; but the difficulties and the obstacles cannot be overlooked. If we make the attempt too sweeping and pledge ourselves to too much, it will break down just as surely as all these

empty treaties about a year's delay, and so forth, would break down under the stress of war and the danger of the country. Whatever we do in that direction, if anything is possible — which I very much doubt — must be done with the utmost care. Above all nothing of the sort should be urged or pressed now before the conclusion of the present war. As is said in that statement, this movement would involve treaties. Coöperation in everything, the submission of all possible questions to arbitration with the force of the Governments of the world behind it — how far is that to go? Is it to include the Monroe Doctrine? Is it to include the sovereign right to admit and exclude whomever we please from immigration to this country? Where is the line to be drawn? Those are some of the questions which are opened up by this sweeping proposition of coöperation with other nations.

Mr. Hitchcock. Mr. President —

The President *pro tempore*. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. Lodge. I yield for a question.

Mr. Hitchcock. I should like to know if the Senator will yield to permit me to ask unanimous consent to have this resolution go over until to-morrow? The morning hour is about to close.

Mr. Lodge. Yes; I have not quite concluded, but I am perfectly willing to let it go over. I want the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Townsend] to get his bill up.

Mr. Hitchcock. Then, Mr. President, I ask that this matter may go over until to-morrow, retaining its privileged character.

Mr. Lodge. I should like it understood that I can have the floor to-morrow to complete what I have to say.

THE PRESIDENT *pro tempore.* Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Nebraska? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

PEACE NOTE

January 4, 1917

MR. LODGE. Mr. President, when I yielded the floor yesterday at the hour of two o'clock I had been speaking of that clause in the President's note, which seems to me of very great importance, and which declares that the people of the United States "stand ready and even eager to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over," and so on, pledging us to a general coöperation with the powers of Europe and other powers in an arrangement for the maintenance of the peace of the world. I pointed out that this declaration might cover a great many questions. I desire now, without reading, to print an article in a similar sense from the "New York Sun."

The article referred to is as follows: —

PRESIDENT WILSON ATTEMPTS TO PLEDGE UNITED STATES TO REVERSAL OF TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Wilson may not be proposing peace; he may not be proposing mediation; he may not be interposing his hand or his head between the belligerents who are fighting this European war; he may not be suiting his acts to Germany's present desires — but the fact remains that he is not only proposing something which no President of the United States ever before proposed, but also pledging this Nation to something which no President of the United States has the right or the power to pledge.

That something is the annihilation of the Monroe Doctrine,

which has governed the policy of the Republic for almost one century of the Republic's existence.

Mr. Wilson speaks with feeling of the interests of the United States as a neutral power in relation to the war waged for European politics.

There is no other interest of the United States of such transcendent importance as that which lies behind the traditional refusal of our Government to mix in the political affairs of the European nations and its traditional determination, so often and in so many forms declared, to permit no European interference with the destinies of the Republics of North, Central, and South America, no extension of European political influence in the Western Hemisphere.

We are not discussing the merits of the Monroe Doctrine or now examining its health to see if it is senile, moribund, fit for no further progress except a journey to the last resting place of obsolete and superseded national policies. We merely call attention to the outstanding fact that the proposal and pledge which occur in the course of President Wilson's eloquent expression of the natural hope of American civilization and humanity to see peace restored on a lasting basis would incidentally send the Monroe Doctrine straight to the tomb. This is not to be dismissed as a matter of academic interest; its bearings on our international relations are those of a revolutionary change with practical consequences immeasurable. It means not only the utter abandonment of our attitude of aloofness from the complications of European politics, but also the absolute surrender of the position which we have maintained against all comers with regard to the American Republics south of our border. The participation of the United States in European guaranties inevitably means the entering of the European powers into the affairs of the Western Hemisphere wherein we have assumed and exercised an exclusive function. Specifically, it means European cooperation and tutelage in the affairs of Mexico, of Guatemala, of Honduras, of Nicaragua, of San Domingo, of Costa Rica, of Panama, of Colombia, of Venezuela, and so on, down to the jumping-off place of Pan-American policy at Cape Horn. There is no avoiding the fact that the United States cannot abolish one half of the Monroe Doctrine and preserve intact the other half.

Here is President Wilson's proposal and his pledge: —

> In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interests, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to coöperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command.

In this passage, as the "World" justly remarks, "the President pledges the coöperation of the United States in the enforcement of future guaranties of the peace of the world and the integrity of the small and weak nations of Europe." It cannot be made too clear that whether this is or is not a desirable departure from past policy, it is a departure involving not only our participation in the control of the destinies of Belgium and Serbia and Roumania, but also participation of Great Britain and Germany and Russia and France and Italy in the control of the destinies of Mexico, of the Central American States, of Venezuela; why not even of Cuba?

For — the Monroe Doctrine thus blithely swept away in the exuberance of emotional rhetoric is beyond the power of President Wilson to annul. The Government of the United States, by the joint action of Executive and Legislature, has officially declared the Monroe Doctrine to be its policy. Our participation in the peace conferences at The Hague, and our assent to the conventions there framed, were distinctly qualified and limited by this declaration: —

> Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign State, nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed as to require the relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude, toward purely American questions.

As the American historian of the first peace conference at The Hague, himself one of the American delegates, well said: "Not even in the supposed interest of universal peace would the American people have sanctioned for one moment an abandonment or the slightest infraction of a policy which appeals to them as being founded not only upon legitimate national desires and requirements but upon the highest interests of peace and progress throughout the world." And the general conventions both of the first conference at The Hague in 1900 and of the second in 1907 were ratified by the Senate of the United States with this broad and significant reservation specifically recorded as part of the contract.

President Wilson can, if he sees fit, propose the relinquishment of the Monroe Doctrine as the traditional policy of the United States by negotiating with European countries new treaties affecting the entry of this Government into political entanglements of European concern and conversely admitting European powers into political engagements of purely American concern. The Senate of the United States can, if it chooses, validate such proposed treaties by the constitutional process of ratification.

But until that has been done the Monroe Doctrine stands as our declared policy in international relations, and there is no more power in the White House to extinguish it, or to pledge the people and the Government of the United States to the guaranty of European boundaries, than there is in this newspaper or in the executive offices of the Pennsylvania Railroad.

Mr. President, I present this article simply as showing what outside judges who have given attention to this point regard as involved in this committal by this note of the Administration, and of the United States by implication, to the doctrine of general coöperation with the powers of Europe. I do not wish to enter into further details, which might be extended indefinitely, because I think it must be apparent to every one that when we abandon our traditional policy of separation from the politics and affairs of Europe we take a very momentous step, and one which

should not be taken without the most thorough knowledge of what is intended and of the distance to which we are to be invited to go. An approval of the note in this general form carries approval, of course, and without limitation, of the principle of general coöperation with European powers in the affairs not only of Europe but of America.

Mr. President, I desire next to call attention to the note of the German Government in reply to the President's note. I have no official copy of this note and am obliged, of course, to take that which was published in the newspapers. What I shall quote I cut from the "New York Times," and I have no doubt that it is absolutely correct. The note says: —

BERLIN, *December 26.*

The answer of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to President Wilson's peace note says: —

> The high-minded suggestion made by the President of the United States of America to create a basis for the establishment of a lasting peace has been received and considered by the Imperial Government in the friendly spirit which was expressed in the President's communication. The President points out that which he has at heart and leaves open the choice of road.
>
> To the Imperial Government an immediate exchange of views seems to be the most appropriate road in order to reach the desired result. It begs, therefore, in the sense of the declaration made on December 12, which offered a hand for peace negotiations, to propose an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerent States at a neutral place.
>
> The Imperial Government is also of the opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can be begun only after the end of the present struggle of the nations. It will, when this moment shall have come, be ready with pleasure to collaborate entirely with the United States in this exalted task.

The answer of the Central Powers concludes with the usual diplomatic terms of politeness. The text of the answer was transmitted to-day to James W. Gerard, the American Ambassador.

There is nothing said in this note which corresponds to the statement of the German ambassador here about the "Star of Bethlehem" and the light cast by the President's word; but if we remove the very appropriate diplomatic civilities we find that on the three essential points of the President's note, — which were a request for the naming of the terms, the proposal of neutral coöperation, and also a declaration as to future coöperation in a league for the preservation of the world's peace, — the German note is very explicit, almost blunt. It says nothing whatever about terms; it passes that by in complete silence. It then says, according to this dispatch, that the delegates of the belligerent States should meet in a neutral place. That excludes neutrals from the conference. My own belief is that the people who are fighting the war should make the peace, and that seems to be the German view. The German note then further says that the question of coöperation and association for the preservation of peace in the future must be relegated to the future and cannot be dealt with until after the conclusion of the peace which shall bring this war to an end. I think on that point the Imperial Government takes the sensible ground which might have been anticipated.

As to the terms, we are told in this morning's newspapers that it is believed that the terms of the Central Powers came through Ambassador Gerard from Berlin. They also quote a statement attributed to Count Andrassy, former Prime Minister of Hungary, in a New Year's speech. He is quoted as saying: —

As the Entente alleges that our peace proposal was only a manœuvre and was not made with any earnest desire to bring about peace, I am able to declare that President Wilson now knows our peace conditions and the Entente can learn them from that source.

ANOTHER VERSION OF SPEECH

The version of the Budapest dispatch received by the Reuter Telegram Company via Amsterdam quotes Count Andrassy as saying that the peace conditions of the Central Powers will be communicated to President Wilson, the quotation being as follows: —

> If the Entente reject our peace offer only because they maintain that our offer is not honestly meant, but is merely a manœuvre, and that they cannot enter into negotiations before knowing our conditions, they can learn these from President Wilson, to whom they will be communicated.

Mr. President, how much truth there may be in this report I do not know. Although nothing is said about terms in the German note, it is very possible that they may have been communicated through some other channel to the President. It is the President's undoubted right in pursuing a negotiation of this or any other kind, to receive communications of that character and to exercise an absolute discretion in keeping them entirely secret; the Senate is not a part of the negotiating power, and we have no right to inquire about or to thrust ourselves into negotiations; but, Mr. President, when we are called upon to endorse and to approve an entire note which covers this question, when we are invited to take action, then we should have the information on which to act. The Senate, in my judgment, has no right — and I have thought so for a long time — to try to force itself into the conduct of a diplomatic negotiation, and when it asks for diplomatic papers its request is always accompanied with the statement that the papers be sent "if not incompatible with

the public interest" ; in other words, it is recognized that the whole conduct of the negotiation is in the President's hands. Now, if the President has in his possession the terms proposed by the Central Powers, it is entirely within his discretion to deal with them; but, if we are summoned to endorse in the dark everything that he is doing, then before action we are entitled to know the grounds of the action ; in other words, when our coöperation is invited we are entitled to have the same information as that which the President has.

Mr. President, I do not wish to have it supposed that my interpretation or analysis of the German note is confined to me or is an unreasonable interpretation to put upon it. I wish to read in this connection, as showing what others think of that note, an article from the "New York World" of December 27, 1916. Everybody knows that the President has no more faithful supporter than that great newspaper, and therefore it gives me a particular reason for desiring to read this article to the Senate. It is entitled "Germany evades the Issue" : —

Germany's answer to President Wilson's note completely evades the issue.

The President requested from each of the belligerents a definite statement of the objects of the war and the terms upon which it would consider peace. Germany replies by proposing an immediate conference "of delegates of the belligerent States at a neutral place," knowing that this proposal had already been emphatically rejected by the Entente Governments.

The President did not ask for a peace conference. He recognized the fact that a conference at this time was impossible, but expressed the hope that "an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference." Germany refuses all interchange of views, and returns to the text of the note of December 12, which contained the proposal of the Teutonic Powers "to enter forthwith into peace negotiations."

The British Government, through its Prime Minister, has already made its response to that suggestion. Mr. Lloyd George in his speech to the House of Commons declared emphatically that —

> To enter, on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposal she intends to make, into a conference, is putting our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of the Germans.

Yet in reply to the President's request for terms the German Government goes no further than to renew a proposal which it knows has been rejected. In renewing this proposal it formally excludes all neutral Governments from such a conference and inferentially asserts that they are not concerned with the kind of peace that the belligerents may choose to make.

President Wilson in his note of December 18 spoke as "the representative of a neutral Nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue." Germany's reply makes certain a continuance of the war. The United States most assuredly will not ask Great Britain and France to enter a peace conference beaten and blindfolded, to learn in the dark what terms of peace a Germany "conscious of victory" is prepared to impose. Nor can it ask friendly Governments to give serious consideration to a proposal which they have already formally rejected but which is renewed in the disguise of an answer to President Wilson's request for terms.

In the light of Germany's reply to the President, it is impossible to believe that there was either honesty or sincerity of purpose back of the original peace proposal. It is plain enough now that the President's action stripped off the German mask and that the whole proceeding was a game invented in Berlin for the propitiation of neutrals and for the further bedevilment of German public opinion.

Had Germany's peace overtures been made in good faith the Imperial Government would have met the President halfway with a statement of terms that the Allies could not have rejected out of hand, but to which they would have been compelled to give consideration. That would have opened the door to further negotiation and eventually to conference. Instead the

German Foreign Office has abruptly closed the door and left no basis for further discussion.

So far as the United States is concerned, the hands of the clock have been turned back to December 18, and the Government at Washington is again confronted with "a manifest necessity to determine how to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue."

Mr. President, I think this article justifies me in saying that I have not construed or interpreted the German note uncharitably. To me it seems clear from the German note that no advance has been made on the points which the President brought forward. Yet we are asked, in the presence of that reply from Germany — and we do not know whether her terms may be in the hands of the President or not — to give a blanket endorsement, wholly blindly, to this entire negotiation. I am not contending in any way against the President's right to carry on the negotiations; I am not impugning his motives or his purposes; but I am resisting, and I mean to resist, the attempt to bring the Senate and the Congress of the United States into a blind approval of a negotiation of which we know nothing except what we see in the newspapers. If we are to endorse and approve any negotiation, then we are entitled to know all the facts in regard to it. We have not been given the facts, and yet we are asked to pass this general resolution in the presence of this reply from the one side of the belligerents which has answered. What the other side will say — the Allies of the Entente, as they are called — in reply to the President's note is not known. That reply has not yet arrived. I ventured to suggest the other day, when I asked to have this resolution go over, that it would perhaps be well to know what views the other belligerents took of the note, and what

their position was going to be in regard to it; but it was thought best by the majority in control of the Senate that we should dispose of this matter at once.

As I have said, we have not received the reply of the Allies to our note; but the reply of the Allies to the German note is before the world. Although I assume that every Senator has read it, I should like to call their attention to the terms of that reply and ask them to consider whether, in view of what the Allies said in answer to the German note, it is an apt and appropriate time for the Senate and the Congress of the United States to precipitate themselves into negotiations of which they know nothing. The Allies say: —

The allied Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, and Serbia, united for the defence of the liberty of their peoples and faithful to engagements taken not to lay down their arms separately, have resolved to reply collectively to the pretended propositions of peace which were addressed to them on behalf of the enemy Governments through the intermediary of the United States, Spain, Switzerland, and Holland. Before making any reply the Allied Powers desire particularly to protest against the two essential assertions of the note of the enemy powers that pretend to throw upon the Allies responsibility for the war and proclaim the victory of the Central Powers.

The Allied Governments cannot admit an admiration doubly inexact and which suffices to render sterile all tentative negotiation. The allied nations have sustained for thirty months a war they did everything to avoid. They have shown by their acts their attachment to peace. That attachment is as strong to-day as it was in 1914. But it is not upon the word of Germany, after the violation of its engagements, that the peace broken by her may be based.

A mere suggestion, without a statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace. The putting forward by the Imperial Government of a sham proposal lack-

ing all substance and precision would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre. It is founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present, and the future.

As for the past, the German note takes no account of the facts, dates, and figures which establish that the war was desired, provoked, and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

At the Hague Conference it was a German delegate who refused all proposals for disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after having addressed to Serbia an unprecedented ultimatum, declared war upon her in spite of the satisfaction which had at once been accorded.

The Central Empires then rejected all attempts made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution of a purely local conflict. Great Britain suggested a conference, France proposed an international commission, the Emperor of Russia asked the German Emperor to go to arbitration, and Russia and Austria-Hungary came to an understanding on the eve of the conflict. But to all these efforts Germany gave neither answer nor effect.

Belgium was invaded by an Empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which had the assurance to proclaim that treaties were "scraps of paper" and that "necessity knows no law."

At the present moment these sham offers on the part of Germany rest on the "war map" of Europe alone, which represents nothing more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation and not the real strength of the belligerents. A peace concluded upon these terms would be only to the advantage of the aggressors, who, after imagining that they would reach their goal in two months, discovered after two years that they could never attain it.

As for the future, the disasters caused by the German declaration of war and the innumerable outrages committed by Germany and her allies against both belligerents and neutrals, demand penalties, reparation, and guaranties. Germany avoids mention of any of these.

In reality, these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence the future

course of war and to end it by imposing a German peace. The object of these overtures is to create dissension in public opinion in the allied countries. But that public opinion has, in spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already given its answer with admirable firmness and has denounced the empty pretense of the declaration of the enemy powers.

They have the further object of stiffening public opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her, one and all severely tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure, and crushed by the supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants.

They endeavor to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral countries, whose inhabitants have long since made up their minds where the initial responsibilities lie and are far too enlightened to favor the designs of Germany by abandoning the defence of human freedom.

Finally, these overtures attempt to justify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes — submarine warfare, deportations, forced labor, and forced enlistment of the inhabitants against their own countries, and violations of neutrality.

Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but equally conscious of its requirements, the Allied Governments, closely united to one another and in perfect sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere.

Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationalities, and of the free existence of small States; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations and to afford the only effective guaranty for the future security of the world.

In conclusion, the Allied Powers think it necessary to put forward the following considerations, which show the special situation of Belgium after two and a half years of war.

In virtue of the international treaties signed by five great European powers, of whom Germany was one, Belgium enjoyed before the war a special status, rendering her territory inviolable and placing her under the guaranty of the powers, outside all European conflicts.

She was, however, in spite of these treaties, the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. For this reason the Belgian Government thinks it necessary to define the aims which Belgium has never ceased to pursue while fighting side by side with the Entente Powers for right and justice.

Belgium has always scrupulously fulfilled the duties which her neutrality imposed upon her. She has taken up arms to defend her independence and her neutrality violated by Germany, and to show that she remains faithful to her international obligations.

GERMANY PLEDGED REPARATION

On the 4th of August, 1914, in the Reichstag, the German Chancellor admitted that this aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the laws of nations and pledged himself in the name of Germany to repair it. During two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the proceedings of the occupying forces, which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and villages, and have been responsible for innumerable massacres, executions, and imprisonments.

At this very moment, while Germany is proclaiming peace and humanity to the world, she is deporting Belgian citizens by thousands and reducing them to slavery.

Belgium before the war asked for nothing but to live in harmony with her neighbors. Her King and her Government have but one aim — the reëstablishment of peace and justice. But they only desire peace which would assure to their country legitimate reparation, guaranties, and safeguards for the future.

Mr. President, I have read this note because it is the only thing we have had which shows the position of the Allies. Certainly from that note it is plain that they do not accept the German peace proposition. To venture into negotiations which neither party has asked us to begin, and to force our good offices of which neither party has indicated an acceptance, upon the belligerents, seems to me, in the presence of statements like the one which I have just read, unwise.

The President, better informed than the rest of us, may have good grounds for it. I am speaking only in regard to the action of the Senate and the Congress of the United States. There is nothing in the German note nor in the Allies' reply to the German note, as it seems to me, to justify the Senate and the Congress in embarking on the perilous field of negotiations between European powers, and in regard to terms which concern those powers alone.

It is well to remember, Mr. President, that it is not a desirable thing needlessly to create unfriendliness or ill feeling in the minds of the powers involved in war on either side. The United States, if her true policy is followed, will seek to maintain good relations with all. We do not surely desire to find ourselves at the end of the war, when peace comes, without a friend in the world among the other nations, and with the fact glaring them in the eyes that we have made uncounted millions out of a war which has cost them millions of lives and destroyed untold millions of property, and that we are also wholly unprepared and quite defenceless. I think we should move with extreme caution before we enter, as the legislative body of the United States, upon this perilous field.

We have not had the assent of the belligerents to what we are undertaking. We have demanded, without our mediation or good offices having been accepted, that the belligerents should state their terms, which concern them alone and not us; and we have undertaken to lay out a policy for the future, after peace is concluded, which the Central Powers at least have said must go over. This resolution involves us in all these difficult and dangerous questions; and, so far as we are concerned as a nation, we are asked to give our endorsement to a plan which involves the abandonment of the policy that the country has pursued

ever since the formation of the Constitution, after a few hasty debates in the Senate — a policy in which not only the Monroe Doctrine is involved, but many other questions of great domestic importance.

My objection to this resolution, Mr. President, is that there is no occasion whatever for it. The President is entrusted with the care of our foreign relations. Negotiations are in his hands. He is conducting them. When he needs our coöperation and assistance, he should lay before us all the facts which have guided him. But until that time comes, the Congress of the United States ought not to project itself into the field of negotiations, and thrust itself forward into the dangerous field of European politics. When we come to the further question of coöperation with other nations, to take this leap in the dark, after a brief debate during the morning hour, without having the facts, without knowing what we are asked to do, seems to me the height of unwisdom on the part of the Senate or of the House of Representatives.

XIV

ADDRESS

AT THE CELEBRATION OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF ST. JOHN'S CHURCH, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 13, 1917

XIV

ADDRESS

At the Celebration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of St. John's Church, Washington, January 13, 1917

Not far from here on a pleasant hillside there is an old spring-house, well past its hundredth birthday. It is a solid, little stone building which was not without a certain picturesqueness until the heavy hand of improvement fell upon its surroundings. Now its sole interest lies in the fact of its continued existence, in the knowledge that it came into being with the nineteenth century. No one thought of celebrating its anniversary, because something more is needed than the mere passage of time to make anything of man's handiwork worthy of commemoration. No memories gather upon the hillside where it stands, like those which cluster about this old church and which interest and bring together to-day, not only the men and women who form its congregation, but all to whom the past of the nation is dear. It is with buildings as with human beings. Mere existence is of little moment. The Thomas Parrs of this world, with their one hundred and fifty years, arouse at most a passing curiosity, while a whole literature springs up devoted to the brief lives of such creators of beauty as Keats and Shelley. The "crowded hour of glorious life" is long and full of memory to the generations yet unborn, but there is only emp-

tiness in the protracted lives which can show naught but,

> "The long mechanic pacings to and fro,
> The set, gray life and apathetic end."

Length of days in one who in no way is of use to his country or his fellow-men, who is unconscious of the fact that individual existence is valueless without service to its generation, is as vain and fleeting as the passing of the shadow on the dial. But he who in his first youth plunges into the darkness for the sake of a great cause goes from us, —

> "Rejoicing that the sun, the moon, the stars
> Send no such light upon the ways of men
> As one great deed."

I speak of this church as old. Measured merely by years the adjective is excessive. A century is but as yesterday in the eight thousand years of recorded history; the whole period of recorded history is only a trivial space in the life of man upon earth, now known to stretch back for nearly half a million years; and that in turn sinks into insignificance in the presence of the untold ages which science finds in the geological epochs, stretches of time as impossible of realization to the human mind as the distances of the stars or as the infinity of space in which they travel through their orbits. But to us this is a purely comparative world. That which is called new in one place is counted ancient in another; and, moreover, we have two measures of time, the dull accumulation of uneventful years on the one hand, and, on the other, the work, the achievements, the perils faced and overcome which, compressed into a few brief months, perhaps, are none the less able to fill great spaces in the memories of men and occupy with their record uncounted pages in the volumes

which history calls her own. This church is old as age is measured in our own brief new-world history, and it is old also if we try it by the events of which it has been an unmoved spectator.

But when we seek fitly to commemorate the meaning of an anniversary like this, it is this immobility, this very lack of emotion, which is most trying. Among the many well-known perversities of inanimate things none is more unbearable than their silence; so hopeless unless some one had the happy thought to cut into their surface a coeval inscription. They are little enough, these inscriptions, as a rule; still they are something. But for the most part we must gaze hopelessly upon the ruins or the buildings of the past, while questions crowd to our lips and die unspoken, in the presence of these dumb witnesses of a time and of events when men long dead were young. Too often the speechless ruins of a remote past are all that remain to tell us of what once has been, but as we come nearer to our own time we can at least clothe the monument which the years have spared with the memories of its youth elsewhere preserved.

Eloquence has often apostrophized the passionless earth, or the lifeless stones which the clinging memories have consecrated; art and imagination have personified them and given them voice and form. But without possessing any of these great gifts, we can all, if we will, permit ourselves to pause a moment amid the din and dust of daily existence and try to reflect on the lessons of history; we all are able to summon up remembrance of things past. Here to-day we can easily imagine this church when its life began. Peace succeeding to a three years' war had just settled down upon the country. The men who founded and organized this church, the men who built these walls,

had seen, only a few months before, a British force four thousand five hundred strong march unopposed from the Patuxent to the Capital. They had watched the hasty mustering of militia to the number of seven thousand and the helpless inefficiency of the attempt at any intelligent defence. On August 24, 1814, the British appeared at Bladensburgh. The militia there gathered fired upon them, not wholly in vain. Fifteen hundred British regulars advanced, and the American army dispersed. The only stand, and a very gallant one, was made by Commodore Barney and his sailors. They had burned the gunboats to which they had been attached — Mr. Jefferson's gunboats on wheels, which were designed to replace an expensive navy of fighting ships — in order to prevent the capture of these precious instruments of war by the enemy. Then they had come to Washington and to Bladensburgh. They fought bravely and effectively and Barney was badly wounded. They differed in no respect from their countrymen, in the guise of militia, who had run away, except that they were trained and disciplined. Mrs. Madison, watching anxiously from the White House for the return of her husband, saw through her spy-glass the militia hurrying back in flight across the fields, and marvelled with some bitterness that they had not courage to fight for their homes. In this she did the men injustice. They were individually just as brave as the British who routed them, or as their fellow-citizens who fought so gallantly and well with Barney. But they were untrained, undisciplined, unorganized, and no amount of individual courage will enable untrained, unorganized men to face successfully those who are trained, organized, disciplined, and equipped, who know not only what they mean to do, but what they must do.

The lesson of Bladensburgh glared in letters of fire before the American people. They paid no attention to it then. It is not yet apparent that they ever have paid any continued attention to it since. The preference in all that concerns the public business for the untrained amateur over the trained, and thus suspected expert, has remained, generally speaking, unaffected by much more serious events than Bladensburgh. And yet that quick defeat was not a pleasant, although a most emphatically instructive, incident. The fugitive militia streamed away past this spot, and in the rout were the amateurs who had brought about this rather painful result: the President, with the duelling pistols of his Secretary of the Treasury in his holsters; the Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, who with no military rank had been issuing military orders, and who, it is fair to say, was no more incompetent than the general in command with whom he interfered; and with them went the rest of the Cabinet and all that constituted the Government. Then the British marched in and burned the buildings and returned to their ships, covered with the useless glory of destruction, having effected nothing of the slightest military value, and peace came and this church rose from the ground and gazed upon the blackened walls of the Capitol and the White House, reflecting, let us hope, in silent, inanimate fashion upon the discredit which had befallen us and likewise upon the wisdom of relying upon improvised armies and navies organized and led by patriotic amateurs.

To describe all that has happened within sight of this spot, all that this church has seen, looking across the square, would be to tell in large part the history of the United States. It saw the White House restored and has watched great buildings rise from the vacant fields and a

city take the place of the village in which it was born. Administrations have come and gone, Congresses have met, played their part, and departed to make room for their successors. Presidents and Vice-Presidents, Ambassadors and Ministers of foreign countries, Senators and Congressmen, lawyers and judges, officers of the Army and the Navy, in long procession have occupied its pews and been members of its congregation. It is safe to say that there is no building in this country not pertaining to the Government which has sheltered within its walls so many men conspicuous in the life of their time and in the control and management of public affairs as this church in which we meet to-day.

When its half-century was closing, it passed through four years of the Civil War and listened to the beat of drums and the tramp of regiments and the rumble of artillery. It has heard the sounds of battle and the roar of guns when the enemy were near its gates. Its bells rang out in the darkness when the great President was murdered and panic filled the streets. A few weeks later and it beheld great armies, veterans of many battles, at last victorious, marching by for two days just across the way. Then for another half-century of peace it has watched, as it did before the Civil War, the changing administrations, while the country grew and developed beyond all that men had ever imagined.

Meanwhile through all these years of the century, in times of peace and in times of war, the purposes for which it was built were carried out; the duties inseparable from its existence were ever duly fulfilled. About it, as about all old churches, gathered ever more and more the gentler memories lying wholly apart from the transactions and the deeds which, when we bind them together, are called

history, the tender and intimate memories of those events which mark to every one of us the stages of our pilgrimage and, meaning nothing to the world, mean everything to each man and woman to whom they come in the relentless process of the years. As we think of it in this aspect, it no longer recalls alone the annals of the country, but that which is far larger, the story of the life of humanity itself. Here unconscious children have come, been named and gone forth with the blessing of the church upon them to face the unknown future. Along these aisles, while the organ poured forth the rejoicing music of the wedding march, have passed brides and bridegrooms to begin life together. From out these doors the dead have been carried, young and old, who have finished their course and to whom has come the final rest. Sorrow has gone with them, sometimes the sorrow of a nation, and over some has rested the flag to mark the close of a life which has been always ready for sacrifice when the country called for it. It is the pageant of human existence which year by year and day by day has passed in and out of this church amid smiles and tears, in joy and grief, but ever moving to the inevitable end.

So rise the ghosts of the "daughters of time, the hypocritic days." So the memories crowd about us as we summon them to us at the bidding of the anniversary season. The places where they should be cherished, the buildings where they gather, should be reverently preserved. We have been as a people too heedless everywhere in protecting the tangible and visible guardians of historic associations. The places to which such associations are attached are not many, but when the buildings which enshrine them are swept away the memories are scattered to the winds. Bricks and mortar, stone and metal and glass, can be

reassembled and replaced; but the memories, once dispersed, once severed from their original resting-place, can never again be brought together. They flutter away like the dead leaves of autumn; they melt and pass like the snows of yester-year.

More important even, more difficult certainly than the preservation of the monuments of the past, is the duty which we owe to the memories they awaken. To recall historic deeds and the lives of those who have served the country is of little use unless their commemoration is something more than lip service. To recite the glories of the past is rather worse than futile unless we also learn its lessons. If we merely utter words of praise for the dead, of affection for the recollection of the time that has gone, and then go back to the daily interests of our own little lives and forget the deeper meanings of that which we have celebrated, silence would be more becoming. If we take no inspiration from the memories in which we glory, if we neglect their teachings and are content with lower and more sordid levels, then, when we come into the presence of the past, instead of raising our voices in idle acclaim it would be more honest to avoid speech and rhetoric, to avert our gaze and pass on, free at least from the hypocrisy of lauding the honor and the glories of the past which we, by our indifference to their teachings and by our failure to sustain them, neither desire nor deserve. We should benefit ourselves and be more helpful to others and more serviceable to our country if now and then we should withdraw from the duties and the pleasures of the day, from the universal struggle for money and what money brings, from the restless pursuit of amusement, and seek the quiet of woods and fields remote from crowds and think a little on things past, things present, and things

yet to come. In this way we might secure an opportunity to forget for a moment our rights and privileges and consider whether the chief duties of life are not more important than life itself. If we cannot obtain this seclusion physically, we can at least retire to the "sessions of sweet, silent thought," and give, alone and separated from the noise and movement of the busy world, from her ambitions, jealousies, and hatreds, a passing hour to reflection. To do so might not advance us in heaping up riches or in grasping the gains of the stock market, but it could not fail to be profitable to any one capable of connected thought, for it is well always to remember that, in Landor's words, "Solitude is the audience chamber of God."

XV

THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR A WORLD PEACE

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 1, 1917

XV

THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR A WORLD PEACE

Mr. Lodge. Let me say, first, Mr. President, that I shall make no allusion whatever to the note from Germany which has startled the country this morning. That note is in the hands of the President, in the hands of the Chief Executive. It places upon him a great responsibility, and no word shall fall from my lips which by any possibility could embarrass him in dealing with that note. I shall confine myself absolutely to the propositions of the recent address by the President to the Senate.

Mr. President, I have cherished an earnest hope that we might conclude the necessary business of Congress before the 4th of March and spare to ourselves and to the country the misfortune of another summer session. It is, therefore, with extreme reluctance that I venture to take any time in discussing a subject not immediately connected with the measures now demanding action if we are to avoid an extra session. I can find justification for doing so only in the extreme seriousness of the questions forced upon the attention of Congress by the President's address delivered in the Senate Chamber on Monday, the 22d of January. Moreover, the President was kind enough to say that he sought this opportunity to address us because he thought that he owed it to us, as the council associated with him in the final determination of our international obligations,

to disclose to us without reserve the thought and purpose which had been taking form in his mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

The President has thus recognized the duties imposed upon the Senate by the Constitution in regard to our foreign relations and has invited an expression of our opinions. We have abundant evidence of the gravity of the questions thus presented. The newspaper press and others, employing generous if inaccurate language, have decorated the speech with the adjective "epochal," which calls at once to mind the movement of glaciers and the vast tracts of geologic time. I shall content myself with a simpler word and say that the President's utterances in this Chamber, especially as he declared that he said what the people of the United States would wish him to say, and that he was setting forth the principles of mankind, are in a high degree important. I do not think that the failure on the part of the Senate to discuss the President's statements would imply either approval or disapproval or would by implication bind either the Senate or the country to any given course of action. But none the less it seems to me most desirable that, as we were chosen in this instance to be the medium of communication with foreign nations and with the people of the United States, we should at least give our own understanding of what the President proposed.

It is not necessary, of course, to say anything as to the many general and just observations made by the President in regard to the horrors and miseries of war, or the dangers and complications with which the present conflict threatens the United States, or as to his or our duty as

servants of humanity. Of course, we all agree most heartily with the proposition that peace — just and righteous peace — is infinitely better than war; that virtue is better than vice; that, in Browning's words: —

> "It 's wiser being good than bad;
> It 's safer being meek than fierce;
> It 's fitter being sane than mad."

In all these declarations we must be cordially and thoroughly of one mind. All that I desire to do is to speak briefly of the substantive propositions contained in the President's address and, by analysis, discover, if I can, to precisely what policies and course of action he is undertaking to commit the country. We have a right — indeed, it is our duty — to learn, if possible, just what the President means and whither he is trying to lead us. To attain this object we must, in his own language, "uncover the realities."

As I understand it, the President is aiming at two objects, both in the highest degree admirable — to bring to an end the war now raging in Europe, and to make provision for the future and permanent peace of the world. It is to the promotion of the second purpose that he proposes action on the part of the United States, saying that we should frankly formulate the conditions upon which this Government would feel justified in asking our people to approve its firm and solemn adherence to a league for peace. He then proceeds to state the two purposes in this way: —

> The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to

an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards, when it may be too late.

It will be observed that in this paragraph of his address the President says explicitly that the first condition precedent to any action for a league for peace must be the ending of the present war. He then declares that the treaties and agreements which bring the war to an end must create a peace which is worth guaranteeing and preserving. He says further that we shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but that they can never be lasting or permanent unless they meet with our approval. It seems to me that this is equivalent to saying that we are to have no voice in what the terms of the peace which ends the present war shall be, but that at the same time the terms must be what we approve or we shall not be able to enter into any future league to preserve the peace of the world. In other words, our action is to be conditioned upon the terms of a peace which we are to have no voice in determining. If the belligerents when they come to make peace do not make all the terms satisfactory to us, they cannot look to us to aid them in making that peace lasting and permanent. The President then goes on to lay down the general principles upon which the terms of the peace, in which we are to have no voice, shall be based if the peace thus obtained is to be a peace worth having.

In the first place, it must be a peace without victory.

It is not quite clear just what this means, unless it is intended to be a declaration in the interest of one group of belligerents who, having abandoned the original hope of complete victory, wish to make peace in the most advantageous way now open to them. This interpretation must be at once dismissed, for it is not to be supposed for a moment that this can be the President's object, because we all know how devoted he is to neutrality, — how it has been his belief from the beginning that it was the duty of the American people to be neutral even in their thoughts, — and he is, of course, well aware that it is as easy to be unneutral in forcing a peace favorable to one side as it is to help one side against the other while war is raging. Peace without victory can only mean, therefore, that neither side is to gain anything by the terms of peace through victory in the field, because if there are no victories on either side there can be neither gains nor losses in the final settlement except through the voluntary self-sacrifice and generosity of the combatants: in other words, all the lives have been given in this war and all the money spent in vain and Europe is to emerge from the conflict in exactly the same situation as when she entered it. It seems to me incredible that people who have made such awful sacrifices as have been made by the belligerents should be content to forego the prospect of victory, in the hope of bringing the war to an end, with everything left just as it was. In such a result they might well think that all their efforts and losses, all their miseries and sorrows and sacrifices were a criminal and hideous futility. Both sides have been inspired by the hope of victory; both sides are still so inspired. Some of the belligerents, at least, believe as I believe that the one object of the war is to win a victory which will assure a permanent peace and would regard a

reproduction of the old conditions, with all their menacing possibilities, as something far worse than war. They are determined that the dark peril which has overshadowed their own lives and threatened the independence and very existence of their own countries shall not be permitted to darken the future and be a curse to their children and their children's children. For this they are fighting and suffering and dying. Perhaps they ought not to think in this way; perhaps they ought to feel as the President does. But we must deal with things as they are; we must "uncover realities," and there is no doubt of the reality of the desire among many of the great nations of Europe to close this war with a victory which will give them a peace worth having, and not a mere breathing-space filled with the upbuilding of crushing armaments and then another and a worse war. Such, I think, is their point of view; but as a practical question for us, dealing with a condition on which we are to build a future league for peace to which we are to be a party, how are we going to provide that it shall be a peace without victory? How are we to arrange that there shall be no victories?

The President says that a peace won by victory would leave a bitter memory upon which peace terms could not rest permanently, but only as upon quicksand. There has been pretty constant fighting in this unhappy world ever since the time when history begins its records, and in speaking of lasting peace in terms of history we can only speak comparatively. I think, however, that I am not mistaken in saying that since the fall of the Roman Empire the longest period of general peace which Europe and the Western World have enjoyed was during the forty years following the battle of Waterloo. During that time there were, of course, a few small and unimportant wars, but

there was no great general conflict among great nations anywhere, and yet the peace of 1815 was a peace imposed upon France by the victorious allies if ever such a thing happened in the history of mankind. There was an attempt to settle that Napoleonic war by a treaty "without victory" and between equals. The treaty was signed at Amiens on March 27, 1802. This "peace without victory" lasted exactly thirteen months and nineteen days, and then war came again and continued for twelve years, and was ended by a peace through victory of the most absolute kind, and that peace has lasted between England and France for a hundred years and has never been broken. Our war with Spain ended with a peace based on the complete victory of the United States by land and sea. There is no reason to suppose that because it was a peace obtained by victory it is not a lasting peace. I might cite other examples, but one affirmative instance is enough to shatter a universal negative. As the Frenchman said, "No generalization is ever completely true, not even this one." It is a little hasty, therefore, to say that no peace can endure which is the fruit of victory. The peace which lasts is the peace which rests on justice and righteousness, and if it is a just and righteous peace it makes no difference whether it is based on the compromises and concessions of treaties or upon victories in the field. But I return to and repeat the main question before I leave this point. If peace without victory is to be a condition precedent of lasting peace to be maintained by the covenant in which we are to take part, how are we practically to compel or secure the existence of such a condition?

The next condition precedent stated by the President, without which we can have no peace that "can last or ought to last," is the universal acceptance of the idea that

governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. Must the fact that any given government rests on the consent of the governed be determined by a popular vote or by the general acceptance by the people of the existing form of government? Who is to decide whether the principle is recognized under the different governments of the world with whom we are to form the League for Peace "supported by the organized major force of mankind"? If the recognition of this principle is to be essential to the lasting peace which we are to support, — and every American, of course, believes in and admires the principle, — what is to be done about Korea, or Hindustan, or Alsace-Lorraine, or the Trentino, or the Slav Provinces of Austria, or the Danish Duchies? Does the government of Armenia by Turkey, with its organized massacres, rest on the consent of the governed, and if it does not are we to take steps to remedy it, or is Turkey to be excluded from the league, or is the league to coerce Turkey to an observance of our principles? As a preliminary of the peace which we are to help enforce must we insist that it cannot exist if there are any people under any government who have been handed from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property? I am not contesting the justice of the principle, — far from it, — but we may well ask how we are going to compel the adoption of that principle by other governments, and this is no idle question, but a real and practical one which cannot be evaded. If we enter upon this most desirable reform of other nations, there may be people sufficiently malevolent to ask whether we secured Louisiana by a vote of the people of that Territory, or California and other acquisitions from Mexico, or the Philippines,

or Porto Rico, or even Alaska, where there were Russian inhabitants who were handed over for a price, very much like property or as serfs *adscripti glebæ*.

The next condition precedent where I should like to "uncover the reality" is that to obtain a firm and lasting peace we must have "freedom of the seas." The President does not say whether it is the high seas or all seas. Let us assume that it is the high seas. The demand must apply either to time of war or time of peace, or both; but for many, many years there has been no interference with the freedom of the seas in time of peace. I think we may, therefore, assume again that the President's "freedom of the seas" must mean the freedom of the seas in time of war. Is the plan, then, to compel all nations to abandon the rights of belligerents to blockade a hostile port in time of war or to seize contraband going to their enemy? To attain this end we should have to begin by sweeping away all existing doctrines as to the rights of belligerents at sea in time of war — doctrines which were so widely extended in regard to contraband and blockade by the decisions of our own Supreme Court during our Civil War. These doctrines were established by us in the face of very general opposition and have been since accepted and acted upon by belligerents in other wars as the sound construction of international rights. We should therefore have to begin at once by tearing down the fabric of law on this point which we ourselves created and built up.

In the "Congressional Record" of January 26, 1917, on page 2376, there is a printed code prepared by a committee of the American Institute of International Law, which has been accepted by the Institute and is to be presented to the twenty-one American Republics. This code deals with the freedom of commerce, the rights and duties

of belligerents, and the rights and duties of neutrals in time of war. The committee was appointed to deal with this subject on the suggestion of Mr. Lansing, and this code is the result. I have no right to infer that this code represents what the President meant by the freedom of the seas in his recent address, but it embodies in concrete form some of the supposed cases which I have just suggested to the Senate. To state the propositions of the code fully — still more to discuss its details — would occupy hours, and I have only minutes to spare; but what Mr. Temple said when he presented it covers, in a general way, the general purposes of the code. Mr. Temple said: —

> The seas are already free in time of peace. The new code provides for the freedom of the seas in time of war. It abolishes blockade entirely, forbids interference with the mails, declares that merchant ships of the enemy, as well as those of neutrals, shall be free from capture, and abolishes the right of visit and search. Even vessels carrying contraband may in no case be confiscated or sunk under any pretext whatever, though the contraband itself may be confiscated or destroyed by the captor.

These are the radical changes which I have just been imagining as possible, and this code, if adopted, would sweep away practically all the most important belligerent rights at sea which have hitherto existed, as well as the doctrines which we extended and laid down during our Civil War by the decisions of our Supreme Court. I do not suppose that there is any idea of overthrowing and sweeping away international law, the work of centuries, in regard to belligerent rights at sea during the present war, which began with the old system fully recognized by the world and which could not now be altered, except by an entire breach of neutrality if attempted by neutrals. I assume that this new code is to take effect after the war.

There are only two comments which I desire to make upon it. One is that if it embodies the freedom of the seas spoken of by the President in general terms, it would require for its enforcement the navies of all nations who were parties to the league for peace, for, if belligerents engaged in war rested their rights on existing law and long-established usage, they could only be brought into obedience to the new code by force, and, as I have already said, we should then, as a party to the league, be obliged by force of arms to take our share in preventing the exercise of these long-established rights. The conference of neutrals provided for in the code would be looked to for its maintenance, and the occurrences of the present war do not give us much hope that such a conference would be very effective in future wars.

My other comment is this: There has been no violation of the rights of neutrals so glaring as the planting of contact mines on the high seas. That is a method of destruction without warrant of international law or of the customs and usages of nations. A contact mine is no respecter of persons. It is just as likely to destroy a perfectly innocent ship without contraband and on a perfectly innocent voyage as it is to destroy the warship of a belligerent. No worse attack upon the rights of neutrals could have been made than by this planting of contact mines on the high seas. So far as I am aware no neutral has protested against it, — certainly no neutral has protested effectively, — and I observe with some surprise that in all this long code for the protection of neutral rights upon the seas in time of war there is not one word said to prevent the planting of contact mines upon the high seas. If this code represents the President's conception of the freedom of the high seas, it is in this respect, at least, very imperfect.

It will also be observed that in this code it is provided that —

> In important cases the conference may authorize severe measures against the belligerent or against the neutrals refusing to respect the rights and duties of neutrality.
>
> Such measures may be public blame, pecuniary indemnity, commercial boycott, and even the use of international force, to be determined by the conference.

So that whether or not a league for peace is created, under the conference of neutrals proposed by this code we should be obliged to take very strong measures for the enforcement of neutral rights as agreed to by the conference, and at the bidding of the majority of the conference we should be forced into war in order to compel the belligerents to obey our rules. Therefore, this proposal does not differ in essence from the league for peace supported by the major force of mankind. Whether the cases which I have supposed or the new code suggested by the Institute represent the freedom of the seas, it would seem as if the enforcement of this new doctrine would surely involve us, and those nations which sign the covenant with us, in every war which might occur between maritime nations.

Closely allied with this proposition for the freedom of the seas, the President tells us, is the limitation of armaments and the coöperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas free and safe. This, as I have just pointed out, would involve the use of our navy in any war where the belligerents saw fit to exercise their long-established rights. The limitation of armaments, although not made by the President a condition precedent for lasting peace, is treated by him as of great importance and opens up some very difficult questions. If all naval armaments are to be

limited, or, still more, if they are to be abolished, the result would be to leave the nation having the largest mercantile marine in complete control of the seas if war occurred, because, if there were no naval ships, the nation which could arm and put afloat the greatest number of merchant vessels for naval purposes would, of course, be supreme in the absence of ships of war. Before entering upon the freedom of the seas, allied with the limitation of armaments, it would be well to consider whether the world would thereby be left under a system which, in time of war, would confer absolute power upon the nation possessing the largest mercantile marine.

It will also be necessary, for the firm and lasting peace which the league proposed by the President is to bring about, that every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and its powers be assured a direct outlet to the sea. The President confines this important right to the "great peoples," which does not seem to harmonize entirely with his earlier proposition, that there must be no difference, recognized or implied, between big nations and small, "between those which are powerful and those which are weak," or with the declaration that the equality of nations, upon which peace must be founded, must be an equality of rights. If the right of access to the sea is to be confined, as the President says, to "every great people," small nations are excluded. We have ample access to two great oceans, so that this proposed reform of the President has the enormous advantage of being wholly altruistic. It is entirely for the benefit of others.

Coming down to the practical question, in order that we may obtain lasting peace, are we to see to it that a direct right of way to Constantinople shall be secured to Russia that she may reach the Mediterranean, and to Germany

that she may have a direct route to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf? Must we see to it that if Italy regains the Trentino, Trieste shall be kept open so that Germany and Austria may have access to the Mediterranean, and are Servia and Switzerland to be deprived of the right of way giving them access to the sea because they are small? Are we to bring the doctrine into the American Hemisphere and provide that Bolivia and Paraguay shall have direct access to the sea? Are we to carry the doctrine to Asia and make sure that Afghanistan has a right of way to the sea, or is Afghanistan excluded as a small power? It seems to me that this plan for securing free access to the sea to all the great nations of Europe, and still more to the nations, both great and small, would involve us in some very difficult questions wholly outside our proper sphere of influence; and yet the President states this as one of the essentials for the lasting peace which we are to covenant to bring about and to enforce.

The President says that he proposes, as it were, that the nations with one accord should adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world. In the effort which I am making to "uncover the realities" which lie behind the President's propositions and to avoid "the soft concealments" to which he justly objects, I do not find it easy to determine precisely what is meant by making the doctrine of President Monroe the doctrine of the world. Let me begin by quoting the doctrine as stated by President Monroe. The Monroe Doctrine appears, as every one knows, in the President's annual message of December 2, 1823. It is found in two separate passages. The first is connected with the statement made by the President as to the proposition of the Russian Government to arrange by negotiation the respective rights of the two

nations upon the northwest coast of this continent. President Monroe then says: —

> In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

The second declaration of the doctrine occurs in connection with that portion of the message devoted to South America and to the purposes of the Holy Alliance, and is as follows: —

> We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfavorable disposition toward the United States.

John Quincy Adams, who formulated, and President Monroe, who proclaimed, the doctrine which rightly bears the latter's name, were eminent men of very large experience, both in public affairs at home and in diplomacy. They knew well the values of words. Mr. Adams was a scholar with a remarkable power of expression. No doubt they could both, if they had seen fit, have said something which meant nothing, for that is an art as old as language

itself. But it may be doubted if either was able or would have consented to say something which might mean anything. They were upright, straightforward men, and Mr. Monroe stated his famous doctrine in plain, unmistakable terms which he who ran might read. When we examine the message of 1823 it will be observed that the Monroe Doctrine is strictly local in its application; that is, it applies only to the American Hemisphere and is based on the theory that there are two spheres in the world which are entirely separate in their political interests. How are we to reframe the first portion of the Monroe Doctrine so as to give it a world-wide application? It asserts that the American continents are not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. How is this proposition to be turned into a world doctrine? If all the European powers accepted that doctrine and agreed with us that they would attempt no colonization here, we should have the recognition of the doctrine by European powers, but the doctrine would apply to the same territory as before. How are we to make it a world doctrine in any other way? How are we to turn into a world doctrine President Monroe's second statement that he should regard it as an unfriendly act if any European power interfered with the independence of any American Government? Is the transformation to be effected by having Europe and Asia and Africa adopt a doctrine that there shall be no colonies established by any power on any of those great continents, and that if, for example, any European power should establish a new colony somewhere in Africa, we should regard it as an unfriendly act? It has been suggested that the Monroe Doctrine would cover the protection of small nations. The Monroe Doctrine has nothing to do with the rights of small or great nations as

such. Its declared purpose was simply to protect the independence of all American States, great and small, from the interference of Europe and to prohibit European colonization. How can it be said that it concerns the rights of small States when Argentina and Brazil have taken control of Paraguay, when Chile has by force of arms annexed part of Peru, and when we took by conquest the larger part of Mexico, and no one, either at home or abroad, ever suggested that these acts constituted in any way an infraction of the Monroe Doctrine? The Monroe Doctrine defined our position and defined nobody else's position, and if we are to extend that doctrine to the other nations, the only sanction it could carry would be that we should regard European colonization in all continents as an unfriendly act. Or does the President's proposition mean that the Monroe Doctrine is to be extended to all the world and thereby be abandoned under the law laid down by John Fiske in regard to myths — that when we find a story of something which has happened everywhere, we may be quite sure that it never happened anywhere — so that if we have a Monroe Doctrine everywhere we may be perfectly certain that it will not exist anywhere? If we are to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, this no doubt is one way of doing it.

I have tried very briefly to set forth the conditions precedent which the President says are essential to a lasting peace. I have endeavored in a very general and imperfect way to "uncover the realities" and to get rid of all "soft concealments." Now, having clearly in our minds these conditions precedent, vital to the establishment of a lasting peace which we are to help bring about, I desire to consider the part which we are to take in maintaining it. Let me say at the outset by way of preface that it seems

to me unwise to entangle the question of what shall be done to make peace permanent after the conclusion of the present war with the peace which is to terminate this war. It confuses two wholly distinct questions, and is certainly injurious to the prospect of the success of any attempt to make the peace which comes at the end of this war permanent. It tends also to create ill-feeling toward the United States on one side or the other, and perhaps on both, and the influence of the United States in behalf of the future peace of the world will not be increased, but will, I fear, be sadly diminished if we endeavor, directly or indirectly, to meddle with the terms of the peace which shall conclude the present war, because in so doing we should inevitably take sides with one group of belligerents or with another.

Let us then now consider what has already been done in behalf of world peace and what it is proposed we shall do in the future, because that question has been forced upon us. All international associations or agreements for the promotion of the world's peace have hitherto been voluntary; that is, there has been no sanction behind the decisions of the international tribunals or behind the international agreements. If any signatory of the agreements or treaties, or any party to an arbitration, declined to be bound by a decision of the tribunal which had been created or by the provisions of an international convention, there was no means of compelling such signatory to abide by them, a fact which has been most dismally demonstrated since this war began.

The chief practical result of international associations for the promotion of peace has taken the form of arrangements for the arbitration of disputed questions. The subjects of these arbitrations have been limited and the sub-

mission of the nations to the international tribunals and their decisions has been purely voluntary. Much good has been obtained by voluntary arbitration. Many minor questions which a hundred years ago led to reprisals, and sometimes to war, have been removed from the region of armed hostilities and brought within the range of peaceable settlement. Voluntary arbitrations, which have gone on in steadily increasing number, and in the promotion of which the United States has played a large, creditable, and influential part, have now reached, as they were certain to do, their natural limits; that is, they have been made to include in practice all the questions which can at present be covered by voluntary arbitration. The efforts which have been made to carry voluntary arbitration beyond its proper sphere — like our recent treaties involving a year's delay and attempting to deal with the vital interests of nations — are useless but by no means harmless. They are, indeed, distinctly mischievous, because in time of stress and peril no nation would regard them, and a treaty which cannot be or will not be scrupulously fulfilled is infinitely worse than no treaty at all. No greater harm can be done to the cause of peace between the nations than to make treaties which will not be under all conditions scrupulously observed. The disregard of treaties is a most prolific cause of war. Nothing has done more to envenom feeling in the present war or to prolong it than the disregard of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and the further disregard of the Hague Conventions, for this has implanted in the minds of men the belief that treaties bring no settlement and are not worth the paper upon which they are written; that the only security of peace is to be found in the destruction of the enemy and in placing an opponent in a physical condition where he is unable to

renew war, because there is no assurance of safety in a duly ratified treaty.

If, then, voluntary arbitration and voluntary agreements, by convention or otherwise, without any sanction, have reached their limits, what is the next step? There is only one possible advance, and that is to put a sanction behind the decision of an international tribunal or behind an agreement of the nations; in other words, to create a power to enforce the decree of the international courts or the provisions of the international agreements. There is no other solution. I have given a great deal of thought to this question and I admit that at first it seemed to me that it might be possible to put force behind the world's peace. The peace and order of towns and cities, of states and nations, are all maintained by force. The force may not be displayed, — usually there is no necessity for doing so, — but order exists in our towns, in our cities, in our States, and in our Nation, and the decrees of our courts are enforced solely because of the existence of overwhelming force behind them. It is known for example that behind the decrees of the courts of the United States there is an irresistible force. If the peace of the world is to be maintained as the peace of a city or the internal peace of a nation is maintained, it must be maintained in the same way — by force. To make an agreement among the nations for the maintenance of peace, and leave it to each nation to decide whether its force should be used in a given case to prevent war between two or more other nations of the world, does not advance us at all; we are still under the voluntary system. There is no escape from the conclusion that if we are to go beyond purely voluntary arbitration and purely voluntary agreements, actual international force must be placed behind the decisions of the agreements. There is no half-

way house to stop at. The system must be either voluntary or there must be force behind the agreement or the decision. It makes no difference whether that force is expressed by armies and navies, or by economic coercion, as suggested by Sir Frederick Pollock. It is always force, and it is of little consequence whether the recalcitrant nation is brought to obedience by armed men and all the circumstance of war, or by commercial ruin, popular suffering, and perhaps starvation, inflicted by the major force of mankind under the direction of the League for Peace. It is ever and always force.

Every one must feel, as I do, the enormous importance of securing in some way the peace of the world and relieving the future of humanity from such awful struggles as that which is now going on in Europe, but if the only advance is to be made through the creation of an international force, we are brought face to face with the difficulties of that system. The President sees this clearly. He proposes that we should adhere to a league for peace and then says: —

> It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

Nothing could be plainer or more direct than that statement, and if we are to advance from the voluntary stage, it must be, as the President says, by a league for peace behind which is the organized major force of mankind. I fully agree with the President that if we are to have a league such as he describes and are to enforce peace, it

must be done in just the way he has stated. As a general proposition nothing could be more attractive for those who desire the peace of the world. I confess that when I first began to consider it some two years ago it presented great attractions to me, but the more I have thought about it the more serious the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment seem to be. This is a matter which cannot be determined by verbal adherence to a general principle. Everything here depends upon the details. In the first place, a league to enforce the peace of the world and create a major force of mankind to carry out the purposes of the league, must be made by treaty or convention among the nations agreeing. The agreement must be of the most solemn and binding kind. When disputes arise among nations, whether such nations are members of the league or not, those disputes must either be determined by an international tribunal created by the treaties agreed to by the members of the league, or they must be settled by representatives of the league after due consideration. So far all is simple. It is no new thing to create international tribunals or to make agreements as to methods to be employed in war, the rights of neutrals, and the many other subjects now covered by the voluntary Hague Conventions. The first difficulty comes when the league is confronted by the refusal of a nation involved in dispute with another nation to abide by the decision of the league when that decision has been rendered by an international tribunal, or in any other way. Submission to such a decision can only be compelled as submission to a decision of the court is compelled — by force; in this case the organized major force of mankind. If, therefore, a decision has been made in a dispute between nations by the tribunal and authority of the league, all the members of the league are bound

by their treaties to contribute their share toward the enforcement of the decision, and if a recalcitrant nation resists, it means war and the vindication of the power of the league which has the control of the major force of organized mankind. The authorities of the league would, of necessity, have the power to call on every member of the league to send out its quota to the forces of the league and the nations forming the league would find themselves, of necessity, involved in war.

The first question that would occur to any one of us is what the numbers of the league force will be. I will not venture a guess myself, but I will quote the opinion of Professor Albert Bushnell Hart, the distinguished historian, a close student and high authority on all American policies and a most friendly critic of the President's address. In a very interesting article in the "New York Times" of January 28, 1917, Professor Hart says: —

> He [the President] does incline toward the general plan which is pushed by the League to Enforce Peace. For, he says: "It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination, could face or withstand it."
>
> If that means anything definite, it means an international police force of not less than 5,000,000 men, in which the share of the United States would be at least 500,000.

There is the estimate of a dispassionate and competent observer. Will it not be worth while to pause a moment before we commit ourselves to an army of 500,000 men, to be held ready for war at the pleasure of other nations in whose councils we shall have but one vote if we are true to the President's policy of the equality of nations?

Arrangements would have to be made for the command

of the forces of the league, and the commander would have to be taken from some one of the signatory nations. The quotas or units of the international army and navy would have to be inspected at least annually. The inspectors would be of necessity officers of the league's army and navy. Are we ready to have our army and navy inspected and reported upon at regular intervals by the officers of foreign services? It may be said by those who wish to have the world's peace assured by force, without using force to do it, why conjure up these phantoms of unpleasant possibilities? My reply is that they are not phantoms, but simply the realities which it is our duty to uncover and upon which the whole scheme is founded. You cannot make effective a league for peace, "supported by the organized major force of mankind," by language or high-sounding phrases, which fall so agreeably upon the ear, when there is no thought behind it. The forces of the league must consist of an army and navy. They must have rifles and machine guns and cannon, battleships and battle-cruisers, submarines and aeroplanes, and all the terrific machinery of modern war. They cannot set that machinery in motion by "calling spirits from the vasty deep" like Glendower. They must have men of flesh and blood to man their ships and fight their guns, and these men must be officered and commanded. Then when they order these forces to move they can enforce peace, and they will do it by war, if necessary, in which each member of the league must bear its part. Representatives of the league would thus be vested with the authority to make war and to put the league forces under the control of some commander whom they should select.

If we are to adhere to the principle of the equality of nations laid down by the President, each nation, great and

small, having equality of rights, would have an equal voice in the decision of the league, and a majority would set the forces of the league in motion. It might happen that the majority would be composed of the smaller and weaker nations, who, if they are to have equality of rights, would thus be enabled to precipitate the greater nations into war, into a war, perhaps, with one of the greatest nations of the league. In the present state of human nature and public opinion is it probable that any nation will bind itself to go to war at the command of other nations and furnish its army and navy to be disposed of as the majority of the representatives of other nations may see fit? It seems to me that it is hardly possible, and yet in what other way can we come to the practical side of this question? In what other way are you to enforce the decisions of the league? If you undertake to limit the questions of disputes between nations which the league shall decide, you will not be able to go beyond the limits already imposed in voluntary arbitration and there will be no need of force. If a real advance is to be made, you must go beyond those limitations, you must agree to submit to the decision of the league questions which no nation will now admit to be arbitrable. You would be compelled, if a decree of the league were resisted, to go to war without any action on the part of Congress and wholly on the command of other nations. We are all anxious to promote peace in every possible way, but if we are to maintain the peace of the world by force it can only be maintained in the way I have described, and no amount of shouting about the blessings of peace will relieve us from the obligations or the necessities imposed by putting force behind the peace of the world as we put it behind the peace of a city.

Let us now consider this plan from our own point of

view alone and with reference solely to the United States. The policy of the United States hitherto has been the policy laid down by Washington, and its corollary expressed in the message of President Monroe. Washington declared that we had a set of interests separate from those of Europe and that European political questions did not concern us. Monroe declared that we had a set of questions which did not concern Europe, and that, as we did not meddle with Europe, Europe must not meddle with us. These doctrines were approved and stated with great force and explicitness by Jefferson. From the time of their enunciation these policies have been followed and adhered to by the United States. I have the greatest possible reverence for the precepts of Washington; no wiser, no more far-seeing man ever lived. I only wish that we had followed all his precepts as closely as we have that which he laid down as to our relations with Europe. But I have no superstition in regard to Washington's policy, nor do I think he had. He set forth his policy under conditions not unlike those which now exist, and he stated very explicitly that we should not involve ourselves in any way in the ordinary vicissitudes of European politics. I think he meant that we should hold ourselves aloof and that this should be our guiding rule. I am far from thinking that the man who won the Revolution largely through the alliance with France would have suggested that there could be no possible situation in which it might not be well for us to form an alliance with some other nation or nations. But that situation certainly has hitherto never arisen. The wisdom of Washington's policy, supplemented by that of Monroe, has been demonstrated by the experience of more than a century, and this at least must be said, that we should not depart from it without most powerful rea-

sons and without knowing exactly where that departure would lead. We are now invited to depart from it by giving our adherence to a league for peace when the present war closes, without knowing how far it is proposed to go or what is to be demanded of us. If an effective league for peace among the nations is to be made, it must be one backed by the force which the President has described. Are we prepared to commit ourselves to a purely general proposition without knowing where we are going or what is to be demanded of us, except that we shall be compelled to furnish our quota of military and naval forces to the service of a league in which we shall have but one voice? We are asked to place ourselves in a position where our military forces could be used for war by the decree of other nations. This would be a very momentous step. Surely we ought to pause and consider very carefully and know every detail before we commit ourselves to any vague, general propositions involving such serious results and responsibilities.

The first service which the United States can render to the cause of peace is to preserve its own. I do not mean within its own borders, but to preserve its peace with the other nations of the earth. This can be done in only one way — by the most absolute and scrupulous observance of every treaty or agreement that we enter into; by the termination of all treaties for arbitration, which we know well we should not under certain conditions and in time of stress regard, for no such war-breeding treaties ought to cumber the ground; and, lastly, by the establishment of such national defences, both by land and sea, as to insure our country, so far as it can be done, from wanton attack. When we have taken steps to insure our own peace and have national defences sufficient for that pur-

pose, the next step, if we are to become members of this league for peace, would be to put our national forces, or a portion of them, at the disposition of the league under conditions established by the terms of the treaty which creates the league. If we are not prepared to take these obligations; if we are not ready to submit questions which we consider of vital interest to the decision of the league; if we are not fully prepared to carry out all the obligations which a league for peace would necessarily require, we had better restrict ourselves to the voluntary arbitration, which we know can be carried out, until the people of the United States are ready to go further. A league for peace has a most encouraging sound, but this is altogether too grave a question to be satisfied with words. We must realize that a league for peace means putting force behind peace and making war on any nation which does not obey the decisions of the league. It may be that the world's peace can be secured in this manner, but we should not attempt it without a full appreciation of just what it involves. Effective leagues for peace cannot be sustained by language alone nor by moral suasion as their only weapons. I reiterate with all possible emphasis that when they pass beyond the present voluntary stage, they must be sustained by men and arms, and if we are ready to assume that responsibility, then we may proceed to take the necessary steps, but not otherwise.

Let me take two examples of questions which we must be prepared to face as members of a league for peace "supported by the major force of mankind." If, as I have already said, such a league is formed, it must deal with questions of vital interest and go beyond the limitations of voluntary agreements, for if it does not, there will be no advance on the present conditions. Assume that such

a league has been formed, with the powers which I have outlined. China and Japan, we will say, acting on the principles of the brotherhood of man which this league is to embody, come before the representatives of the league and demand for their people the right of free emigration to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which now practically exclude them. Suppose the league decides that the people of China and Japan ought not to be deprived of the right to migrate anywhere, and that Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, backed by England, decline to accept this decision. The league will then proceed to enforce its decision, and we shall find ourselves obliged to furnish our quota to a force which will compel the admission of Asiatic labor into Canada. Are we prepared to make war upon Canada in such a cause as this, our quota of the forces of the league perhaps being under the orders of a Japanese commander-in-chief? Let us turn the question the other way. Suppose the Asiatic powers demand the free admission of their labor to the United States, and we resist, and the decision of the league goes against us, are we going to accept it? Is it possible that any one who wishes to preserve our standards of life and labor can be drawn into a scheme, veiled by glittering and glancing generalities, which would take from us our sovereign right to decide alone and for ourselves the vital question of the exclusion of Mongolian and Asiatic labor? These are not fanciful cases drawn from the region of the imagination. They are actual, living questions of the utmost vitality and peril to-day. In them is involved that deepest of human instincts which seeks not only to prevent an impossible competition in labor, but to maintain the purity of the race. Are we prepared to make any agreement which would put us in such a position as that?

Before we give our adhesion to a league for peace, let us consider all these contingencies. The time will not be wasted which we give to such consideration.

I hear already the clamor of those who have been shrieking for peace at any price and denouncing all armaments, rising around us with the passionate demand that we shall immediately join a league for peace, about the details of which they neither know nor care, but which will compel the establishment of large naval and military forces and which may plunge us into war in any quarter of the globe at any moment at the bidding of other nations. Such is the magic of a word to those who are content with vocal sounds and ask only that the word they love be shouted with sufficient loudness. But they, too, if they persist, will meet the day when words are vain, when there is no help or shelter in language, and when they must face relentless, unforgiving realities. I know well the question which can be put to me, and probably will be put to me here and elsewhere: "Are you, then, unwilling to use the power and influence of the United States for the promotion of the permanent peace of the world?" Not at all; there is nothing that I have so much at heart. But I do not, in my eagerness to promote the permanent peace of the world, desire to involve this country in a scheme which may create a situation worse than that which now exists. Sometimes it is better to "bear the ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." There are measures which will promote peace and which are wholly practicable. The first and most important is the protection of our own peace against foreign attack. That can only be done by national defence, and we have no adequate national defence now. We have no means of repelling the invasion of a great power as it must be repelled,

and such weakness, combined with great wealth, constitutes an invitation and a temptation to war. Against that danger we should insure ourselves by adequate national defences, and by reducing the danger of war being forced upon us we to that extent promote the peace of mankind and we likewise put ourselves in a position where our influence and power in the world for the maintenance of general peace would be enormously increased. The next thing to which we ought to address ourselves on the conclusion of this war should be the rehabilitation and reëstablishment of international law. International law represents a great mass of customs and usages which have become law and which have been observed, cited, and referred to by the nations. International law has had an ever-increasing power in guiding and controlling the conduct of nations toward each other. The fact that it has been violated and disregarded in many instances during the present conflict is no reason for adopting the counsel of despair and saying that it is of no value and must be abandoned. It is of enormous value and should be restored and upbuilt on the conclusion of this war with all the energy and influence which we can bring to bear. We should try also, within the necessary and natural limits, to extend the use of voluntary arbitration, so far as possible, and create, as we can well do, a powerful public opinion behind the system and behind the maintenance of peace. We can also do much in urging a general reduction of armaments by all nations.

It may be said that these are but slight improvements and but moderate advances. This may all be true, but what I propose has at least this merit — it is not visionary, and I suggest nothing which is not practical and reasonable and which will not, within its limitations, do sub-

stantial good. If there is any way in which we can go further without creating a worse condition nobody will be more rejoiced than I; but I do not wish to plunge blindly forward, misled by phrases and generalities, into undertakings which threaten worse results than the imperfect conditions now existing. We are as a people altogether too prone to be satisfied with words; to believe that we advance the cause of peace or any good cause merely by shouting for it. When we approach such questions as are involved in our relations with the other nations of the earth and such a mighty issue as the maintenance of the world's peace, to be misled by words and to take words for deeds would be a fatal error. Whatever we decide to do, let us know precisely what we are doing and what we may reasonably expect.

As an example of what I mean, let me call your attention to the resolution offered by the Senator from Idaho. It meets with my full approval at the present time, for I now see in this tortured and distracted world nothing but peril in abandoning our long and well-established policies, which have behind them not only the authority of Washington and Jefferson and Adams and Monroe, but a long acceptance by the American people. Let it not be forgotten that if we pass that resolution we close the door for the time being, so far as the Senate is concerned, upon a proposition that we should join a league for peace backed by the organized major force of mankind. This resolution commits us without reserve to the policy, in regard to foreign nations, of Washington, Monroe, and Jefferson, whose statements are as clear as the unclouded sun at noonday, and are not collections of double-meaning words under which men can hide and say they mean anything or nothing. Let there be no mistake about what we are

doing in this direction. I would not have our action misunderstood there any more than I should wish to see a mistake made if resolutions were adopted in a sense to which I was opposed. There is no lurking-place for a league for peace "supported by the organized major force of mankind" in the sentences of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson set forth in the preamble to which the resolution of the Senator from Idaho declares our allegiance.

This war will end; the passions of mankind will die down; individual ambitions will vanish with the evanescent beings who cherish them; but the Republic and the American people will remain. Let us beware how we take any steps which may precipitate this country and the people who are to come after us, and whose inheritance it is, into dangers which no man can foresee. We cannot secure our own safety or build up the lasting peace of the world upon peace at any price. The peace of the world, to be enduring, must be based on righteousness at any cost.

XVI

ON THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 7, 1917

XVI

ON THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Resolved, That the Senate approves the action taken by the President as set forth in his address delivered before the joint session of the Congress, as above stated.

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, this resolution gives the approval of the Senate to the action taken by the President as set forth in his address delivered before the joint session of Congress. That action consisted of the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. The President then announced that he had handed to the German Ambassador his passports and had recalled our Ambassador from Berlin.

In my opinion, Mr. President, the President of the United States in taking that action did what was demanded by the honor, the safety, and the future security of the United States. But my personal opinion as to his action is of no consequence at this juncture. The Constitution of the United States has vested the President with the conduct of our foreign relations up to the point where war becomes the next step. Of his right under the Constitution to dismiss a foreign representative I have no question. The power which can alone receive must, in the necessity of things, be the power which must dismiss. In the exercise of his constitutional power, and with the high responsibility of his office resting upon him, the President has taken

this action. It has placed us in controversy and created a strained situation with a foreign nation.

Under these circumstances, so far as I am concerned, party lines vanish, and any criticism of the past or any criticism of the present is silenced for me. When my country is in controversy with a foreign nation I can see for myself but one duty, and that is to stand by and to support the recognized constitutional authority of the Government in our dealings with foreign nations.

I see no place here at this moment for the discussion of an embargo on munitions of war. I think the President was quite right in refusing to impose such an embargo if he desired to preserve neutrality. It seems to me also quite out of place to attempt to apportion blame or praise among other nations. This is not the time nor the place for the expression of sympathies for one side or the other in this great war. There is only one question before us, and that is our relations with one of the great powers of the earth at this moment.

The President has taken grave action. I feel it to be my duty, as I have said, to support him to the utmost of my power. He is the President of my country, the President of the United States. And, Mr. President, if, as we all pray, further difficulties are to be avoided and we are to be saved from war, in my poor judgment there is one step more important than any other, if we are to preserve our peace under existing conditions, and that is to show to the people of the country that we are without divisions at this moment; that we are thinking only of the United States and its representative in all international questions. If we exhibit divisions we exhibit weakness, and weakness is the temptation to those intolerable aggressions which would surely bring the war that we all seek honorably to avoid.

My earnest hope is that at this time personal feelings, political feelings, political enmities will all be laid aside, that we may remember only that we are citizens of a common country, that we are all Americans, and that our first duty is to stand together in this controversy, which has unhappily arisen with another nation, and let that nation and the world know that when the President speaks, as he has spoken, he has the Congress of the United States and the people of the United States, no matter what their race or origin, behind him in the one simple character of American citizens.

XVII

THE FAILURE OF THE EXECUTIVE TO VINDICATE AMERICAN RIGHTS

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 24, 1917

XVII

THE FAILURE OF THE EXECUTIVE TO VINDICATE AMERICAN RIGHTS

Mr. Lodge. Mr. President, I have consumed no time in the discussion of this revenue bill, and I should not take the time of the Senate now were it not for some of the things which have been said by the Senator from Mississippi.

I am surprised, Mr. President, that the Senator from Mississippi — who, as we all know, is one of the most brilliant debaters and speakers who has been in Congress in the thirty years that I have been here — should not yet have learned how to be severe and parliamentary at the same time. He began with charging that we were in a conspiracy over here with the Senator from Washington [Mr. Poindexter], who made a speech this morning in regard to the postmaster amendment to the legislative bill. There was no such conspiracy by anybody. I had no more idea that the Senator from Washington was going to discuss the postmaster amendment this morning than I had that the Senator from Mississippi was going to speak, and I do not believe that anybody else had. The Senator from Washington discussed a subject which he regards as of great importance, as he had a right to do. He referred to the promotion of Dr. Grayson. I think it would have been just as well if the Senator from Mississippi had passed this subject by, for that appears to be a principal element in the presidential conception of national preparation.

MR. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

MR. LODGE. One moment, Mr. President.

MR. WILLIAMS. Will the Senator from Massachusetts pardon an interruption not over two minutes long?

MR. LODGE. No, Mr. President; I have not interrupted the Senator while he was in order.

MR. WILLIAMS. I just wanted to say that if the Senator thought I had passed by Dr. Grayson's claims because I thought he was not worthy in every way, he was mistaken.

MR. LODGE. I made no such suggestion, Mr. President. I repeat that it is a matter of high importance when an officer in the Navy, of no special distinction in any way, is promoted one hundred and twenty-four numbers, by far the greatest promotion ever given to a naval officer, greater than Farragut ever received or Dewey or Decatur, and this, too, when the country may be on the eve of war. That has not been done by Congress, but by the Executive. It is a serious, a most serious, matter. It discourages every man in the Navy. It spoils the spirit of the men there when such a thing is done. I have no earthly hostility, personally or otherwise, to the gentleman in question, but it is ruinous to the service to have such favoritism shown. It becomes a matter of grave importance when in the presence of war such favoritism as this is employed.

Mr. President, I am not going to touch on anything so miserable as the words of the Senator from Mississippi, which I suggested were out of order. It would be very easy, if I wished to embark in such discussion, to call attention to some of the large subscribers to the Democratic campaign fund and compare with their contributions the profit they made on the stock market when somebody told what somebody ought not to have told about the peace

note. I shall confine myself, Mr. President, to saying a word for Congress and for some of us here. I am by no means a eulogist of the great body, of which I have been so long a Member, in either branch, but at this time Congress is not to blame. Congress has given all that has been asked by the Executive with lavish hand. Speaking only for myself, when the resolution approving the President's break with Germany came here I not only voted for it, I supported it in a few words, and I implored the support of everybody else, because I said there must be no division shown among Americans. I have just helped to prepare a bill in which we have given the President $115,000,000 to be spent in expediting the building of ships and in procuring all the ships that can be quickly built and quickly bought if war comes. I shall refuse him no authority and no money that is needed for the defence of the United States. But I am not ready on that account to stand by and accept every kind of extension of presidential power relating, not to war, but to peace. There is a persistent attempt going on to efface the powers of Congress. It is not merely the President, it is not merely the Cabinet officers, every commissioner, every head of a bureau, every jack in office dressed in a little brief authority is coming up here trying to take from the Congress of the United States the powers that belong to it.

I will support the President to the utmost, I care not what party he belongs to or what my opposition to him may be, whenever he is standing for his country against a foreign nation; but I am not on that account to be led, for example, into giving my assent to an objectionable treaty under the blackmail of a threat of war. I am not going to give my assent to every kind of request that is made by any bureau or commission. Those are different things.

The Republican Party has stood here and voted for great appropriations, voted to give the President authority, backed him up on his break with Germany, and the division and the reluctance are not found in Congress. The Senator from Mississippi has talked about Nero fiddling when Rome was burning. If our Rome is burning, let me recall to the Senate and to the country that when Nero fiddled it was on the Palatine Hill, the fiddling was not done on the Capitoline Hill or in the Senate, and it is not being done here now.

The Senator talks about our ships. Yes; they are blockaded — some of them. You cannot walk into a hardware shop and buy six-inch guns. The Government has the guns. Why do they not let the merchantmen arm, as set forth in their own regulations and in accordance with international law? There are plenty of American gunners who have been in the Navy who will volunteer in a moment to go on those ships. What is stopping them? Not Congress. What the Senator from Mississippi said was true about the old ships, the ships that went out from New England and from Baltimore. What arms did they have to carry? Muskets and brass guns called the "long Toms." You could buy them anywhere. You cannot buy four- and six-inch rifles anywhere. There is really only one person who has them and that is the Government of the United States. The Government has them ready and Congress gave last year $1,600,000 to make guns for our merchant auxiliaries and for no other purpose. They have been making them for a year with that specific object, and we have $5,000,000 more in this bill for the same purpose.

Why do the ships not have the guns? It is not Congress. Congress alone cannot give them the guns. We

have no executive power. If the Executive lacks authority, let him come to Congress and get it.

Mr. President, the blame has been laid heavily on Congress about our wasting time and talking about trivial things. The American Ambassador in Berlin was held there for an entire week. The State Department could not communicate with him and he could not communicate with them. He was shut in until he got over to Switzerland before he could communicate with his own Government. Not one word was said. Congress could not say it. This morning it is stated in the newspapers, I know not how truly, that he said that he has not got safe conduct and he warns Americans not to go on the ship which carries him because he is afraid it may be destroyed. Can Congress send a battleship to bring its own Ambassador home? No; but the Navy Department can. That is not an act of war. Can we not even protect our own Ambassador? We have had the wives of our Consuls within two weeks stripped and acid applied to see whether they had invisible writing on their skins and there was nothing done. Is that the fault of Congress? No protest was made, no word uttered.

Mr. President, I am loath to say these things, but when the charge is made here that Congress is to blame, that Congress is promoting division, and because a Senator chooses to make a speech which he had a perfect right to make on a matter of importance, that we are engaged in a conspiracy, I resent it. The Senator from Washington had a right to make his speech if he chose to make it. The subject is of importance, but no Senator has a right to charge that there is a conspiracy in any such thing as that.

Mr. President, if the President acts he will have the

country and the Congress behind him as he did when the break came with Germany; but when he hesitates and disputes and discusses and lets things go by, the feeling of the country is chilled and you are bound to have differences among the people; you are bound to have distrust in Congress; you are bound to have the feeling arise that no matter what your views may be as to war or peace, it is safer and better for the country that the Congress of the United States should remain in session.

XVIII

WAR WITH GERMANY

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR WITH GERMANY, APRIL 4, 1917

XVIII

WAR WITH GERMANY

No one is more conscious than I that this is a moment for action and not for debate. But, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and having taken part in framing this resolution, I wish briefly to state why I support it with the greatest earnestness of which I am capable.

The most momentous power entrusted to Congress by the Constitution is the authority to declare war, and never has Congress been called to a more solemn exercise of this great function than at this moment. We have submitted to wrongs and outrages from the Central Powers of Europe — wrongs which involve not only injury to property, but the destruction of American lives — with a long patience. We have borne and forborne to the very limit of endurance. Now the inevitable end is here and we are about to declare war against Germany.

Speaking for myself and, I hope, for my associates generally on this side of the Chamber, I desire to say that in this crisis, and when the country is at war, party lines will disappear, and this disappearance of the party line will, I am confident, not be confined to the minority. Both Democrats and Republicans must forget party in the presence of the common danger. This is not, and cannot be, a party war. It is a war in which all Americans must be united, and no one must ask a loyal citizen, high or low,

who seeks to serve his country in the field or in civil life to what party he belongs, any more than it would be possible to ask his religion or his race. As Americans we shall all, I am sure, be prepared to give to the Executive money, men, and all the necessary powers for waging war with energy and driving it forward to a successful conclusion. The President has made recommendations as to the action which he hopes Congress will take, with which I for one am in most thorough accord.

We have only a very small army and we must proceed at once and as rapidly as possible to build up a large one fit to defend the country in any emergency. We must provide for the future and for the supply of men for the Army by a system of universal military training. I agree with the President that this new army should be chosen upon the "principle of universal liability to service." Our Navy is strong in certain branches and very weak in others. It must be our business to supply the deficiencies as rapidly as possible. Fortunately those deficiencies are, as a rule, of the kind which can be most quickly supplied. It is our duty to see to it that all the money and all the legislation necessary for both the Army and the Navy are given at once.

The President has said that war

> will involve the utmost practicable coöperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany and, as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs.

I am not only in full agreement with this policy advised by the President, but it seems to me that nothing is more important than to follow it out. I am as thorough a believer as ever in the general policy laid down by Wash-

ington when he advised the people of the United States not to enter into permanent alliances; but the man who won the American Revolution through the alliance with France would have been the last to lay down a hard-and-fast rule that under no circumstances and for no purposes were we ever to ally ourselves with other nations. He covers this point completely in the Farewell Address, where he says: —

> Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Farseeing and wise, he knew very well that dangers might come which would make a temporary alliance or agreement with foreign nations imperative. That time has arrived. It would be madness for us to attempt to make war alone upon Germany, and find ourselves, perhaps, at the end left isolated, at war with that power, when all the other nations had made peace, because we had not associated ourselves with them. The Allies of the Entente, as they are called, are fighting a common foe, and their foe is now ours. We cannot send a great army across the ocean, for we have no army to send. Yet I should be glad for one if we could send ten thousand men of our regular troops, so that the flag of the United States might at least be unfurled in the fields of France. I believe that the mere sight of our flag in that region made so desolate by war would stimulate the courage and help the success of those who have the same aim that we have and who seek the same victory. We can also help the Allies, as the President recommends, with large credits and with those supplies which we can furnish and which they lack. We cannot do more in any direction to bring this war to a

speedy end than to give those credits and furnish those supplies.

The President has told us that German spies

> were here even before the war began, and it is, unhappily, not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial German Government accredited to the Government of the United States.

I believe myself that the overwhelming mass of our citizens of German descent are just as loyal to the United States as any citizens could possibly be. But there is this class of agents of the Imperial German Government who are ready to engage in plots and crimes to the injury of the people of this country. "Disloyalty," if I may again borrow the words of the President, "must be put down with a firm hand."

The purpose of the German submarine campaign is the absolute destruction of the world's mercantile tonnage, something wholly new in warfare. In the old days, in previous wars, the ships of warring nations were captured, frequently in large numbers, as was the case when our privateers ranged the English Channel in the War of 1812. But it must not be forgotten that, with few exceptions, these vessels, when captured, were sent into port, condemned as prizes, and again put afloat. The total tonnage of the world was not materially reduced. But the German submarine war, ruthlessly carried on, is directed toward the complete destruction of the tonnage of the whole world. Forced into war, as we now are, our first action should be to repair in some measure this loss to our

own tonnage and to that of the world by seizing the ships of Germany now in our ports and putting that additional tonnage into the world's service.

Mr. President, we have never been a military nation; we are not prepared for war in the modern sense; but we have vast resources and unbounded energies, and the day when war is declared we should devote ourselves to calling out those resources and organizing those energies so that they can be used with the utmost effect in hastening the complete victory. The worst of all wars is a feeble war. War is too awful to be entered upon half-heartedly. If we fight at all, we must fight for all we are worth. It must be no weak, hesitating war. The most merciful war is that which is most vigorously waged and which comes most quickly to an end.

Mr. President, no one feels the horrors of war more than I. It is with no light heart, but with profound sadness, although with hope and courage, that I see my country compelled to enter the great field of conflict. But there are, in my opinion, some things worse for a nation than war. National degeneracy is worse; national cowardice is worse. The division of our people into race groups, striving to direct the course of the United States in the interest of some other country when we should have but one allegiance, one hope, and one tradition, is far worse. All these dangers have been gathering about us and darkening the horizon during the last three years. Whatever suffering and misery war may bring, it will at least sweep these foul things away. Instead of division into race groups, it will unify us into one nation, and national degeneracy and national cowardice will slink back into the darkness from which they should never have emerged.

I also believe that on our entrance into this war, under

the conditions which it has assumed, our future peace, our independence as a proud and high-spirited nation, our very security, are at stake. There is no other way, as I see it, except by war, to save these things without which national existence is a mockery and a sham. But there is a still higher purpose here as I look upon it. The President has said with great justice that Germany is making war upon all nations. We do not enter upon this war to secure victory for one nation as against another. We enter this war to unite with those who are fighting the common foe in order to preserve human freedom, democracy, and modern civilization. They are all in grievous peril; they are all threatened. This war is a war, as I see it, against barbarism; not the anarchical barbarism of what are known as the Dark Ages, but organized barbarism panoplied in all the devices for the destruction of human life which science, beneficent science, can bring forth. We are resisting an effort to thrust mankind back to forms of government, to political creeds and methods of conquest which we had hoped had disappeared forever from the world. We are fighting against a nation which, in the fashion of centuries ago, drags the inhabitants of conquered lands into slavery; which carries off women and girls for even worse purposes; which in its mad desire to conquer mankind and trample them under foot has stopped at no wrong, has regarded no treaty. The work that we are called upon to do when we enter this war is to preserve the principles of human liberty, the principles of democracy, and the light of modern civilization; all that we most love, all that we hold dearer than life itself, is at stake. In such a battle we cannot fail to win. I am glad that my country is to share in this preservation of human freedom. I wish to see my country gathered with the other nations who are fight-

ing for the same end when the time for peace comes. We seek no conquests, we desire no territory and no new dominions. We wish simply to preserve our own peace and our own security, to uphold the great doctrine which guards the American hemisphere, and to see the disappearance of all wars or rumors of wars from the East, if any dangers there exist. What we want most of all by this victory which we shall help to win is to secure the world's peace, broad-based on freedom and democracy, a world not controlled by a Prussian military autocracy, by Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs, but by the will of the free people of the earth. We shall achieve this result, and when we achieve it, we shall be able to say that we have helped to confer great blessings upon mankind, and that we have not fought in vain.

THE END

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